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Dutch summary
De vier studies die gepresenteerd worden in dit doctoraal proefschrift, zijn allen gericht op
de identificatie van succesfactoren in de transities van jongeren op school en op de arbeids-
markt. Voor elk van deze studies werd gebruik gemaakt van Vlaamse data. Enerzijds werd
de SONAR-databank, longitudinale data als resultaat van een representatieve bevraging van
drie geboortecohorten, verder ontgonnen. Anderzijds werd data verzameld door het opzetten
van een veldexperiment in de Vlaamse arbeidsmarkt.
In een eerste studie delen we de waargenomen verschillen tussen autochtone en allochtone
jongeren in school- en arbeidsmarktuitkomsten op in (i) een stuk dat verklaard kan wor-
den door sociaal-economische kenmerken (zoals het onderwijsniveau van de ouders) en (ii) een
resterend “zuiver etnisch verschil” (veroorzaakt door bijvoorbeeld discriminatie en etnische ver-
schillen in voorkeuren en verwachtingen). We bouwen daartoe een dynamisch discretekeuze-
model waarin we de opeenvolging van schooluitkomsten en eerste arbeidsmarktuitkomsten
verklaren. Onze bijdrage tot de literatuur ligt erin te focussen op (i) de vertraging waarmee
schooluitkomsten gerealiseerd worden, (ii) de identificatie van de specifieke momenten waarop
zuiver etnische verschillen opduiken, (iii) het afzonderlijke belang van het slagen voor een
schooljaar en de beslissing om verder te studeren nadien en (iv) het belang van de taal die
in het ouderlijke huis wordt gesproken. We vinden enerzijds, en in lijn met de literatuur,
dat het zuiver etnische verschil in schooluitkomsten klein is wanneer geen rekening wordt
gehouden met de schoolvertraging waarmee deze gerealiseerd worden. Anderzijds is het zuiver
etnische verschil substantieel eens op schoolvertraging en op eerste arbeidsmarktuitkomsten
wordt gefocust. Wat de rol van het gebruik van Nederlands in het ouderlijke huis betreft, vin-
den we enkel een significante rol in de overgang van school naar werk voor laaggeschoolden.
In een tweede studie gaan we dieper in op één van de achterliggende mechanismen van het
zuiver etnische verschil in eerste arbeidsmarktuitkomsten: discriminatie. We bekijken em-
pirisch of aanwervingsdiscriminatie de overgang van school naar werk voor Turkse jongeren in
Vlaanderen beïnvloedt. We dragen in deze tweede studie bij tot de internationale economis-
che literatuur door, als eersten, de theoretische relatie tussen aanwervingsdiscriminatie en
ix
xarbeidsmarktkrapte te testen. Daartoe voeren we een correspondentietest uit op de Vlaamse
arbeidsmarkt: fictieve sollicitaties, afwisselend gekoppeld aan een Vlaamse en Turkse naam,
worden verzonden naar bestaande vacatures voor schoolverlaters. De resultaten bevestigen
de theoretische verwachtingen. Enerzijds vinden we dat, in vergelijking met hun autochtone
tegenhangers, Turkse kandidaten even vaak uitgenodigd worden voor een jobgesprek wan-
neer zij solliciteren voor jobs waarvoor de arbeidsmarktkrapte hoog is. Anderzijds dienen
deze Turkse kandidaten dubbel zoveel sollicitaties uit te voeren om even vaak uitgenodigd
te worden voor een jobgesprek als autochtone kandidaten wanneer zij solliciteren voor banen
waarvoor de vacatures makkelijk in te vullen zijn.
Een derde studie is gericht op de korte- en langetermijneffecten van overzitten op verdere
schooluitkomsten. Via een dynamisch discretekeuzemodel verklaren we de opeenvolgende
schoolresultaten en schoolbeslissingen van jongeren tijdens het secundair onderwijs. We
houden daarbij rekening met de typische “watervalkenmerken” van het Vlaams onderwijs door
ook de transities tussen studierichtingen te modelleren. Bovendien wordt statistisch gecon-
troleerd voor kenmerken die niet waarneembaar zijn vanuit het standpunt van de onderzoeker.
In contrast met eerdere bijdragen vinden we dat overzitten een positief effect heeft op de
slaagkansen voor het volgende schooljaar. Op langere termijn is het effect heterogeen: terwijl
meer getalenteerde studenten een eerder negatief langetermijneffect ondervinden van overzit-
ten, kunnen minder getalenteerde studenten een blijvend voordeel hebben.
In een vierde studie, ten slotte, bestuderen we of werkloze schoolverlaters hun overgang naar
een adequate job kunnen versnellen door een baan te aanvaarden onder hun scholingsniveau.
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, passen we de “Timing of Events”-methode toe.
De timing van het instromen in een job waarin men overschoold is, wordt daarbij gebruikt
om het oorzakelijke effect te identificeren van het aanvaarden van deze job op de duurtijd tot
een adequate job. We vinden dat overscholing veeleer een val is waarin men blijft vastzitten
dan een springplank naar een adequate job. In concreto wijzen onze onderzoeksresultaten uit
dat jongeren die een job aanvaarden waarin zij overschoold zijn (in plaats van enkel adequate
jobs te aanvaarden) de snelheid van hun overgang naar adequate arbeid verlaagd zien met 51
–98%. Hoe vroeger overscholing wordt aanvaard, hoe negatiever het effect.
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1
General Introduction
The future will tell which name will be given to the deep economic crisis that coincided the
years of this doctoral research. Candidates indicating its severity are “the Great Recession” and
“the Long Recession”. This crisis developed from a liquidity crisis in the financial markets into
a global economic and sovereign debt crisis. The last years it also turned into a labour market
crisis. Figure 1.1 describes the evolution of the unemployment rate in the EU-27 according to
the ILO definition. While at the start of the crisis in 2008 the prime age adult (aged between
25 and 54 years) unemployment rate in the European Union attained just 6.1%, it has been
rising from then onwards reaching 9.5% in 2012. This evolution is even more alarming among
youth (under 25 years old): the youth unemployment rate grew from 15.6% in 2008 to 22.8%
in 2012. Clearly, young people bear much of the brunt of the current economic crisis. Their
higher incidence of unemployment at the start of the career is particularly worrisome, since it
can induce long-lasting scars on the subsequent career development, a mechanism on which
we elaborate further during the following chapters. The risks posed by a “scarred” generation
have motivated many governments to take action, notably by scaling up funds for youth labour
market programmes. Recently the European Commission launched the Youth Guarantee, a
for the period 2014–2020 6 million euro worth action to help EU countries get young people
into employment, further education or (re)training within four months of leaving school.
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2 Chapter 1. General Introduction
Figure 1.1: Unemployment rate in the EU-27 (2003-2012)
Source: Eurostat.
In order to develop adequate policy actions to fight youth unemployment in Europe and
elsewhere, there is need for identifying success factors in first labour market transitions. In
addition, since labour market success is closely related to school achievement,1 success in the
former cannot be independent from success in the latter. In the following four chapters of this
thesis we present studies on three factors that influence success in school and in the transition
from school to work: (i) ethnicity, (ii) school retention and (iii) overeducation2 at the start of
the career.
Chapter 2 is motivated by the fact that in Belgium, as in many other countries, school and
labour market transitions are much more successful for native youth than for ethnic minority
youth. The question is whether policy action targeted at the latter youth is the right response.
It is if the observed gaps are induced by pure ethnic differences in preferences and expectations
or by discrimination. However, if these gaps just mirror different family endowments that
result in different levels of educational attainment and therefore in different labour market
performances, then no specific measures for minority youth are required to eliminate these
gaps. Therefore, in Chapter 2 the observed gaps in educational attainment and first labour
1While the youth unemployment among individuals without a secondary education degree was 30.3%, it
was “only” 20.0% (17.9%) among the ones with only a secondary (tertiary) education degree (source: Eurostat).
2A worker is considered to be overeducated if her/his education level is higher than the level that is typically
required to perform adequately (McGuinness, 2006).
3market outcomes between native and immigrant youth in Flanders3 are decomposed into (i)
differences in observed family endowments and (ii) a residual “pure ethnic gap”. This study
innovates by explicitly taking delays in educational attainment into account, by identifying
the moments at which the pure ethnic gaps arise, by disentangling the decision to continue
schooling at the end of a school year from the achievement within a particular grade and by
integrating the language spoken at home among the observed family endowments. In line with
the literature, the pure ethnic gap in educational attainment is found to be small if educational
delays are neglected. However, this pure ethnic gap is substantial if these delays are taken
into account and for school-to-work transitions.
In order to test whether the pure ethnic gap in the transition from school to work, as
outlined in Chapter 2, reflects discrimination in the hiring process, in Chapter 3 the results
of a field experiment on unequal treatment based on ethnic origin are reported. This chapter
contributes to the international economic literature in being the first to test the theoretical
relationship between hiring discrimination and labour market tightness in an empirical way.
To this end we sent out fictitious job applications of school-leavers, randomly assigned to
individuals with a native and a Turkish sounding name, to vacancies for jobs requiring no work
experience in Flanders. Classifying these jobs on two measures of labour market tightness,
we verify to what extent our measure of discrimination, the differential callback rate, differs
between types of jobs. In line with theoretical expectations, we find that, compared to natives,
candidates with a Turkish sounding name are equally often invited to a job interview if they
apply for occupations for which vacancies are difficult to fill, but they have to send twice as
many applications for occupations for which labour market tightness is low. Our findings are
robust against various sensitivity checks.
Grade retention is used in many countries as a tool to improve poor academic performances.
The hypothesis is that, by resitting the same grade, low-achieving students have extra time to
catch up to the grade-level requirements, in terms both of knowledge and emotional maturity.
Moreover, the threat of retention might be an incentive device to work harder. However, reten-
tion might generate personal and academic costs with both short- and long-term effects. Most
former empirical contributions on the effects of grade retention conclude that grade retention
has a negative effect on subsequent performances. In Chapter 4, we add to the literature on
short- and long-term effects of grade retention controlling for school track mobility. We model
schooling attainment and track choices by means of a dynamic qualitative choice model which
flexibly takes into account the presence of unobserved characteristics jointly determining the
educational choices and performances. In this model, we allow the effect of past retention
3Flanders is the Northern and Dutch speaking region of Belgium.
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episodes to vary across different levels of the unobserved determinants. By doing so we find
that grade retention has a positive impact on the next evaluation and can permanently affect
subsequent educational achievements. The direction of the permanent effect is heterogeneous:
while more able students are permanently penalised by retention, less able students benefit
from it.
Numerous studies have shown that many young workers are overeducated at the start
of their career. Given that overeducated workers have lower earnings and job satisfaction,
one might wonder why young job seekers actually accept jobs with requirements below their
educational attainment. One potential answer is given by the career mobility theory. This
theory states that overeducation is an investment in work experience which enhances pro-
motion opportunities to higher level positions inside or outside the firm. In Chapter 5 we
test this hypothesis. More concretely, we are the first to investigate whether graduates who
accept a job below their level of education accelerate or delay the transition into a first job
that matches their level of education. Contrary to many other contributions on the long-term
effects of accepting an overeducated job at the start of the career, we handle selection (into
overeducated and adequate employment) on both observables and unobservables. For this,
we apply the Timing of Events approach. The research results show that overeducation is a
trap. By accepting a job for which one is overeducated rather than only accepting adequate
job matches, monthly transition rates into adequate employment fall by 51–98%, depending
on the elapsed unemployment duration.
All studies presented in this PhD thesis are based on Flemish data. For Chapter 2, Chapter
4 and Chapter 5 we further explore the SONAR data. These data are based on a representative
longitudinal survey conducted in Flanders on 9,000 individuals of the 1976, 1978 and 1980
cohorts and aimed at studying the transition from school to work. The SONAR data contain
detailed information regarding both school and labour market careers, which makes them very
suitable for investigating success factors in transitions in youth. Also the experimental data
on which the analyses reported in Chapter 3 are based we gathered in Flanders. This means
that our research results and derived policy recommendations are particularly relevant for the
Flemish region. However, also policy makers outside Flanders may take an interest in our
results. First, the causal mechanisms we identify are also relevant for other countries. There
is no reason to believe that, for instance, the relation between labour market discrimination
and labour market tightness we identify in Chapter 3 or the trap effect of accepting a job
in which one is overeducated we identify in Chapter 5, would be specific to the Flemish
context. Moreover, the results on pure ethnic gaps in school and in the labour market in
Chapter 2 complement those of similar studies in the US, France and Denmark. Furthermore,
5although in Chapter 4 we integrate the particular features of the Flemish schooling system
in our econometric model, we believe that the results based on this model are relevant for all
countries adopting grade retention.4 Second, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, we are the first to
empirically test two economic theories that are widespread both among academics and policy
makers. Third, the methodological workhorses we employ in the studies of this thesis can be
replicated by (policy) researchers inside and outside Flanders to answer the policy questions
they are interested in.
The four chapters in this thesis are completely self-contained5 and can thereby be read in
any order. However, although these studies focus on completely different key determinants
of transitions in youth and follow different methodologies, there is bilateral cohesion between
particular chapters in different respects both in terms of content and in terms of methodology.
As regards content, two links are worth highlighting here. First, and as mentioned before, the
study presented in Chapter 3 is motivated by the results of the one presented in Chapter 2.
Second, the research results of both Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 stress the importance of grade
retention in school. In Chapter 2 the number of years of grade retention at a particular level
of education is an important outcome in which ethnic groups, even after controlling for family
endowments, differ. In the latter chapter grade retention is investigated as a key (short- and
long-term) determinant of later education outcomes.
From a methodological point of view, all studies in this thesis focus on (and contribute
to the literature by) solving selection problems. Based on survey or administrative data,
individuals who are identical in observable characteristics may differ in characteristics that
are unobservable to the researcher (for instance motivation and preference for leisure) but
affect the outcomes of interest. In Chapter 3 we control all the employers’ decision making
information by our experimental design so that selection on unobservable characteristics is not
an issue. In Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we use non-experimental statistical methods
to account for “selection on unobservables”. In particular, we solve for a dynamic selection
problem in education in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. This problem is brought about by the
progressively growing negative correlation between observed endowments (such as parental
educational attainment) and unobserved endowments because pupils with adverse observed
endowments pass the final evaluation at the end of a particular grade and continue schooling
4Grade retention is possible in most European countries. Data from the 2009 PISA survey show that the
lowest retention rates (less than 3%) are found in Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Iceland and Finland. The
highest rates (more than 30%) are found in Spain, France, Luxembourg and Portugal (OECD, 2011).
5Since according to the current international quality standards a PhD aims at demonstrating that the
candidate can conduct research at a level of that is published in international peer reviewed journals, a PhD
thesis nowadays consists more and more of a collection of self-contained articles. At the moment this PhD
thesis went to print, Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 were accepted for publication in, respectively, the Economics of
Education Review and Labour Economics.
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only if their unobserved endowments are sufficiently favourable. This biases the coefficients of
the observed endowments downwards, and more so as one proceeds to higher grades. To that
end we model subsequent schooling outcomes from the start of primary school (Chapter 2) or
from the start of secondary school (Chapter 4), explicitly accounting for the initial conditions
problem.
Besides the highlighted links between the chapters of this PhD thesis, the careful reader
might spot that while in Chapter 4 we argue that the modelling of educational tracks in
(secondary) education (and therefore of horizontal transitions within a school year) is impor-
tant when investigating educational outcomes, at the same time this dimension is completely
absent in the model in Chapter 2. On the one hand, this has to do with research focus. While
in Chapter 4 the focus lies directly on (vertical and horizontal) transition dynamics in secon-
dary education, in Chapter 2 we focus on ethnic gaps in particular school and labour market
outcomes. On the other hand, we were forced to make abstraction of the horizontal dimen-
sion to keep the programming and the estimation of the model in Chapter 2 feasible. Two
reflections are relevant in this context. First, as mentioned before, in Chapter 2 we find only
little evidence for pure ethnic gaps in educational outcomes without specifying the potential
delay with which these are attained, but do find important pure ethnic gaps if we take delays
into account. When discussing this result we suggest that similar conclusions may arise with
respect to other measures of educational achievement within a particular level of educational
attainment. This might be the case for the educational track in which pupils realise their
educational attainment. In other words: there might be a pure ethnic gap (caused by, for
instance, ethnic differences in parental expectations) in the level of this track. Results by
Colding et al. (2009) indicate, however, that, at least in Denmark, observed ethnic gaps in
the choice for prestigious tracks in secondary education can be to a large extent explained by
family endowments. Second, the reader might worry that the results presented in Chapter 2
are biased by making abstraction of the horizontal dimension. Indeed, if due to pure ethnic
differences immigrant youth are overrepresented in particular tracks and these tracks lead,
ceteris paribus, to better (or worse) schooling or labour market outcomes, the pure ethnic
gaps presented in Chapter 2 could be biased downwards (upwards) by not controlling for this
horizontal dimension. In this respect Chapter 4 shows that school drop-out is, ceteris paribus,
higher in the least prestigious track of Flemish secondary education, the vocational track. If,
therefore, immigrant youth are, after controlling for family endowments, overrepresented in
this track, the pure ethnic gaps in educational outcomes without specifying the delay with
which these are attained would be even smaller after controlling for educational tracks. For
the educational outcomes that take schooling delay into account the direction of the bias is,
however, less clear-cut. The likelihood of grade retention is, ceteris paribus, the lowest in both
7the most and the least prestigious tracks of secondary education. Therefore, it is unclear in
which direction the pure ethnic gap in grade retention would be affected if we were able to
control for educational tracks in Chapter 2.
After presenting the announced studies in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter
5, in a General Conclusion we highlight three key results to take away for policy makers and
three key directions for future research.

2
Pure Ethnic Gaps in Educational Attainment
and School to Work Transitions. When Do
They Arise?
This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Bart Cockx (Ghent University, Université catholique
de Louvain, CESifo and IZA).
2.1 Introduction
In Europe school-to-work transitions are much more successful for native youth than for ethnic
minority youth. In 2011, the youth unemployment rate of non-EU-15 residents in the EU-
15 was as high as 29% compared to 20% for natives.1 In Belgium, the country of analysis,
these figures attained 32% and 18%, resulting in a gap of fourteen percentage points, which is
reported to be one of the largest in the OECD (OECD, 2008; Nonneman, 2012). This gap is
particularly worrisome, since the higher incidence of unemployment at the start of the career
can induce long-lasting scars on the subsequent career development (Arulampalam, 2001;
Gregg and Tominey, 2005; Mroz and Savage, 2006). Therefore, not surprisingly, the OECD
1Source: Eurostat (Labor Force Study: Unemployment rates by sex, age groups and nationality). Youth
is defined as individuals between 15 and 24 years old.
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(2010) calls ethnic minority youth a target group for intensive assistance. The question is
whether this is the right response. It is if the observed unemployment gaps are induced
by pure ethnic differences in behaviour or by discrimination. However, if these gaps just
mirror different family endowments that result in different levels of educational attainment and
therefore in different labour market performances, then no specific measures for minority youth
are required to eliminate this gap. Heckman (2011), for instance, argues that in contemporary
American society the racial gap in achievement is primarily due to gaps in skills and that,
consequently, by closing the gaps in skills, the racial gap disappears. According to this view
discrimination in the educational system and in the labour market are not an issue and policies
need not be targeted to ethnic minorities but rather to providing support to disadvantaged
families of all racial and ethnic backgrounds as early as possible as to enhance the skills of
their children.
School attainment and early labour market outcomes of immigrant youth have been studied
amply in the literature. Researchers have mostly focused on a single or a couple of educatio-
nal or labour market transitions in isolation from related transitions, such as the decision to
enrol in tertiary education (see, e.g., Hagy and Staniec, 2002), the probability of succeeding
the first year at university (see, e.g., Ortiz and Dehon, 2008) or the probability of a success-
ful transition to work (see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin, 1998; Ryan, 2001; Pozzoli, 2009). A
problem with this literature is that analyses that ignore the dynamic sorting that takes place
in the educational progression are biased. Cameron and Heckman (1998) show this formally.
Intuitively, this bias is brought about by the progressively growing negative correlation be-
tween observed endowments, such as the parental educational attainment, and unobserved
endowments because pupils with adverse observed endowments pass the final evaluation at
the end of a particular grade and continue schooling only if their unobserved endowments are
sufficiently favourable. This biases the coefficients of the observed endowments downwards
and more so as one proceeds to higher grades.
Cameron and Heckman (2001) explicitly address this selectivity problem by modelling,
beyond the maximum compulsory school age, the decision to drop out in each school year as
a dynamic discrete choice model that explicitly takes into account unobserved determinants
of this decision that can generate the aforementioned sorting. Based on this model they
investigate the sources of racial and ethnic disparity in college attendance. They find that
the racial gap in educational attainment is eliminated or even reversed once they adjust for
differences in parental background and family environment.
These conclusions are not only relevant for the US. For instance, based on a version of the
model of Cameron and Heckman (2001) that disregards the age dimension, Belzil and Poinas
2.1. Introduction 11
(2010) report that the gap in higher educational attainment between second generation im-
migrants and natives in France is mainly explained by family background. In addition, these
authors study the gap in the school to work transition and find that the gap in access to per-
manent employment is nearly completely closed once both family background and educational
attainment are conditioned upon. Colding (2006) and Colding et al. (2009) also disregard
the age dimension but extend the model of Cameron and Heckman (2001) by taking into
account that students need not only to decide whether they continue education beyond the
current grade level, but also, if they proceed, in which branch (academic or vocational). They
estimate this model on Danish data. Their results corroborate previous findings that family
background is an important determinant of educational outcomes, but also demonstrate that
differences in endowments alone do not explain the observed gap in educational attainment
between natives and ethnic minorities in Denmark.
In this study we follow this line of research to study to what extent the ethnic gap in
educational attainment and in school-to-work transitions in Belgium can be explained by
observed family endowments or whether a residual pure ethnic gap, reflecting differences in
behaviour and unobserved endowments, or discrimination, remains present. Our analysis is
based on a retrospective survey taken at age 23 of a representative sample of three cohorts born
in 1976, 1978 and 1980, living in Flanders, the Northern Dutch speaking region of Belgium.
It contrasts natives to grandchildren of women of “non-Western” nationality, born in Belgium
or immigrated prior to age three. The latter selection avoids that the pure ethnic gap partly
captures the effects of additional barriers that recent immigrants face (see, e.g., Colding et al.,
2009).
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, in the past researchers have
studied ethnic gaps in the attainment of particular levels of education, such as secondary
school completion or college entry, irrespectively of the age at which these levels are attained.
However, since, depending on the educational system, youths can be retained at various points
in the educational career, youths may attain these levels at different ages. This matters. Even
if retention may improve educational achievement (see Chapter 4), it is costly if it eventually
induces pupils to enter the labour market with delay and if employers use it as a negative signal
of productivity in their hiring decision. In this study we therefore explicitly take these delays
into account both when measuring educational attainment, and by explicitly modelling them
as outcomes and determinants of schooling progression. We show that conclusions crucially
depend on whether or not delays are considered in the measure of educational achievement.2
2Cameron and Heckman (2001) also implicitly model schooling delay since they allow schooling choices
at particular grades to depend on age. However, they only take these delays into account for one particular
outcome: the probability of being in grade nine or higher at age 15. For all other outcomes they consider the
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Second, we propose a method to decompose the residual pure ethnic gap according to the
moment at which this gap is generated. We do this by studying to what extent this gap
diminishes by sequentially conditioning on prior levels of educational attainment. As such,
critical grades of study can be identified in which the pure ethnic gap arises more prominently
than in other grades. This can be a useful tool to get a better understanding where this gap
originates from. In this study the data allow us to identify whether the gap originates in
primary school or in any grade beyond age twelve. This is much earlier than in the literature
so far that usually starts analysing these gaps from around grade nine in secondary school.
Third, we move a step forward by disentangling the educational outcomes within a parti-
cular grade. Sociologists Boudon (1974) and Erikson et al. (2010) argue that observed social
class schooling differentials result both from the “primary effects” of differing levels of academic
performance, that is passing or failing, and from the “secondary effects” in the educational
choices, that is continuing school or dropping out, that one makes at given levels of perfor-
mance. The pure ethnic gaps may emerge within these steps of the educational progression
with a different magnitude or even in the opposite direction, which may call for different
policy actions. We distinguish in our empirical analysis between the educational achievement
(passing or failing) realised at the end of each grade and the decision to continue schooling
(rather than stopping) at the end of each school year and we allow the outcomes of each of
these components to depend on past decisions and achievements.
A final innovation is that we integrate the language spoken at home among the observed
family endowments. Language is reported to be an important determinant of school and
labour market success. van Ours and Veenman (2003) conclude that language proficiency
of migrants in the Netherlands has a positive effect on the educational attainment of their
sons but no effect on the educational attainment of their daughters. Dustmann et al. (2010)
indicate language as the key factor for minority youth in the UK to catch up with white
pupils throughout compulsory schooling. Moreover, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003), Chiswick
(2008) and Aldashev et al. (2009) conclude that migrants who speak the language of their
destination country have better labour market prospects. Therefore, it may matter to control
for language usage in an analysis of the determinants of ethnic gaps in schooling and labour
market outcomes.
This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 2.2 summarises the institutional
setting: the educational system and the youth labour market in Belgium. The next section
describes the dataset and provides descriptive statistics that motivate our analysis. Section
schooling outcomes at age 24, an age at which most schooling must be completed, irrespectively of schooling
delays.
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2.4 presents the econometric model and the simulation and decomposition methodology. The
empirical findings are reported subsequently, starting with an assessment of the model in
terms of within-sample fit and followed by a series of counterfactual simulations that aim at
answering the main research questions. A final section concludes.
2.2 The Institutional Setting: Education and Youth Labour
Market
In Belgium the language communities (Flemish and French) are in charge of the organisation
of the educational system, while labour market regulation is in the period of analysis mostly
organised at the national level. Since the data we analyse concern only inhabitants of Flanders,
we restrict the description to the Flemish educational system. School choice is free at all levels
and schools are mixed in that children cannot be refused on grounds of gender or ethnicity.
Education is compulsory from the first of September of the year in which a child reaches age
six and lasts until his/her eighteenth anniversary or the 30th of June of the year in which
(s)he reaches age eighteen. Even though a regular student graduates from (the sixth3 grade
of) secondary school at age eighteen, this is not the case for an important share (40%), since
students who do not attain a certain competency level are retained and thus required to repeat
the school year. This retention may already take place in primary school. Talented pupils
can skip grades in nursery and primary school. In our dataset 107 (89) of the 7,256 native
children start primary (secondary) school at age five (eleven) instead of six (twelve). None
of the immigrant children skip a grade. Special (nursery, primary or secondary) education is
aimed at children who need special help, temporarily or permanently. This may be due to
physical or mental disability, serious behavioural or emotional problems, or serious learning
difficulties. In our research project, these pupils (1% of the total number) are dropped from
the sample.
Children can enter nursery school when they are two and a half to three years old. Although
nursery education is not compulsory, in Flanders 98% of the kids attend it. A child usually
starts primary education at age six, but if the child is not school ready entry can be delayed.
Primary education comprises six consecutive years of study. When graduating from primary
school, students enter secondary education. Without grade retention (or grade skipping) at
primary school pupils enter secondary education in the year in which they reach age twelve.
At this point pupils choose between four tracks: general, technical, arts or vocational. A pupil
is granted the diploma of general, technical or arts secondary education after successfully
3This corresponds to twelfth grade in the US. In the sequel of this chapter we reset, in accordance with
the Flemish system, the counter of grades to zero at the start of secondary school.
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completing six years (“grades”). Without grade retention (or grade skipping), this occurs in
the last compulsory schooling year, at age eighteen. Students in the vocational track are
granted a secondary school diploma only after completing a seventh grade, but, since this
seventh grade involves quite some specialisation, we assimilate it in this study as part of
higher (tertiary) education. Students with a secondary school diploma can enrol directly,
without any entry exam,4 into higher (tertiary) education, that is college or university. Our
observation period of education registrations is prior to adoption of the Bologna process.
Three sorts of higher education degrees could be obtained: (i) non-university of the “short
type” (typically vocationally oriented and lasting three years), (ii) non-university of the “long
type” (typically four years mixing a vocational and a more academic curriculum) and (iii)
academic university education (typically four or five years). No tuition fee has to be paid at
nursery, primary and secondary school and very low and stable tuition fees (from 80 euro to
600 euro in 2012, depending on the parents’ income) in higher education. Twenty-two colleges
and seven universities are spread over less than 14,000 km2 resulting in a high regional diffusion
of providers of tertiary education. For more details on the educational system, see Chapter 4
and De Ro (2008).
There is no compulsory military service in Flanders and school-leavers enter the labour mar-
ket directly after school leaving. Moreover (and different from other countries and regions)
school-leavers can claim unemployment benefits after a “waiting period” of nine months. This
period starts with the registration at the employment office after leaving school. Labour regu-
lation distinguishes between two types of labour contracts: with time stipulation (temporary
employment contracts) and without time stipulation (permanent employment contracts). A
finite number of successive temporary employment contracts between the same employee and
employer, are permitted for a maximum of three years.
2.3 Data and Some Facts
2.3.1 The Data: Retrospective Survey of a Representative Sample of Three
Birth Cohorts
The data source (the so called “SONAR” data) consists of representative samples of 3,000
individuals each of three cohorts born in 1976, 1978 and 1980 and living in Flanders when
they were 23 years old, the moment of interview. Follow-up interviews were conducted at age
26 and/or 29. Data of these follow-up interviews were, however, not used in the main analysis
to avoid drop-out selectivity. They are only used in a sensitivity analysis discussed below.
4The only exception is the entry exam for students who want to study medicines.
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This database contains exceptionally rich information on both the educational career and the
start of the labour market career. It contains, apart from a range of socio-economic variables,
monthly information on the educational choices and progression as well as on the labour market
status5 from the moment secondary school is entered,6 until the moment of the last interview.
In addition, the age at which primary school is started, is reported. This information was
collected by trained interviewers conducting oral interviews at the interviewees’ home address.
2.3.2 Motivating Gaps
Throughout this chapter, two sub-populations of the SONAR cohorts are indexed by the
nationality of their grandmother on mother’s side. On the one hand, we identify “natives”,
that are youths whose grandmother on mother’s side possesses the Belgian nationality (8,091
individuals). On the other hand, we consider “immigrants”, that are youth whose grandmother
on mother’s side neither has the Belgian nationality nor any other Western7 nationality (545
individuals). This group is heterogeneous since the nationality of the grandmother does not
determine the moment at which the immigration occurred. Card (2005) and Chiswick and
DebBurman (2004) find that the educational attainments of the immigrants of the second
generation are better than the ones of the first generation. We therefore make the group more
homogeneous by only retaining grandchildren who resided and went to school in Flanders from
the start of nursery school onwards. This means that we essentially exclude first generation
immigrants from the sample.8 In a robustness check we further enhance the homogeneity of
the sample by restricting our sample to respondents with the Belgian nationality (at age 23).
Consequently, if the findings of the aforementioned authors apply for Belgium, the gaps in the
educational attainment found in this research are a lower bound for the gap of first generation
immigrants.
Dropping individuals with (i) missing explanatory variables; (ii) inconsistent school regis-
trations and (iii) years of special education (see Section 2.2) we obtain a sample of 7,256
native respondents and 359 immigrant respondents. Among the immigrants those with a
Turkish (122 individuals) and Moroccan (87 individuals) origin are highly represented. 316 of
5An individual is employed when holding a job of at least one hour a week and during at least one month.
Part-time jobs held by students in the vocational track are not considered as employment, but as part of the
educational career.
6As indicated before, in principle, secondary school is started in the year of one’s twelfth anniversary. In
case of grade skipping or retention, this can be at an earlier or later age.
7In particular, by “Western” nationality we refer to a North American, British, Scandinavian, Western
European or Australian nationality.
8First-generation immigrants are only included to the extent that they immigrated to Belgium between
birth and the start of nursery school at age three. We chose to not exclude them completely as to avoid a too
small immigrant sample, but, as mentioned in the main text, performed a sensitivity analysis that makes this
group more homogeneous by only retaining immigrants with the Belgian nationality.
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these 359 immigrant respondents have the Belgian nationality at age 23. In the benchmark
analysis all 359 immigrants are considered as one group. However, in sensitivity analyses, we
restrict once the immigrant sample to those of Turkish and Moroccan origin and once to those
of Belgian nationality at age 23. In what follows, we refer to “natives” and “immigrants”9
according to the definitions in this section.
Figure 2.1 presents some relevant observed gaps in school attainment and successful tran-
sitions to work between the native and immigrant groups in our dataset. First, we present
the gaps for two key schooling outcomes: (i) passing sixth grade of (and thereby graduating
from) secondary education and (ii) enrolling in tertiary education. Concerning these outcomes,
we distinguish between realising them (without specifying any potential delay) and realising
them without schooling delay. Those in which schooling delay is left unspecified are usually
considered in the literature. However, as argued in Section 2.1, it makes sense to also con-
sider educational outcomes specifying the delay with which they are attained, since eventual
schooling delays are costly. They translate in postponed labour market entry and therefore
in substantial foregone earnings. Moreover, these schooling delays are commonly experienced
in the Flemish educational system: 40% of the pupils graduate from secondary school with
delay.
Figure 2.1: Schooling and School-to-Work Transition Outcomes by Ethnic Group
Source: own calculations based on the SONAR database. Low-educated is defined as holding a secondary education degree or lower.
High-educated is defined as leaving school with one to four successful years of tertiary education and at most one year of schooling delay.
Second, we report, conditional on observed school attainment, the gap for being employed
9The label “immigrant” is used somewhat loosely, since it essentially comprises immigrants beyond the first
generation besides a minority of first-generation immigrants (see previous footnote).
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three months after leaving school as an indicator of successful school-to-work transition. We
report this gap for low educated (defined as holding a secondary educational degree or lower)
and high educated (defined as leaving school with one to four successful years of tertiary
education and at most one year of schooling delay).10 We chose to condition this indicator
on school attainment, since the observed gap in school-to-work transitions unconditional on
school attainment is biased downwards, because some youth is still in education at the time
that the survey is conducted at age 23: this is more likely to be the case for natives and, since
this group is more likely highly educated, its employment propensity is higher.
The first two statistics in Figure 2.1 show that the observed ethnic gaps in school attain-
ment are substantial, both in absolute and in relative terms. Native youth is 17 percentage
points more likely than immigrant youth to graduate from secondary education, while they
are 25 percentage points more likely to enrol into higher education. Proportionally, these
gaps amount to 23% and 44%. These differences are even more outspoken if we consider the
fractions of natives and immigrants who attain these educational levels without any schooling
delay: 29 and 32 percentage points in absolute terms, or 83% and 119% in relative terms.
Finally, the last two statistics illustrate that the observed gaps in the school-to-work tran-
sitions are also important, even if we condition on attained educational level. Observe that
these gaps do not differ much between the low and the high educated: in absolute terms the
difference is 20 to 23 percentage points while in relative terms this varies between 44% and
42%.
2.3.3 Explanatory Variables
In this subsection, we describe the explanatory variables used for each modelled outcome.
The choice of covariates is restricted by their availability, their required strict exogeneity, and
by their relevance according to the existing research. Cameron and Heckman (2001) find
that long-run factors associated with parental background and family environment are strong
predictors of the educational disparity between natives and ethnic minorities in that once they
control for these long-term factors the gap in educational attainment is completely eliminated
or even reversed. This is confirmed in the research of Belzil and Poinas (2010) and partly in
that of Colding (2006) and Colding et al. (2009). We aim at verifying to what extent similar
conclusions can be drawn for Belgium.
We therefore include the following family endowments as explanatory variables: the gender,
the educational attainment of father and that of mother, the number of siblings, the day of
10The latter definition ensures that these high educated individuals have stopped studying at the moment
of the interview (see the subsequent discussion in the main text), so that we can unambiguously define their
employment status.
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birth within a year, and an indicator whether or not Dutch (possibly among other languages)
was spoken at home. The first four variables are standard ones that are also included by
the other researchers.11 The day of birth is included as to control for age effects within a
birth cohort for a given educational delay, since relative age within a birth cohort is found
to positively affect educational achievements (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Bedard and Dhuey,
2006). Finally, we control for the language spoken at home, since this is arguably a key
determinant of educational progression and labour market success for minority youth.12
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics of these variables by ethnicity. These statistics
confirm that immigrant youths generally are characterised by more unfavourable family en-
dowments than natives. First and most importantly, both fathers and mothers of immigrants
have successfully completed on average more than three and a half years of education less than
natives. Second, in the sample immigrants are slightly (nine days on average) younger than
natives. Third, in only 79% of the immigrant households Dutch (possibly among other lan-
guages) is spoken, whereas this fraction attains 98% among the natives.13 The table indicates
furthermore that immigrants have on average twice as many siblings as natives do and that
the immigrant sample contains slightly more girls than that of the natives. The impact of the
latter two variables on educational achievement and labour market outcomes is, however, not
clearly established (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Ryan, 2001; Pozzoli, 2009; van der Klaauw
and van Vuuren, 2010).
In the literature one sometimes also controls in addition for family income, neighbourhood
characteristics, indicators of regional labour market conditions, the regional level of tuition fees
and grants for college enrolment. Most of these controls are not included in our analysis. First,
since the analysis is restricted to one region with a homogenous and stable schooling system,
there is no need to control for regional variation in the features of the educational system.
Second, we cannot take family income into account, since we do not have any information on
it. However, this might not be problematic, since Cameron and Heckman (2001) find that
family income plays only a minor role in explaining ethnic gaps in educational attainment in
the US. However, we do include the annual regional unemployment rate in Flanders as a time-
varying indicator of labour market conditions. The unemployment rate of the 24 to 64 year
old male population proxies the labour market conditions of the (usually) male breadwinner
11Belzil and Poinas (2010) include information on the occupation of father and mother instead of their level
of education and they do not condition on the number of siblings.
12See the references to the literature in Section 2.1.
13Recall that the native and immigrant populations are determined on the basis of the Belgian or “non-
Western” nationality of the grandmother on mother’s side. The fact that in a relatively high fraction of
immigrant families Dutch is spoken at home can be explained by this definition and by the exclusion from
the sample of immigrants who immigrated after age three. Since Belgium consists of an important French
speaking community some of the natives may only speak French at home.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Exogenous Individual Explanatory Variables by Ethnic
Groups
Flemish youth Immigrant youth
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
A. Female gender 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.50
B. Mother’s education level 5.54 3.13 1.83 2.79
C. Father’s education level 5.98 3.44 2.36 3.24
D. Number of siblings 1.52 1.18 3.58 2.38
E. Day of birth within calendar year 171.16 100.35 180.50 98.34
F. Dutch at parental home 0.98 0.12 0.79 0.41
Variables B and C measure the number of successful schooling years beyond secondary school. For instance, it is equal to 6 if the parent
has successfully completed secondary education, but did not successfully complete any year of tertiary education. Variable F captures the
respondent’s answer to the question whether Dutch was spoken (possibly among other languages) at the parental home.
during the period that his child is in education. It is therefore included as an explanatory
variable in the logit models explaining the educational outcomes. By contrast for the logit
model that explains the transition from school to work, we include the youth (aged 15 to 24)
unemployment rate as time-varying covariate. The evolution of these unemployment rates are
described in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 reported in the Appendix of this chapter.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Econometric model
Schooling outcomes (choices and results) at any age are the outcome of previous schooling
outcomes (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Cameron and Heckman, 1998). The probability
that a young person enrols into college or university depends on secondary school graduation
which in turn depends on successively passing each secondary school grade and afterwards
deciding to continue schooling. To capture this sequential aspect of economic decisions and
attainments, we extend the dynamic logit model of Cameron and Heckman (2001) by expli-
citly distinguishing between achievements (success or failure) within each school year and the
subsequent decision to continue or stop schooling. Adding these achievements to the set of
educational outcomes makes it possible to study ethnic gaps in school attainment before the
end of compulsory education, point before which the decision to continue schooling is irrele-
vant. We do this by starting modelling schooling outcomes as from the start of primary school
instead of from the end of compulsory education as researchers did in past.
We propose to evaluate the relative educational performance of immigrants relative to
natives based on a cumulative measure of this educational achievement: the relative fraction
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that passes a particular educational grade without delay, that is without having failed in any
past schooling year or without having started primary school with delay (unless this delay
is undone by skipping a grade during primary education). By considering this new measure
of educational achievement we introduce a finer measure than in the existing literature that
considers school attainment irrespectively of delay. Moreover, since ethnic gaps according to
this measure may arise at much earlier ages and are dynamically linked over time, a dynamic
decomposition of this measure that allows identifying when the gap arises is a valuable tool.
We propose a method to realise this decomposition in Section 2.4.2. We first present the
econometric model.
We model the school progression as a sequence of discrete outcomes and choices. This
sequence starts at the beginning of primary school. For most pupils this occurs at age six.
However, as mentioned in Section 2.2 pupils can start primary school one year earlier14 or one
year later. The starting point of our model is therefore an initial condition that models the
number of years of delay (negative in case of an early start) at the start of primary schooling.
Subsequently, since we only observe the grade by grade educational progression as from the
start of secondary school, we group the progression made during primary school in a single
stage in which we model the number of years of delay at the start of secondary education
conditionally on the number of years of delay at the start of primary school. Figure 2.2 shows
a graphical representation of our modelling strategy from the first grade of secondary school
onwards.15 We model for each (secondary and tertiary) schooling year, conditional on starting
it, the probability of passing (P) respectively not passing (NP) and, conditional on this event,
the probability to continue schooling (at a higher grade when passing or at the same grade
when not passing). Finally, when leaving school, we model the probability of being employed
three months later (W/NW).16
A couple of points should be noticed. First, as a consequence of mandatory schooling
until age eighteen, the probability of continuing school is below one only from the fourth
grade of secondary school onwards. This is the point from which the dynamic sorting as
induced by drop-out starts playing a role (see Section 2.1). Second, each of the grade specific
outcomes and choices are allowed to depend on the past history through the accumulated
number of years of schooling delay and in the employment outcome in addition through the
attained number of years of schooling. This introduces a second source of dynamic sorting,
14This is not observed for immigrants in the data.
15If one has no delay, the first grade starts in September of the year that one becomes 12 years old. We
continue counting when one completes mainstream secondary school after the sixth grade (without delay, this
is at the school leaving age of 18) and pursues tertiary education.
16In a sensitivity analysis (see further) we adopt employment with a permanent contract two years after
leaving school as the labour market outcome.
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since students with successful schooling achievements possess more favourable unobserved
endowments than those who have encountered schooling failures in the past. As to avoid
selection bias induced by these sorting processes, we explicitly allow the choices and outcomes
to depend on unobservable characteristics of individuals.
Figure 2.2: Transition Model
Some abbreviations are used: P (passing the grade), NP (not passing the grade), W (being employed 3 months after leaving school) and
NW (being not employed 3 months after leaving school).
Econometrically, our model is specified as a sequence of (ordered and binary) logistic pro-
babilities. Rational and forward looking agents with a schooling status determined at each
time period t by their obtained schooling level, that is grade g, and their accumulated years
of school delay Vt, make their “choices” from a feasible choice set.17 We define t ≡ −1 and
g ≡ −1 at the start of primary school and t ≡ 0 and g ≡ 0 at the start of secondary school.
Subsequently, t increases by one unit for each year that passes since the start of secondary
school and g increases by one unit for each successful schooling year that passes. A conse-
17We use quotation marks around the word “choices” as, properly speaking, (not) passing a grade and being
employed three months after leaving school are not outcomes under full control of the modelled youth.
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quence is that, for t > 0, Vt = V0 + t− g. The dependence on the grade g respectively on the
schooling delay Vt can be thought of as the memory of our model, increasing in each grade
respectively at each year of grade retention.
We distinguish between seven types of outcomes Og, depending on the considered (if still
in education) or realised (if left education) grade g: (i) the years of delay at the start of
primary education (O−1 = 1), (ii) the years of delay at the start of secondary education
(O0 = 2), (iii) the school attainment (passing or not passing) at the end of each of the six
grades of secondary education (Og = 3 for g = 1, 2, . . . , 6), (iv) the subsequent school decisions
(continuing or stopping) at the end of grades four to six of secondary education (Og = 4 for
g = 4, 5, 6), (v) the school attainments at the end of each grade of tertiary education (Og = 5
for g = 7, 8, . . . , 12), (vi) the subsequent school decisions at the end of each of the grades
of tertiary education (Og = 6 for g = 7, 8, . . . , 12) and (vii) the employment status three
months after leaving school (Og = 7 for g = 3, 4, . . . , 12). For each type of outcome Og that
we consider here, the outcomes are ordered or binary. The choice set, denoted by COg , can
therefore be given by a set of ordinal numbers: COg = {0, 1, . . . , nOg}, where nOg defines the
number of ordered choices minus one that can be made for outcome Og. In fact nOg = 1
except for O−1 = 1 and for O0 = 2: n1 = 2 (n1 = 1) for natives (immigrants), since the
number of years of delay at the start of primary school varies between -1 and 1 (0 and 1) and
n2 = 3 (n2 = 2) for natives (immigrants), since the number of years of delay at the start of
secondary school varies between -1 and 2 (0 and 2).
The optimal choice cˆOgg,t of an individual with respect to outcome type Og at time t in grade
g (or after completing grade g in case that school is left) is then:
cˆ
Og
g,t = c ∈ COg if ωOgc < UOgg,t,c ≤ ωOgc+1, (2.4.1)
where UOgg,t,c is the latent utility of choice c for outcome type Og in (after) grade g at time t,
and ωOgc and ω
Og
c+1 are threshold utilities that determine the ordered choice (ω
Og
0 ≡ −∞ and
ω
Og
nOg+1
≡ +∞).18 As advocated by, for instance, Heckman (1981b) and adopted by other
authors, we approximate this UOgg,t,c by a linear index:
U
Og
g,t,c = α
Og
g + Z
′
tβ
Og + γOgVt + ν
Og
g,t,c, (2.4.2)
where αOgg is a parameter that depends on the grade in which the outcome type Og is consi-
18In the case of a binary choice the threshold ωOg1 is thus set to (minus) the constant term instead of to
zero, since the constant term of the latent utility is normalised to zero. This leads to the standard logit model.
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dered,1920 Zt is aM×1 vector representing the M number of (possibly time-varying) observed
strictly exogenous variables, βOg is the vector of associated parameters, γOg is a parameter
measuring the effect of accumulated years of school delay and νOgg,t,c is unobservable from the
point of view of the researcher.
We follow Cameron and Heckman (2001) by assuming that νOgg,t,c is characterised by a factor
structure. However, in line with the more recent literature (Carneiro et al., 2003; Heckman and
Navarro, 2007; Fruehwirth et al., 2011), we generalise by allowing that the factor “loadings”
depend on the treatment status, which in our case is the number of years of schooling delay
Vt:
ν
Og
g,t,c = δ
Ogη + φOgVtη + 
Og
g,t,c, (2.4.3)
in which δOg and φOg are outcome type specific coefficients and Ogg,t,c is the i.i.d. error term,
and η is a random individual specific effect that is independent across people and that cap-
tures unobserved “abilities” affecting all outcomes considered in the model. Assuming that
the unobserved determinants are common to all outcomes is restrictive, but, as shown in
the aforementioned literature, the advantage of doing so is that it allows that the effect of
schooling delay depends on unobserved heterogeneity,21 as it does by the introduction of the
second term in Equation 2.4.3, and that this treatment heterogeneity can be identified non-
parametrically. Fruehwirth et al. (2011) argue that this may be important and indeed find
evidence of heterogeneous reactions to grade retention.
Identification of treatment heterogeneity in the effect of schooling delay does not require an
exclusion restriction if the outcome in the first period, that is the number of years of delay at
the start of primary school, is free of selection. This means that Zt should be independent of η
for all g, t and choice sets COg . Note that this does not mean that conditional on past choices
beyond the start of primary school Zt is independent of η, since, as mentioned in Section 2.1,
dynamic sorting will induce negative correlation between favourable observed determinants
of the educational outcomes that we consider, and the unobserved η. This is because pupils
with unfavourable observed endowments experience successful educational outcomes only if
these unfavourable endowments are compensated for by favourable unobserved endowments
(Cameron and Heckman, 1998). The independence assumption rather means that the un-
observed abilities capture factors that are independent of observed family endowments. We
19The parameter corresponding to the first grade that can be observed within the outcome type is taken
as the reference grade. It is normalised to zero, since it cannot be separately identified from the threshold
utilities ωOgc .
20For the school outcomes in tertiary education (Og = 5 and Og = 6) and for the employment decision
(Og = 7) we restrict the dependence to be linear in g.
21This is labeled “essential heterogeneity” by Heckman et al. (2006).
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improve in this respect on the existing literature by starting modelling the schooling pro-
gression from a much earlier point: at the start of primary school rather than at the end
of mandatory schooling, usually around age 16. Consequently, in our approach the effect of
observed family endowments on the educational outcomes is purged from the bias induced by
the negative correlation with the unobserved determinants of successful schooling outcomes
(no delay) during the period of mandatory schooling.22
We assume that Ogg,t,c is logistically distributed, independent of η for all Og, g, t and c, and
therefore we can write the probability of an outcome as:
Pr(cˆ
Og
g,t = c|Zt, Vt, g, Og, η;θ) =
exp(ω
Og
c+1 − αOgg − Z′tβOg − δOgη − φOgVtη)
1 + exp(ω
Og
c+1 − αOgg − Z′tβOg − δOgη − φOgVtη)
− exp(ω
Og
c − αOgg − Z′tβOg − δOgη − φOgVtη)
1 + exp(ω
Og
c − αOgg − Z′tβOg − δOgη − φOgVtη)
, (2.4.4)
in which we denote the vector of unknown parameters by θ. The likelihood contribution
li(Zt, Vt, η;θ) for any sampled individual, conditional on the unobservable η, is then con-
structed by the product of the probabilities of the school and labour market outcomes as
expressed by (2.4.4) realised in each time period t between the start of primary school, and
the labour market entry or the highest grade that the respondent has attained at the interview
date at age 23.
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), we adopt a non-parametric discrete distribution for
the unobserved random variable η. We assume that this distribution is characterised by an a
priori unknown number of K points of support ηk to which are assigned probabilities pk(λ)
specified as logistic transforms:
pk(λ) =
exp(λk)∑K
j=1 exp(λj)
with k = 1, 2, . . . ,K;λ ≡ [λ1, λ2, . . . , λK ]′;λ1 = 0. (2.4.5)
Hence, the unconditional individual likelihood contribution for an agent i is:
li(Zit, Vit;θ,λ) =
K∑
k=1
pk(λ)li(Zit, Vit, ηk;θ). (2.4.6)
22The outcome scholastic ability test (AFQT) that Cameron and Heckman (2001) add as control in part
of their models may capture these unobserved determinants of early schooling outcomes. Belzil and Poinas
(2010) add an indicator for grade repetition in primary school to proxy for these unobservables, but do not
take the endogeneity of this variable into account.
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Since the estimation is conducted separately on the native and immigrant sample, the log-
likelihood function is the logarithm of these unconditional likelihood contributions summed
over all Nj (j = N, I) sampled individuals, where NN (NI) stands for the number of sampled
native (immigrant) individuals. This is maximised with respect to the unknown parameters.
In order to determine the number of points of support we follow common practice (see, e.g.,
Belzil and Poinas, 2010) and select the number of mass points by choosing the model that
minimises an information criterion. In our case (see Section 2.5) the optimal choice minimises
both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
2.4.2 Goodness-of-Fit and Decomposition Strategy
In order to answer our main research questions, we develop a “counterfactual” decomposition
strategy in the spirit of Machado and Mata (2005) aimed at disentangling the respective im-
portance of pure ethnic differences versus differences in observed endowments between natives
and immigrants in explaining the observed ethnic gap in educational attainment (conditioning
on educational delay or not) and in school-to-work transitions. Moreover, we propose a method
to decompose the residual pure ethnic gap according to the moment at which it is generated.
We first propose a simulation method to test the model’s capacity to fit the ethnic gaps of a
particular outcome. Subsequently, we discuss how, based on this simulation method, we can
realise the aforementioned decompositions.
The method simulates the model on random samples each of size R (R = 5, 000 in the
application) of the native and immigrant samples that were used for estimation. Let ZN and
ZI be R ×M matrices storing the R random draws from the native respectively immigrant
youth observed exogenous endowment distributions and from the time-varying strictly exoge-
nous variables. Let θˆN and θˆI denote the native respectively immigrant parameter estimates
including the ones that refer to the endogenous variables (grade g and schooling delay Vt) and
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In this simulation, the endogenous variables take
on all possible values weighted by their predicted probability of occurrence according to the
parameter estimates. The observed gap as represented by the log expected odds ratio between
natives and immigrants of a particular outcome (for instance, the probability of passing sixth
grade of secondary education) can then be predicted by simulation as follows:
log
(
EZN Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZN; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆI ]
)
, (2.4.7)
where Pr[cˆOgg,t = c|.; .] is the probability that the particular outcome cˆOgg,t = c23 is realised
23We may consider outcomes that are not conditioned on any particular time period t or grade g. In that
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according to the model simulation and EZN and EZI the expectations over the distributions
of ZN respectively ZI. Note that the existing literature expresses the gap in terms of the
absolute difference in the probabilities of realisation of a particular outcome instead of in
terms of the log odds ratio. Expressing the ethnic gap in terms of the log odds ratio will
prove to be useful in decomposing the residual pure ethnic gap according to the moments that
it is generated. The 95% confidence intervals of these (and subsequent) log odds ratios are
constructed by simulation, the steps of which are given in the Appendix of this chapter.
We now propose the following decomposition of the predicted ethnic gap, as expressed by
the log odds ratio in Equation (2.4.7) into the sum of an “explained” and a “residual pure
ethnic gap”:
log
(
EZN Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZN; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆI ]
)
=
log
(
EZN Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZN; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆN ]
)
+ log
(
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆI ]
)
, (2.4.8)
The first term on the right-hand side of (2.4.8) is the gap that can be explained by differences
in the observed endowments ZN and ZI evaluated by using the parameters as estimated on
the native sample, θˆN . The last term in Equation (2.4.8) defines the residual “pure ethnic
gap”. It reflects the gap induced by differences in the parameter estimates, including the ones
that relate to the unobservables, between native and immigrant youth.24 It is the latter gap
that has been found in the literature to be negligible (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Belzil and
Poinas, 2010) or reduced substantially (Colding, 2006; Colding et al., 2009) as compared to
the observed gap, both in terms of educational outcomes as in indicators of successful school-
to-work transitions and which has led researchers to conclude that the ethnic gap in outcomes
is not due to discrimination, but rather to a shortfall in skills, natives and immigrants alike.
In the empirical analysis below, we will show that, in line with the existing literature,
the pure ethnic gap in educational outcomes (leaving schooling delay unspecified) is indeed
relatively small or even disappears if we consider the gap at the enrolment in higher education.
case one would take the expectation of the probability over this dimension. Alternatively, we may consider
outcomes in which the number of years of schooling delay is specified. For instance, in the empirical analysis
we consider schooling outcomes at particular grades (passing a grade or continuing education after passing
that grade) that are attained without schooling delay. Then for some g > 0 the probability of interest is given
by Pr[cˆOgg,g = 1|.; .], since after starting secondary school a schooling outcome can only be attained without
delay if the outcome is successful at all t = g.
24An alternative decomposition strategy consists in evaluating the endowment gap at the immigrant pa-
rameter estimates and the pure ethnic gap at the values of the native covariates. By conditioning on the
endowments of the immigrant youth, as we do in Equation (2.4.8) and in the benchmark empirical analysis,
we focus on the gap for youth with typical immigrant characteristics, so at the lower end of the socioeconomic
scale. We implement the alternative decomposition as a sensitivity analysis (see further).
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However, if we consider the realisation of schooling outcomes without delay or success in the
school-to-work transition, this is no longer the case. Then, in order to identify the cause of
this gap, it is useful to determine the moment at which it originates. We therefore propose
a procedure that decomposes the pure ethnic gap into parts that depend on the moments
that it is generated. It uses the fact that a particular educational attainment can only be
realised if at earlier stages educational outcomes were successful: educational attainments
realise sequentially. This means that we can write the probability of a successful educational
outcome as a product of conditional probabilities in which the conditioning is each time related
to a successful educational outcome at an earlier stage. If we write the ethnic gaps in terms of
log odds ratios, we can therefore decompose a successful educational outcome at a particular
stage in a sum of log odds ratios of the conditional probabilities of educational success in
earlier stages.
We explain the decomposition procedure on the basis of an example. Suppose that we are
interested in identifying when the pure ethnic gap in the fraction that passes fifth grade of
secondary school (cˆ35 = 1) originates. We therefore aim at decomposing the pure ethnic gap
of this outcome, as defined on the left-hand side of the equality in Equation (2.4.9):25
log
(
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
5 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
5 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]
)
=
log
(
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
4 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
4 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]
)
+ log
(
EZI Pr[cˆ
4
4 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]/EZI Pr[cˆ34 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
4
4 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]/EZI Pr[cˆ34 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]
)
+ log
(
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
5 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]/EZI Pr[cˆ44 = 1|ZI; θˆN ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
3
5 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]/EZI Pr[cˆ44 = 1|ZI; θˆI ]
)
. (2.4.9)
Notice first that this gap cannot realise before the start of fourth grade of secondary school,
since by compulsory schooling until age 18 nobody leaves school before this moment. This
means that, if we ignore schooling delays for the moment, the first moment at which the ethnic
gap can differ from zero is by not passing fourth grade of secondary school (cˆ34 = 0). The gap
that is generated at that moment is expressed by the first term on the right-hand side of
the equality in Equation (2.4.9). Subsequently, the gap can further originate from deciding
not to start fifth grade (cˆ44 = 0), conditional on having passed fourth grade (cˆ34 = 1). This
source of the gap is quantified by the second term on the right-hand side of the equality sign
in Equation (2.4.9). Finally, the source of the gap can originate from not having passed fifth
25Note that we do not condition the choice on t, meaning that we implicitly average over t.
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grade of secondary school (cˆ35 = 0), conditional on deciding to start fifth grade (cˆ44 = 1). The
sum of the terms on the right-hand side of the equality in (2.4.9) is by construction equal to
the term on the left-hand side. This means that we can determine the relative importance
of the moments at which the gap originates. It is not difficult to generalise this procedure
for other outcomes and longer sequences of outcomes. This is what we do in the empirical
application.
2.5 Results
We estimate the econometric model separately for native and immigrant youth. As mentioned
in Section 2.4.1, we did this by gradually adding points of support until the log-likelihood value
of the model failed to increase. Subsequently, we chose the best fitting model according to
two information criteria. Table 2.5 in the Appendix of this chapter reports the log-likelihood,
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values
of the model according to the estimated number of points of support of the heterogeneity
distribution. All information criteria are lower for the models that control for unobserved
heterogeneity than for a simpler scheme that ignores unobserved heterogeneity. The lowest
AIC and BIC values are obtained with five points of support for both the native and the immi-
grant youth. Since the main aim of this study is to decompose the ethnic gap in educational
attainment and in school-to-work transitions, and since we have estimated a large number
of parameters (nearly one hundred for each ethnic group),26 we do not report the estimated
parameters. These are available on request. Instead, we first report a goodness-of-fit analysis
with respect to the main outcomes of interest. Subsequently, we present the decomposition
along the lines of our presentation in Section 2.4.2. In Section 2.5.3 we specifically focus on
the role that language plays in this composition. Finally, we briefly present some sensitivity
analyses in Section 2.5.4.
2.5.1 Goodness of Fit
We simulate the fraction of both native and immigrant youth who realise a variety of schooling
and labour market outcomes. The difference between the first two columns of Table 2.2 (or
the two first panels of Figure 2.3 for the main outcomes of interest) measures the goodness of
fit of our model. Column A describes the observed gaps between native and immigrant youth
in our data by means of log odds ratios of the native respectively the immigrant schooling
and labour market outcome probabilities. A positive number means that native youth is more
26When comparing these numbers of parameters to the size of our native and immigrant research sample
one should take in mind that we observe (and model) multiple observations for each individual.
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likely to achieve the considered outcome. Since log(1+x) ∼= x, these log odds ratios mirror the
proportional gaps between native and immigrant youth as reported in the descriptive analysis
in Section 2.3.2. Column B describes the corresponding gaps based on the simulations that
were described in Section 2.4.2. The main outcomes of interest, introduced as motivating
gaps in Section 2.3.2, are denoted in bold and shaded in grey. The decomposition of the gaps
according to the moments at which they originate are reported in the lines below the main
outcomes of interest (neither in bold nor shaded in grey). They sum to the main outcome of
which they are components. The fit is very good, since in all cases, the actual gap lies within
the 95% confidence interval of the simulated outcome.
2.5.2 The Role of Family Endowments in Explaining the Gaps
Column C of Table 2.2 presents the pure ethnic gap for a range of outcomes as obtained by
conducting the counterfactual simulations outlined in Section 2.4.2, by equating the observed
family endowments of both ethnic groups to the immigrant level. We first discuss the findings
with respect to schooling outcomes without specifying the potential delay with which these
are attained. This is common in the literature. Subsequently, we contrast these results to
those obtained for the same schooling outcomes, but restricting that these outcomes should
be realised without schooling delay. Finally, we consider the pure ethnic gap in the school-
to-work transition. We decompose the pure ethnic gaps of all considered outcomes as to
determine the key moments at which these pure ethnic gaps are generated. First, we focus
on the probability of passing the last (sixth) grade of secondary school. Equating observed
endowments reduces the log odds ratio of this (predicted) probability from 0.21 to 0.07. This
means that if a native and an immigrant child are equal in terms of individual and household
characteristics the native child is about 7% more likely to complete secondary education.
Second, we consider the probability of enrolling in tertiary education. In this case conditioning
on observed endowments completely eliminates the 35 points wide predicted ethnic gap. These
results are completely in line with the literature mentioned in Section 2.1. Differences in family
background explain the gap in educational attainment to a large extent and especially so for
higher levels of education.
In the lines below these main outcomes denoted in bold in Table 2.2 the pure ethnic gaps are
further decomposed. First, consider the 7% pure ethnic gap of successfully completing secon-
dary school. Decomposing this gap by analogy with the lines of Equation (2.4.9) in Section
2.4.2, we find that the major part of this gap is generated by a higher dropout rate for immi-
grants after successfully completing fourth grade of secondary school and by a higher fraction
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Figure 2.3: Decomposition of Observed Schooling and Labour Market Gaps
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that does not successfully pass sixth grade after starting it. At these moments 2% respectively
3% of the 7% total pure ethnic gap originates. However, these interpretations are hazardous,
since these subcomponents are small and not very precisely estimated. We conclude that it is
difficult to assign a precise moment at which this pure ethnic gap emerges. But this is not so
problematic given that the total pure ethnic gap is small anyway. Second, the decomposition
of the zero pure ethnic gap with regards to enrolment in tertiary education learns that it
arises by a pure ethnic advantage of 7% that arises for immigrants in this enrolment decision
conditional on secondary school completion. This advantage erases the aforementioned 7%
gap in secondary school completion. Cameron and Heckman (2001) report similar findings for
the US. This ethnic advantage may reflect that for a given level of socioeconomic background
immigrant youths possess “better” unobserved characteristics (ability or motivation) than na-
tive youth, since parents of immigrants may, as a consequence of fewer opportunities, have
attained a lower level of educational attainment than parents of natives. In other words, for
a same level of educational attainment of their parents immigrants may be more able or more
motivated than natives, and may therefore more likely enrol in higher education. However,
further research is required to confirm this interpretation.
We now consider the same two educational outcomes, but restrict these outcomes to be
realised without schooling delay. As already mentioned in Section 2.3.2, this restriction sub-
stantially increases the total ethnic gaps for these outcomes. The log odds ratio for completing
secondary education increases from 0.21 to 0.61, and for enrolling in tertiary education from
0.35 to 0.72. More importantly, even if these gaps are substantially reduced if observed family
endowments are controlled for, in contrast to the case in which no schooling delay is specified,
the pure ethnic gaps remain substantial: 0.34 respectively 0.29. This is an important finding,
since it means that ethnic schooling gaps, in particular gaps in schooling delay, cannot be
eliminated by focussing policy to disadvantaged groups irrespectively of their ethnic back-
ground. It also suggests that similar conclusions might arise with respect to other measures
of educational achievement within a particular level of educational attainment, such as scores
on standardised tests of achievement, implying that our findings may also be relevant for
countries in which grade retention is less wide spread than in Belgium.
In the lines below these log odd ratios are decomposed according to the grade in which
they originate. First, observe that the lower pure ethnic gap for enrolment in higher education
without any delay reflects a pure ethnic advantage for immigrants that was also detected in case
we did not specify the schooling delay. This 5% advantage is, however, no longer significantly
different from zero. More interesting is to get an insight into the grades at which the 0.34 gap
in the log odds ratio in secondary school completion is generated. Since the pure ethnic gap
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matters predominantly if schooling delay is taken into account, we know that it is retention and
not drop out that is the main driver of the pure ethnic gap at each grade. We therefore in this
decomposition make no distinction between passing and the decision to continue schooling
within each grade. From Table 2.2 we deduce that, even if the pure ethnic gap seems to
emerge relatively gradually throughout the educational progression, the major part originates
in secondary school. The components of the total odds ratio assigned to secondary school sum
to 0.19, while those generated during or at the start of primary school sum to 0.15 only. This
is, however, not unexpected, since retention is in Belgium more frequently used in secondary
school than in primary school. The data did not allow determining at which particular grades
of primary school the pure gap emerges. We can only conclude that the ratio attained already
0.03 at the start of primary school, so that the remaining 0.12 is generated during the first
six compulsory schooling years. By contrast, within secondary school we can identify the
evolution of the pure ethnic gap by grade. There we can (again) clearly identify fourth grade
as a major source of the pure gap: 0.07 of the total 0.34 originates in that grade. This means
that more than 20% of the total pure gap that is generated between the start of primary school
and the end of secondary school can be assigned to this grade. This is an important finding,
since it informs to which grade analysts should target attention to get a better understanding
of where the pure ethnic gap originates from. The analysis learns in addition that the first,
third and last year of secondary school are critical as well, but to a lesser extent.
Finally, we consider the pure ethnic gap in being employed three months after leaving
school given a particular level of school attainment. As can be deduced from Column C,
and in contrast with the findings of Belzil and Poinas (2010), for all levels of education
equating observed endowments between natives and immigrants hardly reduces the ethnic
gaps in the transition to work. Independently of the level of education, a native school-leaver
is about 30% more likely to be employed three months after leaving school compared with an
immigrant school-leaver with the same observed endowments. This suggests that, in contrast
to France, discrimination of ethnic minorities may affect labour market outcomes of ethnic
minorities in Belgium (Flanders). Notwithstanding that, as discussed below, alternative and
complementary interpretations are possible, these results square with the findings outlined in
Chapter 3.
Contrary to the existing literature, we thus find evidence for important pure ethnic gaps
in educational outcomes and in the transition from school to work. For the educational out-
comes this is a consequence of explicitly taking schooling delays into account. These pure
ethnic gaps need to be interpreted with caution and may not be simply identified with proof
of discrimination. Discrimination is just one explanation among others. We mention a number
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of alternative explanations without aiming to be comprehensive. First, the pure ethnic gap
may partly be caused by ethnic differences in preferences or expectations. Constant et al.
(2010) provide evidence on divergence in economic preferences and attitudes between natives
and second generation migrants in Germany. Migrants are found to be, for instance, less
risk-averse. Moreover, they conclude that these differentials matter in terms of employment
probabilities two months after unemployment entry. More evidence on the importance of pre-
ferences and expectations in explaining school attainment and labour market outcome gaps is
provided by, for instance, Hennessey et al. (2008), Filippin (2009) and Zaiceva and Zimmer-
mann (2010). Second, a recent literature deals with the role of ethnic networks in explaining
labour market outcome gaps (Winters et al., 2001; Mahuteau and Juanankar, 2008; Yamauchi
and Tanabe, 2008; Zenou, 2011) and diverging school outcomes can be related to class and
school segregation of migrants as a consequence of the concentration of immigrants in certain
neighbourhoods (Colding, 2006; Colding et al., 2009; Dustmann et al., 2010; Agirdag et al.,
2011). Third, in the absence of specific teaching incentive programs for disadvantaged or
immigrant groups (Dustmann et al., 2010), teachers may pay more attention to native (ad-
vantaged) groups. Fourth, part of the pure ethnic gap can be related to differentials in the
unobserved “ability” distributions between natives and immigrants (Cameron and Heckman,
2001). Finally, part of the pure ethnic gap may be induced by differences in language pro-
ficiency that are not captured by the language usage variable that was controlled for in the
analysis. We turn to a discussion of this point in the next section.
2.5.3 Gap Closing Role for Language?
Column E of Table 2.2 presents evidence on language spoken at parental home as a source of
schooling and first labour market gaps between native and immigrant youth. In the spirit of
Cameron and Heckman (2001) these gaps are obtained by estimating the following ratio:
log
(
EZ∗I Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|Z∗I ; θˆI ]
EZI Pr[cˆ
Og
g,t = c|ZI; θˆI ]
)
, (2.5.1)
in which Z∗I differs from ZI by the value of the variable capturing usage of Dutch at the
parental home. This value is set in Z∗I for all draws to the mean native level.
From Column E of Table 2.2 we deduce that speaking Dutch at home plays hardly any role
in closing the observed ethnic gap in educational attainment. The contribution of language is
always very small and mostly not significantly different from zero. Conditional on graduation
from secondary school, it explains 2 of the 14 points predicted log odds in enrolling in ter-
tiary education (without delay). Noticing in addition that by controlling for other observed
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family endowments this predicted gap even turns into a 7 points pure ethnic advantage for
immigrants, this contribution is small. Our estimates also indicate that not speaking Dutch at
home is rather an advantage than a disadvantage for immigrants to continue schooling with-
out delay, since it decreases the predicted ethnic gap significantly by one percentage point
in all but fourth and fifth grade of secondary school. This is consistent with the findings of
Dustmann et al. (2010) indicating that in the UK during secondary school the educational
achievement of ethnic minority pupils for whom English is not the mother tongue improves
more relative to White British pupils than that of ethnic minority pupils for whom English
is the mother tongue. However, globally these ethnic advantages are no longer significantly
different from zero if the unconditional gap in graduating from secondary school without delay
is considered.
These findings suggest that policies encouraging immigrant families to speak the native
language at home are not effective in reducing the ethnic gap in school attainment. The fact
that we could not discriminate between those families who speak Dutch at home among other
languages from those that just speak the native language could be an explanation. In addition,
we could not control for the quality of the spoken language. It may well be that speaking the
native language matters only if the communication partners have native speaker proficiency.
Other researchers finding some positive evidence of language indeed included some measure
of proficiency as control variable (van Ours and Veenman, 2003; Dustmann et al., 2010).
Column E of Table 2.2 reports more, but still not very strong, evidence that speaking Dutch
at home enhances the likelihood of transiting from school to work. It explains as much as six
(= 16%) points of the 37 points predicted gap for the low educated, but only three points
(8%) for the high educated who left school (before age 23). The finding that usage of native
language at home helps more the low than high educated immigrant youth in finding a job is
in line with Aldashev et al. (2009) and is consistent with the hypothesis that language usage
is helpful in basic communications as required in low skilled job, but that it is no guarantee
for proficiency, which is essential for high skilled jobs.
2.5.4 Robustness Checks
We performed several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the results. First, we inves-
tigated the alternative decomposition strategy evaluating the pure ethnic gap at the native
covariate registrations and thereby focusing on the higher end of the socioeconomic scale. In
general, the results, as presented in Column D of Table 2.2, are in line with our main re-
sults. However, the pure ethnic gap in the probability of enrolling in higher education is now
significant. This is because the pure immigrant advantage in enrolling in higher education
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conditional on secondary school completion disappears in this case: in comparison with Co-
lumn C the pure ethnic gap for this outcome is 0.02 and insignificant instead of −0.07 and
significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the immigrant advantage in terms of unobser-
vables, as argued in Section 2.5.2, disappears if parents of immigrants acquire similar levels of
educational attainment as parents from natives. The obtained pure ethnic gap concerning the
probability of being employed three months after leaving school is somewhat lower following
this alternative decomposition strategy: 0.12 and insignificant for the low educated and 0.20
and significant at the 5% level for the high educated. Immigrants with high socioeconomic
background may be less penalised in terms of labour market networks relative to natives than
immigrants with a low socioeconomic background.
Second, we re-estimated our model replacing our indicator of labour market success by an
alternative one, that is being employed with a permanent contract two years after leaving
school. Since at age 23 relatively few individuals have left education for two years or more, we
had to use the data gathered in the follow-up interviews at ages 26 and 29. This means that
these results are subject to sample attrition, especially for the higher educated group, since
this group is the most likely to have left school less than two years ago at age 23. We report
the goodness-of-fit and the decomposition results of this model in Table 2.6 in the Appendix
of this chapter. Even if the predictions for the alternative labour market outcome deviate
more from the observed ones than those in the benchmark model and are less stable between
the different considered educational levels, the fit is satisfactory in that all the observed ethnic
gaps lie in the 95% confidence interval of the simulation.
For the low educated both the total observed (total simulated) and the pure ethnic gap in
being employed with a permanent contract two years after leaving school are much higher than
in the benchmark model. The log odds ratio is respectively 0.74 (0.63) and 0.61 compared
to 0.36 (0.37) and 0.28 in the benchmark. We therefore conclude that for the low educated
the observed family endowments and prior school attainment seem to explain little of the
ethnic gap in this alternative indicator of labour market success. The residual pure ethnic gap
increases even substantially compared to the benchmark.
For the high educated the findings are less stable. This may be related to the attrition
problem for this group, so more care should be taken in the conclusions. If we consider
the labour market outcome of highest educated group, we observe that both the observed
(simulated) and pure ethnic gap are close to zero: respectively −0.09 (0.03) and 0.02. However,
if we consider the highest educated group but one, which was one of the main considered
outcomes (denoted in bold), then the findings are much closer to the benchmark results. The
aforementioned log odds ratios are then 0.27 (0.28) and 0.27 compared to 0.35 (0.37) and 0.34
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in the benchmark. We conclude that the finding of the benchmark model that the pure ethnic
gap of the labour market outcome is substantial is relatively robust, except for the highest
level of education. However, due to drop out selectivity, the sensitivity analysis is less reliable
for the latter group.
Third, we narrowed down our immigrant population definition. First, we restricted the
immigrant population to the immigrant respondents with a Belgian nationality. In contrast
to Euwals et al. (2010) who find a significantly positive relation between citizenship on the
one hand and employment, tenured employment and job prestige on the other hand in the
Netherlands, we obtain, for both the total and the pure ethnic gaps, very similar simulation
results to our benchmark. This can be a consequence of the quasi exclusion of first generation
immigrants from our sample (see Section 2.3.2). Second, we restricted the immigrant popula-
tion to the more homogeneous population of youth with a Turkish or Moroccan origin. Using
this definition leads to slightly larger predicted and simulated pure ethnic gaps. However, even
if, as a consequence of the smaller sample sizes, the estimates are less precise, the empirical
pattern remains very similar. The simulation results for the latter two sensitivity analyses are
available on request.
2.6 Conclusions
Recently, researchers, among whom Heckman (2011), have claimed that ethnic gaps are pri-
marily due to a lack of skills and that, consequently, by closing the gaps in skills, reflecting gaps
in observed family endowments, the racial gaps disappears. In this research we investigated
whether this claim upholds for Belgian society. To that purpose we built a dynamic schooling
progression model that includes the school-to-work transition as a labour market outcome
and estimated this model, separately on natives and immigrants, on a random sample of three
birth cohorts living in Flanders, the Dutch speaking region in the North of Belgium. We then
used this model to decompose, free of dynamic selection bias, the observed gap in both edu-
cational attainment and successful school-to-work transitions between native and immigrant
youth into a part that can be explained by observed family endowments and a part that is
inherent to ethnicity, the so called “pure ethnic gap”. In this analysis natives are contrasted
to grandchildren of women of “non-Western” nationality. We essentially excluded first gener-
ation immigrants from the analysis since only grandchildren born in Belgium or immigrated
prior to age three were retained. Consequently, since the educational attainment of second
generation immigrants is found to be better than that of first generation immigrants, the gap
in the educational attainment found in this research is to be considered as a lower bound for
the gap of first generation immigrants.
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We contributed to the literature in essentially four dimensions. First, we incorporated
years of schooling delay in the measures of educational attainment that are usually considered,
such as completing secondary education or enrolling in higher education. We argued that it
is important to incorporate this dimension, since arriving on the labour market with delay
is very costly. Moreover, we pointed out that in countries where schooling delays are not
important other scholastic achievement could play a similar role. Second, based on the insight
that schooling outcomes realise sequentially, we proposed a method that allows identifying the
moments at which the pure ethnic gaps emerge most prominently and therefore offer a tool
that helps targeting research that tries to understand the origins of these gaps. Third, we
moved a step forward by disentangling the educational outcomes within a particular grade.
We distinguished between the educational achievement (passing or failing) realised at the end
of each grade and the decision to continue schooling (rather than stopping) at the end of each
school year. Finally, we innovated by including an indicator of whether the native language
is spoken at home among the observed family endowments to investigate the role this factor
plays in closing the observed ethnic gaps.
Our findings are the following. First, consistent with the existing literature, we find that
observed family endowments alone explain the major part of the observed gap in secondary
school completion and all of it with regards to the enrolment in higher education. This seems
to suggest therefore that no specific policy for ethnic minorities is warranted to eliminate the
existing schooling gaps in Belgium. However, once we take schooling delays into account this
conclusion is no longer valid. The pure log odds ratio between natives and immigrants of
the probability of completing secondary education without delay and of enrolling in higher
education without delay is respectively 0.34 and 0.29.
Second, if we decompose the latter log odds ratios we find that the pure ethnic gap grows
gradually throughout the educational progression. However, since retention is mainly used
during secondary school, the major part of the pure ethnic gap in secondary school completion
(0.19) emerges during this period. Fourth grade of secondary school has been identified as one
of the key moments at which this gap originates: more than 20% of the total pure ethnic gap
in the fraction that graduates from secondary school without delay is generated in this grade.
Third, in contrast to the finding of Belzil and Poinas (2010) for France, we find that family
endowments and school attainment explain little of the ethnic gap in school-to-work transitions
in Belgium. Independently of the level of education, a native school-leaver is about 30% more
likely to be employed three months after leaving school compared with an immigrant school-
leaver with the same observed endowments. For low educated school-leavers this conclusion
is reinforced if an alternative labour market indicator that measures permanent employment
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two years after graduation is used. In that case the native school-leaver is even 80%27 more
likely to be employed in such a contract.
Finally, we find that speaking Dutch at home plays hardly any role in closing the ethnic gap
in educational attainment, but that it does matter to some extent in explaining the different
rate of transition from school to work between natives and immigrants, especially for the low
educated. The fact that language is found to be less important than in other studies may be
a consequence of our measure not capturing the proficiency of the native language sufficiently
precisely. At the same time these findings are valuable in that they demonstrate that policies
encouraging immigrant families to speak the native language at home are not very effective in
reducing gaps in schooling, and labour market outcomes, especially among the high educated.
Ensuring a higher degree of proficiency may be more effective, but more difficult to achieve.
Based on our analysis we disagree with the earlier evidence that observed ethnic gaps in
educational achievement could be eliminated by targeting policy to socially disadvantaged
groups irrespectively of their ethnic origin. We found that important ethnic gaps unrelated
to family background may remain important if finer measurements of educational outcomes,
such as in this study by specifying whether an educational level is attained with delay or not,
are used. Therefore we believe that policies aimed at specific ethnic groups are still warranted
to eliminate the ethnic gap in educational achievement. In addition, even if alternative ex-
planations are possible, we believe that discrimination is a major candidate in explaining the
important pure ethnic gap that we found in the transition from school to work in Belgium.
27This corresponds to a log odds ratio of 0.61.
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2.7 Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 2.3: Unemployment Rate (UR) in Flanders for Males Aged 15 to 64
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
6.9% 6.8% 6.8% 5.7% 5.3% 5.1% 4.3% 2.8%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
2.3% 2.6% 2.6% 3.8% 4.8% 4.0% 4.1% 3.8%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
4.4% 4.4% 3.2% 3.6% 4.3% 5.2%
Source: Steunpunt WSE of the Flemish government (based on Labor Force Study: Unemployment rates by sex).
Table 2.4: Unemployment Rate (UR) in Flanders for the Aged 15 to 24
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
18.9% 21.1% 23.4% 20.1% 16.5% 16.3% 12.0% 9.7%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
8.8% 8.7% 7.5% 11.7% 13.8% 12.5% 11.6% 11.7%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
11.0% 13.5% 11.3% 10.0% 11.6% 15.5%
Source: Steunpunt WSE of the Flemish government (based on Labor Force Study: Unemployment rates by sex).
Table 2.5: Model Selection (Information Criteria Values)
K Flemish youth Immigrant youth
# parameters Log(L) AIC BIC # parameters Log(L) AIC BIC
1 77 -40186.56 80527.12 80709.60 75 -2298.68 4747.37 4863.19
2 91 -39915.85 80013.70 80229.35 89 -2267.17 4712.34 4849.78
3 93 -39763.65 79713.31 79933.69 91 -2262.74 4707.49 4848.01
4 95 -39932.11 80054.23 80279.35 93 -2260.09 4706.18 4849.80
5 97 -39727.88 79649.76 79879.62 95 -2245.96 4681.92 4828.62
6 99 -39727.07 79652.14 79886.75 97 -2245.96 4685.92 4835.71
7 101 -39726.57 79655.15 79894.49 99 -2245.96 4689.92 4842.80
8 103 -39726.01 79658.02 79902.11 101 -2245.96 4693.92 4849.88
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
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2.8 Appendix: Steps in the Construction of the Simulated 95%
Confidence Intervals of the Log Odds Ratios
The following steps are involved in the construction of the 95% confidence interval of the
probability of any (log odds ratio of an) outcome of interest.
1. Randomly draw a vector of parameters from the asymptotic Normal distribution of all
native respectively immigrant parameter estimates including the ones that refer to the endoge-
nous variables (grade g and schooling delay Vt) and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
2. Consider the first estimated point of support of the unobservables and associate it to
the R draws of the native and immigrant sample, so to ZN respectively ZI.
3. Consider for all R vectors of observed and unobserved variables all possible paths that
lead to the outcome of interest and calculate the chain of probabilities associated to each of
these paths using the drawn parameter estimates as to predict the probabilities that these
paths are realised.
4. Sum over all the possible paths to predict the R probabilities of realisation of the
outcome of interest for the R draws of observed and unobserved explanatory variables.
5. Consider the draw of the next estimated point of support and repeat the steps 2 to 5
until the K estimated points of support are considered.
6. Calculate the weighted sum of the probabilities calculated in step 4 for each point of
support where the weights correspond to the drawn estimated probability pk(λˆ).
7. Go to step 1. and repeat all subsequent steps until these steps are repeated J = 999
times.
8. The 95% confidence interval can be constructed by choosing the appropriate percentiles
of the J = 999 simulated probabilities.
3
Do Employers Discriminate Less if Vacancies
Are Difficult to Fill? Evidence From a Field
Experiment
This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Bart Cockx (Ghent University, Université catholique
de Louvain, CESifo and IZA), Niels Gheyle (Ghent University) and Cora Vandamme (Ar-
genta).
3.1 Introduction
It is well known that discrimination is not sustainable in a perfectly competitive product mar-
ket (Becker, 1957). Similarly, discrimination is not possible in a perfectly competitive labour
market (see, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Employers paying discriminated workers a
lower wage than marginal productivity are driven out of the market by free entry, since em-
ployers without a preference for discrimination are willing to offer to these workers wages
that do equal marginal productivity. However, recent contributions to the literature (see, e.g.,
Manning, 2003) have shown that employers, even if they operate in labour markets composed
of many competing firms, can exercise a certain degree of monopsony power and can therefore
43
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discriminate against certain groups of workers without being driven out of the market. Monop-
sony power raises with search costs of employees and falls with search costs of employers. On
the one hand, search costs incurred by employees limit their capacity to change employer and
hence confer some power to employers to discriminate. On the other hand search costs at the
employer side increase foregone output during the period that vacancies remain unfilled if a
minority candidate is turned away. The primary objective of this study is to verify whether
this second prediction holds: Do employers discriminate less if they have difficulties in filling
their vacancies?
Contrary to the relationship between competition on the product market and discrimina-
tion,1 the relationship between labor market tightness and discrimination has received little
attention in the economic literature. Biddle and Hamermesh (2012) refer to Ashenfelter (1970)
and Freeman (1973) arguing that “the perceived costs to employers of discriminating was higher
in tight labor markets”, but add that “neither found empirical evidence of cyclical movements
in pure wage discrimination in the aggregate data.” In addition, Booth et al. (2012) indicate
that the heterogeneity by city in discrimination found in Australia is potentially partly driven
by differences in labour market tightness. Apart from these authors, hardly any discussion
of this relationship can be found in the literature. Biddle and Hamermesh (2012) are a rare
exception in investigating this relationship, albeit indirectly, by studying how wage discri-
mination evolves over the business cycle. Building on the works of Black (1995) and Rosén
(2003), they develop a theoretical equilibrium search model to get a better understanding
of the underlying mechanisms of the cyclical variation in wage discrimination. At the same
time this model forms the theoretical basis for our empirical analysis, since it confirms the
aforementioned intuition that employers discriminate less if they face a tight labour market.2
In this study we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to directly assess the relation-
ship between labour market tightness and ethnic discrimination in the hiring process. To this
end we conducted a correspondence test in Flanders, the Northern and economically most
prosperous region of Belgium.3 We sent out 752 fictitious job applications of school-leavers,
1See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986), Peoples and Saunders (1993), Black and Strahan (2001), Heller-
stein et al. (2002), Black and Brainerd (2004) and, more recently, based on correspondence testing, Berson
(2012).
2Biddle and Hamermesh (2012) state this result only in words, but it can be formally found by differentia-
ting their Equation (9) with respect to ϕ: ∂c
∗
∂ϕ
= (1−β)λ
r+s+(1−β)ϕλ [rUA − c∗ − rUB ] < 0, where the negative sign
follows from the fact that the term between braces on the right hand-side of (9) is a weighted average of k+ x
and rUA and from the fact that k + x > rUA, so that c∗ > rUA − rUB or, equivalently, rUA − c∗ − rUB < 0.
Since ϕ is the rate at which workers arrive at employers, this rate decreases with labour market tightness
and, hence, c∗ increases with tightness and, since c∗ is inversely related to discrimination, discrimination falls.
Note that in this differentiation we hold UA and UB constant. This is because in the field experiment that
we consider in our empirical analysis the labour market tightness for job seekers is given. They can apply for
vacancies irrespectively of whether these are difficult to fill or not.
3Belgium is a federal state divided in three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. In Flanders the
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randomly assigned to individuals with a Flemish and a Turkish sounding name, to 376 vacan-
cies for jobs requiring no work experience. Classifying these jobs on two measures of labour
market tightness, autonomously constructed by the Public Employment Service of Flanders,
we verify to what extent our measure of discrimination, the differential callback rate, differs
between types of jobs. We perform sensitivity analysis to rule out that the found relationship
just reflects correlation with other determinants of discrimination related to labour market
tightness.
Our results confirm the negative relationship between labour market discrimination and
labour market tightness. We find no significantly unequal treatment between the Flemish and
Turkish job candidates in our experimental dataset when they apply for bottleneck occupa-
tions, that are occupations for which vacancies take long to fill. In contrast, Turkish job seekers
applying for non-bottleneck occupations have to send out twice as many job applications in
order to get the same number of job interviews as their Flemish counterparts.
Readers may take an interest in this study for a number of additional reasons. First, we
focus on ethnic discrimination of school-leavers. Discrimination of this group is particularly
relevant since discrimination at the first stage of the career may cause, through scarring (Aru-
lampalam, 2001; Gregg, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005), long-term adverse labour market
outcomes even if discrimination does not play a role at later stages of the career.
Second, we provide evidence on hiring discrimination in the Flemish labour market. Flan-
ders, and by extension Belgium, is an interesting case for a couple of reasons. In the 1990’s
the International Labour Office (ILO) conducted a series of ethnic discrimination studies in
the three Belgian regions on the basis of audit and correspondence tests. Discrimination was
found to be a significant and, compared with other OECD countries, more pronounced im-
pediment to the employment of foreigners in Belgium (Arrijn et al., 1998). However, OECD
(2008) argues that the results of the ILO studies probably had a stronger policy impact in
Belgium than elsewhere. Affirmative action in combination with a stricter anti-discrimination
legislation introduced in 2007 should have diminished labour market discrimination. Together
with the very recent studies of Capéau et al. (2012b) and Capéau et al. (2012a)4 our findings
raise doubts on this conjecture.
This chapter is structured in the following way. In the next section we outline our experi-
mental design. Subsequently we present a statistical analysis of the resulting dataset. A final
official language is Dutch, in Wallonia French and in Brussels both languages.
4Capéau et al. (2012b) and Capéau et al. (2012a) tested for the presence of discrimination in several
dimensions in the three regions of Belgium: sex, age, ethnicity and nationality, pregnancy, and physical
handicap. Their findings are, however, somewhat difficult to compare with the existing literature, since, in
contrast to this literature, they compare callbacks between individuals who differ in more than one dimension
at a time. We refer to their papers for further discussion.
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section concludes and provides a brief discussion.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Detecting Ethnic Discrimination by a Correspondence Test
Correspondence experiments to test for discrimination in the labour market have been ex-
tensively used (and refined) during the last decade. These experiments consist of sending
carefully matched pairs of fictitious written job applications, randomly assigned to individuals
revealing their minority status by their name or another individual characteristic, to real
job openings and monitoring the subsequent callback. Concerning the identification of eth-
nic discrimination the extensive correspondence test conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) is seminal. These authors show that, in the US labour market at the start of the former
decade, applications with white-sounding names received 50% more positive callback on their
job applications than those with African-American-sounding names. In Europe, pervasive le-
vels of ethnic labour market discrimination are found in Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the UK
(Drydakis and Vlassis, 2010; McGinnity et al., 2009; Bursell, 2007; Carlsson and Rooth, 2007;
Wood et al., 2009). Besides, recent correspondence studies conclude that there is evidence of
varying degrees of hiring discrimination based upon, for example, (i) gender in Austria, France
and Spain, (ii) beauty in Sweden and (iii) sexual orientation in Austria, Greece and Sweden
(Weichselbaumer, 2004; Petit, 2007; Albert et al., 2011; Rooth, 2007; Weichselbaumer, 2003;
Drydakis, 2009; Ahmed et al., 2011). Furthermore, the correspondence methodology has also
been applied to identify discrimination in other markets (an example is Carlsson and Eriksson
(2012), in the Swedish housing market).
These field experiments have been widely viewed as providing the most convincing evidence
on discrimination (Pager, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002). Researchers using non-experimental
data possess far less information than employers do. Native and foreign employees who ac-
cording to these data appear similar to researchers may therefore be very different from the
employers’ perspective. By conducting a correspondence test, selection on individual unob-
servable characteristics is not an issue since all the employers’ decision making information
is controlled for by the researcher. Thereby strict equivalence between candidates is ensured.
Moreover, this approach allows disentangling employer discrimination from alternative expla-
nations of differential hiring rates between migrants and natives, such as differential employee
preferences and network effects.
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3.2.2 Construction of Applications and Matching with Vacancies
We generated template CVs and cover letters for eight profiles of school-leavers. These dif-
ferent profiles allow us to apply for vacancies with different requirements both in terms of
schooling level and specialisation. First, three middle educated profiles with a secondary edu-
cation diploma (ISCED5 3) in commerce, metallurgy and organisation help. Second, five high
educated profiles holding a professional bachelor in business administration (ISCED 5) with
a different specialisation (accounting and tax, finance and insurance, logistics, marketing and
legal practice).6
All profiles were single males with the Belgian nationality graduated in June 2012. De-
pending on the region of the announced workplace in the vacancy, their residence was located
in one of the suburbs of Antwerp or Ghent, the two largest cities of Flanders. Middle educated
school-leavers were 18 years old and high educated school-leavers were 21 years old. So, none
of the candidates experienced a grade retention in the past. In addition we added to each
application the following features: Dutch mother tongue,7 adequate French and English lan-
guage skills, driving license, computer skills and student employment experience. Moreover,
the cover letters signalled a motivated, structured and capable person. For the high educated
school-leavers also sport club membership and student leadership were added. Last, we added
a fictitious postal address (based on real streets in middle-class neighbourhoods) and date of
birth to the applications. The CV and cover letters are available on request.
During five months, from November 2011 until March 2012, we randomly selected vacancies
from the database of the Flemish Public Employment Service (PES or “VDAB” in Dutch),
the major job search channel in Flanders, for which (at least) one of our eight profiles was
adequately educated. We restricted ourselves to vacancies for which no work experience was
required and which were posted less than a fortnight before the start of the experiment.8
The ethnicity of the candidate was only signalled by the name. Turkish names were used
because the Turkish community forms the most significant ethnic minority in Ghent and the
second most important in Antwerp. In addition, the unemployment rate for residents of non-
EU-15 countries (among which Turkey) is very high. In 2011 23% of the active non-EU-15
residents were unemployed in Belgium, compared to 6% of the active Belgians.9 Finally,
5ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education.
6This degree is among the highest that migrants obtain in Flanders (Duquet et al., 2006).
7Thereby, we isolate the effect of ethnicity from potential language effects.
8This choice was made in order to maximise the callback rate, since interviews with human resources
managers revealed that filled vacancies are not always immediately removed from the PES database.
9Source: Eurostat. A study of the PES shows that the unemployment rate of individuals with a Turkish
origin traditionally lies above the non-EU-15 average in Flanders (VDAB, 2009a).
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typical Flemish and Turkish names can be easily distinguished.10
For each of the eight aforementioned profiles of school-leavers we created two types of CVs
and cover letters: “Type A” and “Type B”. This allowed us to send two applications, one
of each type and of each ethnic group, to the same vacancy. To maximise comparability,
both application types were identical in all job-relevant characteristics, such as number of
months of work experience in student work,11 language skills and quality of extra-curricular
engagements. Type A and Type B candidates obtained education in the same type of school,
with a comparable reputation. The applications just differed in inessential details, such as
the name of the school, favourite sports and other particular engagements, and in fonts and
lay-out.12 In order to completely erase any dependence of call backs on the application type
Flemish and a Turkish sounding name were alternately assigned to the Type A and Type B
versions and, subsequently, sent in an alternating order to vacancies, each time with a one-day
delay in between.
We matched to each assigned name an email address and a mobile phone number. These
were registered with large commonly used internet and telecommunication providers. We
logged for each application sent the number of announced (similar) job positions in the va-
cancy, the address of the workplace, the gender of the recruiter (if available), the date of the
application, the application profile (one of the five high educated or one of the three middle
educated profiles) and the application type (A or B).
3.2.3 Measurement of Callback
All applications were sent to the employer by email. Callbacks for interviews were received by
telephone voice mail or by email. The content of the responses are available on request. Since
we included postal addresses with a nonexistent street number in the applications, callback
via regular mail could not be measured. However, several human resource managers confirmed
that employers rarely, if ever, invite job candidates by regular mail for selection interviews. To
minimise inconvenience to the employers, invitations were immediately declined. All callback
later than 40 days after sending the application was neglected. This, however, turned out to
10Based on frequency data on first names and surnames we chose “Thomas Mertens” and “Jonas Vermeulen”
as Flemish sounding names and “Emre Sahin” and “Okan Demir” as Turkish sounding names. We checked
that these names were no stereotypes. Assigning different pairs of names to the middle and high educated
individuals allowed to let both categories of individuals apply for vacancies of the same employer without
risking detection.
11Note that restricting the analysis to school-leavers has an advantage from a methodological point of view.
Controlling for human capital is easier for them, since we need not take labour market experience (beyond
student work) into account.
12To be as realistic as possible, we adapted templates that the PES posts on its website as examples for job
seekers.
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be an artificial restriction since no response was received after 40 days.
In our analysis we distinguish between two definitions of positive callback. Positive callback
sensu stricto means that the candidate is invited for an interview related to the job for which
he applied. This definition is mostly used in the literature and therefore our benchmark
definition. Positive callback sensu lato includes in addition to the sensu stricto definition also
the receipt of an alternative job proposal and the request to provide more information or to
contact the recruiter.
3.2.4 Variation in Labour Market Tightness
We matched each vacancy one-to-one with an occupation in the classification list of the PES.13
For each occupation the PES provided us with two autonomously constructed measures of
labour market tightness in 2011. First, the median duration to fill a vacancy in this occupation.
This duration is right censored at vacancy withdrawal. Second, the so called “bottleneck”
status of the occupation. Each year a list of bottleneck occupations is published by the PES.
This list is obtained combining three statistical criteria and is then assessed by a number of
labour market specialists. These three criteria are that (i) there must be at least 10 vacancies
for the concerned occupation in the PES database, (ii) the vacancy filling rate must be lower
than the median filling rate for all occupations together, and (iii) the median duration until
a vacancy in this occupation is filled must be greater than the median for all occupations
together. According to VDAB (2009b), the bottleneck status is driven by the relative size
of the pool of adequately skilled workers, the wage level and the working conditions in these
occupations. In the benchmark empirical analysis we rely on this second measure. The first
measure is used in a sensitivity analysis as a robustness check.
Table 3.10 in the Appendix of this chapter lists the classifications of the occupations, some
variables characterising these occupations and the number of fictitious applications that were
sent to each of these occupations. First, both PES measures of labour market tightness for
these occupations in 2011 are reported. The occupations with the minimum and maximum
median vacancy duration in our experimental dataset are consultant in recruitment and selec-
tion (13 days) and demonstrator (109 days). “Bottleneck” occupations are industrial cleaner,
classic cleaner, private cleaner, customs declaration officer, executive expedition operator,
planning and logistics clerk, shipping agent at the quay, bookkeeper, accountant, seller, repre-
sentative, call center employee and tele-seller. Second, the table contains two indicators of
customer contact in the occupations, which will be used in the sensitivity analysis. Third,
13This occupation classification is a classification at 5-digit level. The PES classifies occupations in bottle-
neck and non-bottleneck occupations at this level.
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it reports the number of observations (twice the number of vacancies) for each of the occu-
pations by level of education. For three occupations (administrative clerk, commercial clerk
and representative) applications were sent out for both middle and high educated profiles,
depending on the particular requirements in the vacancy.
3.2.5 Research Limitations
In short we assess some research limitations inherent to our experimental design. For an in-
depth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of correspondents tests in general we refer
to Riach and Rich (2002) and Pager (2007) and for an elaboration on the ethical aspects of
this kind of tests to Riach and Rich (2004).
First, our experimental design can only demonstrate discrimination, if any, at the initial
stage of the selection process. Since we simply measure callback rates for first interviews, we
cannot make any statements about discrimination in the later stages of the selection process,
let alone in wages. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) argue that reduced interview
rates are expected to be reflected in reduced job offers and lower earnings. Moreover, since job
interviews are costly, firms invite candidates for an interview only if they have a reasonably
high chance of getting the job.
Second, we only investigate discrimination for a selection of occupations and for vacancies
posted at the PES database. Possibly, discrimination is more or less pervasive in other sectors
than those that are covered by the database and among employers who rely on other channels
(for instance social networks) for filling their vacancies. It is unclear whether these limitations,
taken together, may lead to an overestimation or rather an underestimation of discrimination
in the Flemish youth labour market. However, it is important to keep in mind that we are
especially interested in the relationship between discrimination and labour market tightness.
If, therefore, the limitations mentioned cause a similar shift in the discrimination measures for
the bottleneck and for the non-bottleneck occupations, our main research conclusions remain
valid.
Last, as demonstrated by Heckman (1998), our design does not allow to distinguish between
taste-based discrimination on the one hand and statistical discrimination on the other hand.
Kaas and Manger (2012) and Carlsson and Rooth (2008) show how, to some extent, these forms
of discrimination can be disentangled within the correspondence test framework. However,
disentangling these forms of discrimination is outside the scope of this study.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
In this section we follow the international literature by reporting descriptive statistics on un-
equal treatment of Flemish and Turkish job candidates and on the relative callback probability
of these groups.
Table 3.1 presents the aggregate experimental results adopting the sensu stricto definition
of positive callback. Table 3.7 (in the Appendix of this chapter) displays the same statistics
using the sensu lato definition. Since two applications were sent to each vacancy there are
four possible outcomes: (i) positive callback for neither candidate, (ii) positive callback for
both candidates, (iii) only positive callback for the Flemish candidate and (iv) only positive
callback for the Turkish candidate. Overall, in 79 (139) of the 372 vacancies at least one can-
didate received positive callback sensu stricto (sensu lato). 29 (45) cases resulted in a positive
callback for just the Flemish candidate and 7 (15) for the Turkish candidate only. The net
discrimination rate is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the number of vacancies
in which the Flemish and, respectively, Turkish candidate was treated favourably, and the
total number of vacancies in which at least one candidate received a positive callback. Overall
the net discrimination rate is 0.28 (0.22) adopting the sensu stricto (sensu lato) definition of
positive callback. A standard χ2 test of the hypothesis that the candidates of both ethnicities
were equally often treated unfavourably is rejected at the 1% level. Based on this statistic we
conclude that there is evidence of discrimination against Turkish school-leavers in the Flemish
labour market.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.7 in the Appendix of this chapter also show the same descriptive
statistics after splitting up the data in vacancies for bottleneck and non-bottleneck occupa-
tions. For the remainder of this section, we will focus, unless stated otherwise, on the results
for this split-up and for the sensu stricto definition of positive callback. Note, however, that
the results based on the alternative definition go in the same direction across all presented
statistics.
Table 3.1 indicates that the net discrimination rate varies with labour market tightness in
the expected direction. It is hardly different from zero for bottleneck occupations. In sharp
contrast, this statistic is 0.50 for non-bottleneck occupations: while for 22 of the 195 vacancies
only the Flemish candidate received a positive callback, just one vacancy resulted in a positive
response for the Turkish candidate only. The more competition employers face in attracting
workers, the lower the discrimination rate, since discrimination is then too costly.
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Table 3.1: Unequal Treatment of Flemish and Turkish Job Candidates (Sensu Stricto)
Occupations Jobs Neither Both Only Only ND χ2
callback callback Flemish Turkish
callback callback
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
All 376 297 43 29 7 0.28∗∗∗ 13.44
Bottleneck 181 144 24 7 6 0.03 0.08
Non-bottleneck 195 153 19 22 1 0.50∗∗∗ 19.17
Note. ND: net discrimination rate. The null hypothesis is that both individuals are equally often treated unfavourably. ***(**)((*))
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
Table 3.2: Positive Callback Rates (Sensu Stricto) for Flemish and Turkish Job Candidates
Occupations Callback Callback Callback t
rate Flemish rate Turkish ratio
All 0.19 0.13 1.43∗∗∗ 3.73
Bottleneck 0.17 0.17 1.03 0.28
Non-bottleneck 0.21 0.10 2.05∗∗∗ 4.59
Note. The null hypothesis is that the callback rate is equal for both ethnicities. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the
observations at the vacancy level. ***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
Table 3.2 presents callback rates by ethnicity. These confirm the findings based on the
net discrimination rate. The callback rate is defined as the number of positive callbacks
relative to the total number of sent applications. The callback ratio is obtained by dividing
the Flemish callback rate by the Turkish callback rate. The callback ratio is only significantly
different from 1 for the individuals who apply for a non-bottleneck occupation. Candidates
with Turkish sounding names need to send out more than twice as many job applications to
be invited to as many job interviews as the Flemish candidates.
A counterintuitive result in Table 3.2 is that the callback rate for the Flemish candidates
is lower when they apply for bottleneck occupations than when they apply for non-bottleneck
occupations. This finding seems to be largely driven by the 168 observations (84 vacancies)
with as an occupation industrial, classic and private cleaner. Callback rates for these cleaning
occupations are both for Flemish and for Turkish candidates very low, namely 0.09. This may
be a consequence of employers preferring female candidates for these jobs and of our candidates
being to some extent overqualified for these jobs. If we drop these 170 observations from the
dataset the callback rate sensu stricto (sensu lato) for bottleneck occupations increases for
the Flemish from 0.17 (0.32) to 0.24 (0.39) and for the Turks from 0.17 (0.31) to 0.23 (0.41).
As expected, the coefficient of the indicator of bottleneck occupations becomes, in this case,
positive but is still not statistically significant.
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Table 3.3: Main Empirical Analysis. The Probability of Positive Callback: Probit Estimates,
Average Partial Effects
Variables Positive callback
Sensu stricto Sensu lato
Turkish name * Bottleneck occupation −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.03)
Turkish name * Non-bottleneck occupation −0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.15∗∗∗ (0.03)
Log-likelihood -328.93 -446.47
Observations 752 752
Note. Other control variable: indicator of bottleneck occupations. The reported average partial effects are averages over the Turkish
population. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level and calculated using the delta method, are in parentheses.
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
3.3.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section ethnic differences in positive callback rates are estimated on the basis of various
probit models with the callback indicator (following both the sensu stricto and sensu lato
definitions) as the dependent variable. Since characteristics of applicants are by construction
orthogonal to ethnicity, adding these characteristics or not to the probit model does not affect
the estimates of our main coefficients of interest, the interaction effects with ethnicity. We
therefore choose to leave these characteristics out of the analysis.
The statistics in Table 3.3 (and Table 3.9 in the Appendix of this chapter) square with those
reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.8. In our experimental dataset, overall, a Turkish sounding
name lowers the probability of receiving an invitation for a job interview by 11 percentage
points after applying for a non-bottleneck occupation, while for bottleneck occupations the
callback rate is not significantly different between the Turks and the Flemish. Equality of the
related estimation coefficients for the probit model is rejected at the 1% significance level.
We conducted an extensive number of robustness checks on the aforementioned results. In
a first robustness check, we estimate the probit model with the alternative variable capturing
labour market tightness, namely the median vacancy duration time for the occupation for
which the individual candidates. We normalise this variable by subtracting the sample mean
and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Table 3.4 shows that an increase of the median
vacancy duration by one standard deviation, that is by about 17 days, lowers discrimination
by four percentage points. This result confirms that labour market discrimination is lower for
occupations with high labour market tightness. In addition, we also looked into the effect of
the standard deviation of the vacancy duration time for the occupation as higher standard
deviations might be related to higher uncertainty about the arrival rate of new adequate
(native) candidates after sending away a minority candidate. This exercise, however, led to
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis 1. The Probability of Positive Callback: Probit Estimates,
Average Partial Effects
Variables Positive callback
Sensu stricto Sensu lato
Turkish name −0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Turkish name * Norm. median vacancy duration 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗∗ (0.02)
Log-likelihood -327.46 -444.23
Observations 752 752
Note. Other control variable: normalised median vacancy duration. The reported average partial effects are averages over the Turkish
population. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level and calculated using the delta method, are in parentheses.
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. The median vacancy duration time for the occupation is normalised by
subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation.
insignificant results.
A concern is that the coefficients of both measures of labour market tightness, the median
vacancy duration and the bottleneck status, may be affected by a simultaneity bias. We cannot
exclude that vacancy durations may be longer as consequence of discrimination. However, if
this were the case, the finding of less discrimination for bottleneck occupations would be
strengthened, since we find do not find a positive but a negative relationship between vacancy
duration and discrimination.
Another concern is that the bottleneck status of a job may correlate with other determi-
nants of discrimination, so that the observed correlation is not causal. In a second robustness
check we therefore include additional interactions between Turkish origin and four potential
determinants of discrimination that may be correlated with the bottleneck status of an occu-
pation. First, one could expect that labour market tightness is higher for jobs that require
more education. Moreover, both theoretical14 and empirical evidence15 show that discrimi-
nation decreases with the level of education, so that our findings on labour market tightness
could just reflect this relationship. Therefore, we include an indicator that identifies the high
educated candidates, in casu those holding a professional bachelor in business administration.
In our sample, individuals are high-educated in 34% of the applications for bottleneck occupa-
tions and in 61% of the applications for non-bottleneck occupations. Second, since customer
induced discrimination (Becker, 1957) is expected to be higher in occupations with intensive
customer contact, we include an indicator of intensive customer contact (see Section 3.2.4).
In our sample, intensive customer contact is a characteristic of 35% (15%) of the bottleneck
14Taubman and Wales (1974) argue that higher education can act as a prejudices reducing screening device.
In addition, if the level of education is reflected in the value of the production (“x”) one can use the model of
Biddle and Hamermesh (2012) to show that discrimination decreases with the level of education: It is clear
from their equation (9) that c∗ increases, and hence discrimination decreases, with x. The reason is that the
opportunity cost of an unfilled vacancy increases with x.
15See Bursell (2007), Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Wood et al. (2009).
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis 2. The Probability of Positive Callback: Probit Estimates,
Average Partial Effects
Variables Positive callback
Sensu stricto Sensu lato
Turkish name * Bottleneck occupation −0.09∗ (0.05) −0.08∗∗ (0.04)
Turkish name * Non-bottleneck occupation −0.22∗∗∗ (0.06) −0.25∗∗∗ (0.06)
Turkish name * High educated 0.14∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.06)
Turkish name * Customer contact −0.03 (0.04) −0.01 (0.05)
Turkish name * Norm. % foreign workers in sector 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Turkish name * Log(average wage in occupation) −0.16∗ (0.09) −0.05 (0.11)
Log-likelihood -315.40 -423.31
Observations 736 736
Note. Other control variables: indicator for bottleneck occupations, indicator for high educated candidates, indicator for occupations with
intensive customer contact, normalised fraction of foreign workers in the sector of the firm, natural logarithm of the average wage in the
occupation. The reported average partial effects are averages over the Turkish population. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the
vacancy level and calculated using the delta method, are in parentheses. ***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
The percentage of foreign workers in the sector of the employer is normalised by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample
standard deviation. 16 observations are dropped since neither the name of the firm nor its sector is given in 8 vacancies posted by labour
market intermediaries.
(non-bottleneck) jobs. Third, according to the social distance theory (Akerlof, 1997) hiring
discrimination should fall with the fraction of foreign workers in the firm (sector). Even if
there is only weak empirical evidence for this theoretical prediction (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007;
Bursell, 2007; Wood et al., 2009), we try to capture this relationship by including a variable
measuring the fraction of workers with a non-Western nationality in the sector of the firm as
a proxy of the fraction of foreign workers in the firm itself.16 This variable was constructed by
first identifying the sector of the employer that posted the vacancy17 and then by merging this
information to the fraction of workers with a non-Western nationality in the corresponding
sector (2-digit level) in Flanders on December 31, 2009.18 In our sample, the fraction of foreign
workers is 5% (2%) in the bottleneck (non-bottleneck) jobs. Fourth, we include the average
wage level in the occupation in 2010 as the bottleneck status of occupations is partly driven
by the wage level in these occupations (see Section 3.2.4).19 Therefore, the results presented
in Table 3.3 potentially only reflect that discrimination is higher in well paid occupations. In
our sample, the average wage level in the occupation is 2864 euro in the bottleneck jobs and
2946 in the non-bottleneck jobs.
16To our knowledge, these data are not available at the firm level in Belgium. Note that this proxy is also
imperfect in the sense that all candidates in our empirical setting have the Belgian nationality.
17We did this by linking, on the basis of the online database of the Flemish business periodical “Trends”,
the name of the employer to the sector.
18Source: Datawarehouse of the Belgian federal public service of social security.
19This average is not measured for the profession classification of the PES but for the ISCO-08 classification
at 3-digit-level which is, however, closely related to the former classification. ISCO stands for International
Standard Classification of Occupations.
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Table 3.5 reports the results for this second robustness check. The coefficients for the in-
teractions between Turkish origin and the two last mentioned variables have the expected sign
but are not significant. In contrast, the regression results provide, as expected, evidence of
significantly less discrimination against the high educated subsample of Turkish candidates.
In addition, we find weakly significant evidence for more discrimination in better paid occu-
pations. However, the inclusion of these additional interaction variables does not affect our
main conclusion. On the contrary, the differential discrimination against Turkish candidates
between bottleneck and non-bottleneck occupations becomes even slightly more pronounced.
Equality of the related estimation coefficients for the probit model is rejected at the 1% sig-
nificance level.
We also examined20 a number of alternative specifications in which Turkish origin is in-
teracted with (i) the indicators both of moderate and of intensive customer contact; (ii)
the fraction of Turkish (instead of non-Western) workers in the sector; (iii) the size of the
firm in terms of its average number of workers in 2010 and (iv) other employer (or vacancy)
characteristics (which we did not expect to be correlated with the bottleneck status of the
occupation), such as the number of announced (similar) job positions by the vacancy, the
province of the workplace or the gender of the recruiter.21 None of these alternatives modi-
fies our main conclusions in any way. The same holds true if we differentiate the interaction
between Turkish origin and bottleneck status by level of education.
Heckman and Siegelman (1993) show that not controlling for group differences in the vari-
ance of unobservable job-relevant characteristics (and thereby of unobservable determinants
of positive callback) can lead to spurious evidence of discrimination. To see this more clearly,
assume that both the average observed and unobserved determinants of productivity are the
same for Flemish and Turkish candidates for an unfilled vacancy, but that the variance of
unobservable job-relevant characteristics is higher for Flemish than for Turkish youth. In
addition, suppose that the employer considers the observed determinants of productivity, as
inferred from the CV and the motivation letter, are relatively low compared to the job re-
quirement. In that case it is rational for the employer to invite the Flemish and not the
Turkish candidate, since, as the variance of unobservable job relevant characteristics is higher
for the Flemish than for the Turkish candidates, it is more likely that the sum of observed
and unobserved productivity is higher for the Flemish candidates. A correspondence test that
detects discrimination against Turks could therefore overestimate the extent of discrimination.
However, with other assumptions the bias may be in the opposite direction.
20These findings are available upon request.
21We were not able to include an interaction with a dummy indicating recruiters from an ethnic minority
since hardly any recruiter had a foreign sounding name.
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Neumark (2012) explicitly addresses this critique and provides a statistical procedure in
order to recover unbiased estimates of discrimination. In what follows, we succinctly describe
Neumark’s approach. Subsequently, in a third robustness analysis, we apply this method
to check to what extent our conclusions are sensitive to this critique. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to follow Neumark in applying this methodology.
It is well known that in a standard probit model only the ratio of the coefficients to the
standard deviation of the unobserved residual is identified. In estimations the standard devi-
ation is usually arbitrary set to one. In our case this means that the variance of unobservable
job-relevant characteristics is implicitly assumed to be equal (to one) for both ethnic groups,
which, for reasons stated above, may therefore bias the intensity of discrimination. Neumark
(2012) shows, however, that if the researcher observes job-relevant characteristics that affect
the native and migrant populations’ propensities of call back in the same way, one can iden-
tify the ratio of the standard deviation of the unobserved productivity components of these
groups. The intuition is that if in a standard probit the estimated coefficients of these job-
relevant characteristics differ by ethnicity, then this must be a consequence of a differential
standard deviation, since by assumption the coefficient of these characteristics should be the
same across ethnic groups (and since, as mentioned before, in a probit model only the ratio
of the coefficients to the standard deviation are identified). To implement this idea, this just
boils down to the estimation of a heteroskedastic probit model in which the variance of the
error term is allowed to vary with ethnicity.
To identify the heteroskedastic probit model we assume that (i) the distance between
the living place of the candidate and the announced working place and (ii) the particular
application profiles, beyond their education level (high or middle educated), influence the
callback rates in a similar way for Flemish and Turkish candidates.22 The hypothesis of
equality of the coefficients concerning these variables for both ethnic groups cannot rejected
on the basis of a likelihood ratio test (p-value 0.88 or 0.87 following the sensu stricto or sensu
lato definition of positive callback).
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results. In line with Neumark (2012), we get a (non-
significantly) higher estimated variance of the error term for the foreign candidates. The
overall marginal effects of the interaction variables at interest are closely comparable to the
effects outlined in Table 3.3. They, however, can be decomposed in two parts. First, the partial
effect of the variables at interest, holding the variance constant. Second, the effect of the
22Note that candidates apply for job vacancies that require a level of education that matches the attained
level. Moreover, as mentioned, the extent of discrimination is expected to decline with the level of education,
so that the level of education cannot be used to identify the differential variance in the heteroskedastic probit
model.
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis 3. The Probability of Positive Callback: Heteroskedastic
Probit Estimates, Partial Effects
Variables Positive callback
Sensu stricto Sensu lato
Overall average partial effect
Turkish name * Bottleneck occupation −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.03)
Turkish name * Non-bottleneck occupation −0.11∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.14∗∗∗ (0.03)
Average partial effect through level
Turkish name * Bottleneck occupation −0.06 (0.07) −0.04 (0.06)
Turkish name * Non-bottleneck occupation −0.16∗∗∗ (0.06) −0.16∗∗∗ (0.05)
Average partial effect through variance
Turkish name * Bottleneck occupation 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04)
Turkish name * Non-bottleneck occupation 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
ln(σT /σF ) 0.25 (0.30) 0.17 (0.34)
Log-likelihood -304.73 -419.68
Observations 752 752
Note. Other controls: indicator of high educational attainment interacted with indicator of Turkish name, indicator of bottleneck occupa-
tion, indicator of high educational attainment, normalised variable capturing the distance (in minutes by car) between the announced work
place and the living place of the candidate and six indicators for the eight application profiles except one reference profile for both high and
middle level of education. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level and calculated using 500 bootstrap replications,
are in parentheses. ***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. ln(σT /σF ) stands for the natural logarithm of the
ratio between the standard deviation of unobservables for the Turkish and the Flemish subpopulation.
variables at interest via their impact on the variances of the unobservables. By disentangling
these components we obtain that the effects on the level of the latent variable are larger in
magnitude than the partial effects in Table 3.3.23 The effect on the callback chance sensu
stricto (sensu lato) of a Turkish sounding name applying to a non-bottleneck occupation
increases in absolute value changes from minus 11 (15) to minus 16 (16) percentage points. The
corresponding discrimination in case of application to a bottleneck occupation changes from
minus 1 (1) to minus 6 (4) percentage points, but remains insignificant. Clearly, discrimination
is more severe (although not significantly so) than in the analysis that ignores the role of ethnic
group differences in the variance of the error term. However, the differential discrimination
rate between bottleneck and non-bottleneck occupations is hardly affected.
As a fourth robustness check, available upon request, we extend the benchmark model by
including an interaction between Turkish origin and a monthly proxy for the labour market
tightness at a macro level: the number of vacancies divided with the number of unemployed
in Flanders in the month the job application was sent out. The estimated coefficient for this
interaction variable has the expected positive sign, implying that discrimination is lower in
23In contrast to Neumark (2012) who approximates the effect of a discrete change in the variables of interest
by a partial derivative, we explicitly take the discrete nature of these variables into account and measure these
effects on the basis of discrete changes in the callback probability.
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times of more labour market tightness at the macro level. However, probably because of the
limited variation in this macro variable, this effect is not significant.
3.4 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to test the theoretical relationship between
labour market discrimination and labour market tightness directly. If employers have difficul-
ties in filling a vacancy, turning a minority worker away is extra costly in terms of forgone
output, since the vacancy then risks to remain vacant for a long time. In the correspondence
test that we conducted, applicants with a Turkish sounding name were no longer discrimi-
nated against if they applied for occupations for which labour market tightness was high. In
contrast, if they applied for occupations for which there are plenty of candidates, they had
to send twice as many applications than candidates of native origin to be invited to a job
interview. These results were found to be robust to a number of sensitivity analyses.
From a policy point of view, these findings suggest that labour market discrimination can
be reduced by appropriate economic incentives; by increasing its cost. If thereby monopsony
power is reduced, intuitively, such policies need not come at an efficiency cost, but whether
this is the case clearly depends on the source of monopsony power and the precise nature of
the policy. Further theoretical analysis is required before we can formulate any clear policy
advice on this point. Our results also suggest to advise minorities to apply for jobs that are
difficult to fill. However, such a policy advice may only work to the extent the competencies of
minorities match the requirements for these jobs and that the tightness on the labour market is
partly a consequence of minorities not being informed about for which occupations employers
have difficulties in filling vacancies.
A well known limitation of correspondence tests is that they can only detect discrimination
in the first stage of the hiring process. It is not because we detect no discrimination for
bottleneck occupations at this first stage, that employers do not discriminate at a further
stage. For instance, a possible reason that employers find too few candidates for particular
occupations is that they do not pay enough relative to the job requirements. If this would
be the main reason why bottleneck occupations exist, wage discrimination could remain an
issue, even if employers do not discriminate in the hiring process, since, if as a consequence,
disproportionately more minority workers are hired in these occupations, they will earn on
average less than equivalent non-minority workers. Further research is therefore required to
investigate the importance of this issue.
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3.5 Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 3.7: Unequal Treatment of Flemish and Turkish Job Candidates (Sensu Lato)
Occupations Jobs Neither Both Only Only ND χ2
callback callback Flemish Turkish
callback callback
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
All 376 237 79 45 15 0.22∗∗∗ 15.00
Bottleneck 181 111 44 14 12 0.03 0.15
Non-bottleneck 195 126 35 31 3 0.41∗∗∗ 23.06
Note. ND: net discrimination rate. The null hypothesis is that both individuals are treated unfavourable equally often. ***(**)((*))
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
Table 3.8: Positive Callback Rates (Sensu Lato) for Flemish and Turkish Job Candidates
Occupations Callback Callback Callback t
rate Flemish rate Turkish ratio
All 0.33 0.25 1.32∗∗∗ 3.94
Bottleneck 0.32 0.31 1.04 0.39
Non-bottleneck 0.34 0.19 1.74∗∗∗ 5.09
Note. The null hypothesis is that the callback rate is equal for both ethnicities. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the
observations at the vacancy level. ***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
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Table 3.9: The Probability of Positive Callback for an Interview: Probit Estimates, Average
Partial Effects
Variables Positive callback
Sensu stricto Sensu lato
Turkish name −0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Log-likelihood -331.02 -449.83
Observations 752 752
Note. The reported average partial effects are averages over the Turkish population. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the
vacancy level and calculated using the delta method, are in parentheses. ***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level.
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On Grade Retention, Track Mobility and
Secondary School Completion
This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Bart Cockx (Ghent University, Université catholique
de Louvain, CESifo and IZA) and Prof. Dr. Matteo Picchio (Marche Polytechnic University,
Tilburg University, Ghent University and IZA).
4.1 Introduction
One of the most notable differences between school systems across OECD countries consists in
grade retention policies.1 Grade retention is used in many countries as a tool to improve poor
academic performances. The hypothesis is that, by resitting the same grade, low-achieving stu-
dents have extra time to catch up to the grade-level requirements, in terms both of knowledge
and emotional maturity. By having more time to develop the skills needed in the subsequent
grades, resitting students should be less at risk of failure in the future. Moreover, the threat of
retention might be an incentive device to work more diligently and harder. However, retention
might generate personal and academic costs with both short- and long-term effects, since it
might: hurt pupils’ self-esteem (Browman, 2005; Byrd et al., 1997); generate psychological
1See OECD (2004, p. 262) for a comparison of the features of school systems of OECD countries.
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costs of separating students from their peers (Alexander et al., 1994); produce financial costs
to the families and to society in terms of teaching resources (Eide and Goldhaber, 2005).
In the present study we examine the short-term and permanent effects of grade retention
on later success rates in school. We use econometric modelling tools and identification analysis
to examine the interrelated dynamics of secondary school grade retention, school track choices
and achievements of a sample of Belgian pupils living in Flanders. We also shed light on
the role played by family background and unobserved abilities, especially looking at how
unobserved abilities interact with retention episodes in determining schooling pathways.
The empirical analysis is carried out using the SONAR dataset, a retrospective survey
conducted in Flanders on the 1976, 1978 and 1980 cohorts. The SONAR dataset contains
very rich information on education, but also on family and labour market experiences. Our
sample is made up of 4,214 students belonging to the 1978 and 1980 cohorts. We exploit
the ample information on secondary school performances and choices available for these two
cohorts to estimate dynamic qualitative choice models.
The identification of the interrelated dynamics between grade retention, track mobility
and schooling attainment is obtained by addressing some key challenges. First, educational
achievements and choices are likely to be determined by a set of unobserved determinants,
for instance behavioural and cognitive skills, with an unknown correlation structure. In order
to disentangle the pure effects of past educational outcomes on future ones from the spurious
effects determined by unobserved abilities, we take into account the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity by semi-parametric maximum likelihood techniques (Heckman and Singer, 1984;
Mroz, 1999). Second, at the start of secondary school pupils have already different years of
delay due to retention episodes either in kindergarten or in primary school. If we assume that
grade retention affects future outcome variables, we have an initial conditions problem. The
years of delay at the beginning of secondary school cannot be easily assumed to be exogenous,
since they are very likely correlated to the unobserved determinants. We solve for initial
conditions by adding an equation for the years of delay at the beginning of secondary school
which depends on unobserved heterogeneity and an exclusion restriction (Heckman, 1981a).
Third, as pointed out by Fruehwirth et al. (2011), the effect of grade retention might be
heterogeneous and vary by students’ unobserved abilities. We allow therefore the effect of past
retention episodes to vary across different levels of the unobserved determinants. Fourth, there
might be sample selection attrition induced by students dropping out of secondary school. We
model therefore also the probability of exiting school without the secondary education diploma
at the end of each year from the end of compulsory education onwards, where the unobserved
components determining the school drop-out are allowed to be correlated to the unobserved
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determinants of the other endogenous processes.
In contrast to most of the previous findings, we find that grade retention has a positive
impact on the next evaluation and can permanently affect subsequent performances. The
direction of the permanent effect depends on unobserved heterogeneity. While more able stu-
dents are permanently penalised by retention, less able students benefit from it. We conclude
that when looking for the optimal retention policy, the interaction effect between retention
and students’ abilities should be taken into account.
This study is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the educational system of
secondary school in Flanders (Belgium). Section 4.3 describes the data and summarises basic
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.4 presents the
econometric model. Section 4.5 reports the estimation results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Flemish Secondary School Educational System
In this study we use data from Flanders, the Dutch speaking region of Belgium, situated in the
northern part of the country. Belgium is a federal country with several competences devolved
to its three Regions (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and three Communities (Dutch, French
and German speaking). While the federal authorities are competent for all matters of national
importance, territorial and person-related issues are left to Regions and Communities. The
Flemish Community is in charge of all aspects of education policy in Flanders.
Nationwide, the Belgian Constitution states that every child has the right to education,
which is granted by a compulsory education law. Compulsory education starts on 1 September
of the year in which the child turns 6 years old and ends on 30 June of the year in which (s)he
reaches the age of 18.2 Children start primary school in the year in which they turn 6 years
old. However, they might start one year earlier or some years later if in kindergarten they are
suggested to do so.3 Grade retention and grade skipping are also allowed in primary school.
Hence, pupils may start secondary school at different ages. In case of no retention or skipping
in primary school and regular age at the beginning of primary school, pupils start secondary
school in the year they turn 12 years old.4
In Flanders, when entering secondary school, students formally choose between hierarchical
ordered tracks. Students are grouped or tracked according to their abilities and interests, a
2Starting from the age of 15 (conditional on passing the first two years of full-time secondary education)
or the age of 16 (unconditionally), only part-time education is mandatory.
3In our sample, 1.4% of children started primary school in the year they turned 5 and 1.1% started it when
7 or 8.
4Out of 4,214 pupils in our sample, only 46 (1.1%) started secondary school in the year they turned 11
and 176 (4.2%) started secondary school with delay.
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quite common practice in OECD countries to take into account the diversity of skills and
preferences of pupils in education. In this study, as in Van de gaer et al. (2006) and Van
Houtte et al. (2012), we refer to ‘tracking’ as the situation in which students are taught
entirely different curricula depending on their curriculum choice which may be restricted after
unsatisfactory performances. This is different from ‘setting’ or ‘banding’, where pupils in
the same curriculum are taught at different difficulty levels given their ability (Gamoran
et al., 1995). The Flemish secondary school system consists of several tracks which can
be divided into four main education forms: i) general education (ASO) which emphasises
general education and provides firm foundations for tertiary education; ii) technical education
(TSO) which provides general foundations for practising a profession; iii) art education and
iv) vocational education (BSO) which is oriented to the accumulation of skills for a specific
profession. In this study, we do not consider the art education track, because of the small
number of pupils in our sample choosing it. Our analysis is limited to track choices and track
mobility between ASO, TSO and BSO. Students obtain the secondary school diploma if they
successfully pass the 6 grades of ASO and TSO and the 7 grades of BSO. All the secondary
school diplomas give access to tertiary education.
Track mobility in secondary school is allowed with the following constraints and features.
First, track change is not permitted at the beginning of the last grade, hence at the beginning
of grade 6 for the ASO and the TSO tracks and grade 7 for the BSO track. Second, tracks
are hierarchical and moving upward is not allowed; it is not possible to go from BSO to
TSO/ASO or from TSO to ASO. It is anyway possible at the beginning of each academic year
to downgrade the track and move from ASO to TSO/BSO and from TSO to BSO. Finally,
track mobility is also possible at a finer level within the ASO, TSO and BSO tracks. Within
each major track, it is indeed possible to identify hierarchical subtracks with different curricula
of different complexity for which the just mentioned track mobility constraints are satisfied.
The data at hand allow us to identify two hierarchical subtracks for ASO, which we name
ASO+ and ASO− and two hierarchical subtracks for TSO, labelled TSO+ and TSO−.5
At the end of each academic year, pupils receive an evaluation: A, B, or C. Pupils getting
an A can access the next grade and, if they wish, can downgrade the track. Pupils obtaining
a C must resit the grade and, if they wish, can downgrade the track. Pupils getting a B can
decide whether to resit the grade or not. If they decide to resit, they can stay in the same
track. If they decide not to resit the grade, they must downgrade the track.
Given the set-up of the Flemish educational system, there are different choices that pupils
5More concretely, ASO+ comprises the curricula including Latin and Ancient Greek and TSO+ comprises
the curricula focussed on industrial sciences and on commerce.
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(or/and their parents) have to make in each academic year. First, they have to decide the
track. Second, if at the end of the year they get a B, they have to decide whether to resit the
grade or not. Finally, they have to decide whether to downgrade the track. Once they turn 18
years old, they can also choose to drop-out the school without the diploma. We will model all
these choices and students’ performances (evaluation and secondary school completion) in a
multiple-equations dynamic model for categorical outcome variables, where past choices and
past performances are allowed to affect future schooling pathways.
4.3 Data and Sample
The dataset used in the empirical investigation comes from the SONAR survey. The SONAR
survey retrospectively collected information on education, family background, family forma-
tion and labour market experiences for a sample of almost 9,000 of individuals living in Flan-
ders and born in 1976, 1978, or 1980.6 The 1976 cohort was interviewed thrice, at age 23, 26
and 29. The 1978 cohort was interviewed twice, at age 23 and 26. Finally, the 1980 cohort
was interviewed only once at age 23. While we only know starting and ending years of pri-
mary school, for secondary school we have detailed information, year by year, on school track
choices, evaluations, school drop-out and obtaining the diploma.
Since there is no detailed information on tracks for the 1976 cohort, we removed it from the
sample and are left with 5,953 pupils. In order to have a sample of pupils with a homogeneous
educational, social and family background, we removed from the sample pupils whose grand-
mother on mother’s side have a foreign nationality, pupils who need special help, temporarily
or permanently, and are therefore in special schools and pupils who start secondary school
when older than 15. We also deleted those entering the art curriculum, those reporting a break
of one or more years in secondary school attendance, those leaving school before the end of
compulsory education and those with inconsistent or missing information on the progression
of the grade, evaluation and grade mobility. After applying these selection criteria, we end
up with a sample of 4,214 pupils. The exit from secondary school might take place with or
without the diploma. In our sample there are students who are retained multiple times; the
observed maximum number of years in secondary school is 11. If students move to part-time
education, they are censored in the year they move to it. Hence, we use all the information
6A study of the representativeness of the sample was conducted by the SONAR group and reported in
SONAR (2000b). The sample is representative with respect to gender. Comparing the sample with respect
to other characteristics is more difficult because of a lack of comparable data. A cautious comparison with
statistics of the Ministry of Education and the Labor Force Study reveals that the sample is representative
with respect to family formation. The lower educated, the unemployed and respondents from lower social
classes are instead somewhat under-represented.
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until the transition to part-time education, but we disregard all the information from the
moment of entering part-time education.7
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of schooling attainment and choices which we model
in the empirical analysis. First, we report some outcomes and decisions at the end of the
schooling year averaged over the secondary education career. In our sample on average almost
90% get an A, the highest evaluation, while about 6% and 4% are assigned a B and a C,
respectively. Around 5% of the pupils are retained on average at the end of the academic
year.8 We hardly see track transitions involving downgrades of more than 2 steps: only 48
track transitions involve a downgrade of three steps and nobody makes a 4-step downgrade,
that is from ASO to BSO. Hence, given the starting track, information on track changes
compressed in no downgrade, 1-step downgrade and 2-step downgrade is able to describe
almost all the possible track transitions. In 90% of the cases, pupils stay in the same track,
while 7.5% of the students start the new year with a 1-step track downgrade and 2.5% with a
2-step downgrade. Second, Table 4.1 shows the average cumulative delay at the beginning of
grade 1 and grade 2 and at the end of secondary school (irrespective of whether one exits with
or without a diploma). At the beginning of secondary education, the average number of years
of schooling delay is 0.03. No student is retained at this first grade. By the end of secondary
school pupils are on average retained for 0.32 years. Third, Table 4.1 reports the relative
frequency of track choices at the beginning of grade 1 and grade 2. At the beginning of grade
1, we have only partial information about the school track choice. We only know whether
the student is in the vocational track (BSO) or not (ASO/TSO). This partial observability
generates a complication in modelling track choice at the start of grade 1 and subsequent
downgrades. We explain how we deal with it in Subsection 4.4.4. Only starting from grade
2, we have more detailed information on the tracks and we can group track choices into five
hierarchical categories: ASO+, ASO−, TSO+, TSO− and BSO. At the beginning of grade
1, 6.3% of pupils choose BSO. As a result of some downgrading decisions, this frequency
increases almost up to 10% when moving to the second grade; 27% are instead in ASO+, 40%
in ASO− and the remaining 23% is split almost evenly between TSO+ and TSO−. By the
end of secondary education 19% of the pupils are in BSO, 13% are in ASO+, 36% in ASO−,
11% in TSO+ and 22% in TSO−. Finally, out of the 4,214 pupils who start secondary school,
4.4% enter part-time education and are therefore censored in our model, 86.5% are able to get
the full-time secondary education diploma, while the remaining 9.2% drop out of secondary
school without the diploma.
7Since only 184 students left full-time education for part-time education, we preferred not to model their
transition to part-time education and their future schooling experiences.
8This figure is in line with the figures reported in OECD (2004, p. 262) for the whole Belgium.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables: Schooling Attainment and Choices
Mean Std. Dev.
Outcomes and decisions at the end of the year
Evaluation: A 0.897 0.304
Evaluation: B 0.059 0.235
Evaluation: C 0.044 0.206
Retention 0.054 0.226
No downgrade 0.900 0.300
1-step downgrade 0.075 0.263
2-step downgrade (or more) 0.025 0.157
Cumulative delay
Cumulative delay at the beginning of grade 1 0.031 0.228
Cumulative delay at the beginning of grade 2 0.031 0.228
Cumulative delay at the end of secondary education 0.319 0.624
Track at the beginning of grade 1
ASO/TSO 0.938 0.242
BSO 0.063 0.242
Track at the beginning of grade 2
ASO+ 0.272 0.445
ASO− 0.403 0.490
TSO+ 0.095 0.293
TSO− 0.132 0.339
BSO 0.098 0.298
Track at the end of secondary school
ASO+ 0.133 0.340
ASO− 0.360 0.480
TSO+ 0.105 0.306
TSO− 0.218 0.413
BSO 0.185 0.388
Exit from secondary school
With diploma 0.865 0.342
Without diploma 0.092 0.289
Censored to part-time education 0.044 0.204
Number of pupils 4,214
Number of pupils × number of years of schooling 26,313
Note. The presented outcomes and decisions at the end of the year are yearly averages over the secondary education career.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Covariates at the Beginning of Secondary School
Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.502 0.500
Calendar day of birth 183.9 104.8
Father’s education (years) 6.201 3.339
Mother’s education (years) 5.809 3.032
Age at the beginning of primary school
5 years old 0.014 0.115
6 years old 0.976 0.154
7 years old 0.011 0.103
8 years old 0.0002 0.014
Age at the beginning of secondary school
11 years old 0.011 0.104
12 years old 0.947 0.223
13 years old 0.042 0.200
Cohort
1978 0.497 0.500
1980 0.503 0.500
Presence of siblings
0 0.138 0.345
1 0.465 0.499
2 0.257 0.437
3 or more 0.140 0.347
Number of pupils 4,214
Note. Father’s and mother’s education measure the number of successful schooling years beyond primary school, which lasts 6 years.
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Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of the covariates used in the econometric analysis.
Most of the pupils start primary education in time (97.6%), that is in the year they turn 6.
The fraction of those starting in time secondary school is smaller and equal to 94.7%, while
the fraction of those who start late rises from 1.3% in primary school to 4.2% in secondary
due to retention in primary school. Almost one half of the pupils have a sibling, 13.8% are
only child and almost 40% have more than one sibling. Pupils’ fathers are more educated than
pupils’ mothers, having on average 6.2 years of successful education beyond primary school
against 5.8 years for mothers.
4.4 The Econometric Model
In this section, we write down the likelihood function and clarify the identifying assumptions.
Finally, we deal with the problem of partial observability of tracks at the start of secondary
school.
4.4.1 Model Specification and the Likelihood Function
If we aim at understanding the determinants of educational achievements in secondary school,
we have to take into account that many determinants are potentially endogenous variables.
For example, the total number of years of delay with which students start each grade and the
different track choices they make might influence future schooling attainment and decisions,
but are at the same time the results of past performances and choices. Performances and
choices might be correlated across equations and over time due to the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. If we wish to disentangle the causal effects from the spurious ones, we have to
control for it.
The six outcome variables that we model for each student i at each academic year t, with
i = 1, · · · , N and t = 1, · · · , T are:
• Track choice at the beginning of secondary school (tri). Since tracks are hierarchi-
cally ordered, tri is an ordered response taking on the increasing values {BSO,TSO−,
TSO+,ASO−,ASO+}.
• Evaluation at the end of each academic year (evit) or, if in the last grade, the success
in getting the diploma (diit). evit is an ordered response taking on the increasing values
{C,B,A}. diit is instead binary and equal to 1 if the student gets the diploma at the
end of the academic year or equal to 0 if (s)he fails the last grade and has to resit.
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• School drop out (outit) if turning 18 (compulsory schooling age) in that calendar year or
older than 18. outit is a dummy indicator equal to 1 if the student drops out of school,
0 otherwise.
• Resitting decision (reit) if the evaluation is B (evit = B). reit is a dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if the student chooses to resit when (s)he gets a B, 0 if (s)he chooses instead
to downgrade.
• Track downgrade (dowit) which is defined as an ordered response taking values on
{0, 1, 2}, where 0 means ‘no downgrade’, 1 stands for ‘1-step downgrade’ and 2 is ‘2-step
downgrade’.
Furthermore, we have an initial conditions equation for the number of years of delay (ini) at the
beginning of secondary school. As mentioned before, pupils start secondary school at different
ages due to different past retention histories either in primary school or in kindergarten. If
we assume that past performances like past grade retention affect future outcome variables,
we have an initial conditions problem. The years of delay at the beginning of secondary
school cannot be easily assumed to be exogenous, since they are very likely correlated to the
unobserved determinants. We solve for initial conditions by adding an equation for the years
of delay at the beginning of secondary school which depends on unobserved heterogeneity and
an exclusion restriction (Heckman, 1981a). ini takes values on {−1, 0, 1}. It is equal to 0
when the student starts secondary school without delay, that is in the year in which (s)he
turns 12, to −1 if one year in advance and to 1 if one year late.
LetYit ≡ (evit, diit, outit, reit, dowit) be the vector collecting the five time-varying outcome
variables and zi be the vector of observed explanatory variables. Denote by vi ∈ R7 a random
vector of equation-specific time-invariant covariates that are unobserved to the analyst. This
vector of unobserved determinants has an unknown cumulative distribution function G.
We can always write the density of (ini, tri,Yi) conditional on (zi,vi) as:
f(ini, tri,Yi|zi,vi) = f(ini|zi,vi) · f(tri|zi,vi, ini)
·
T∏
t=1
f(Yit|zi,vi,Yit−1, · · · ,Yi1, tri, ini)
= f(ini|zi,vi) · f(tri|zi,vi, ini) ·
T∏
t=1
f(Yit|zi,vi,=it−1), (4.4.1)
where =it−1 denotes the information set containing all the realisations of the endogenous
variables from t−1 until the beginning of the processes, i.e. =it−1 = (Yit−1, · · · ,Yi1, tri, ini).
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Assumption 1 (Sequentiality):
Within each academic year t and for t = 1, 2, · · · , T , the five time-varying outcome variables
in Yt are realised sequentially with the following chronological order: performance at the end
of the year, either evaluation or achieving the diploma, (evt ∨ dit); school drop-out decision
(outt); resitting decision (ret); track downgrade decision (dowt).
Given Assumption 1 on the sequentiality of the realisations of the endogenous variables, it
is meaningful to rewrite the conditional density in Equation (4.4.1) as:
f(ini, tri,Yi|zi,vi) = f(ini|zi,vi) · f(tri|zi,vi, ini)
·
T∏
t=1
[
f(evit|zi,vi,=it−1)1−gitf(diit|zi,vi,=it−1)git
· f(outit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit)sit
· f(reit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit = B)1−git
· f(dowit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit, reit)cit
]
, (4.4.2)
where git is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is in the last grade of secondary
school and 0 otherwise, sit is a dummy equal to 1 if the student belongs to the set at risk
of school drop-out (legally allowed to drop out) and cit is equal to 1 if the student is in the
ASO/TSO tracks and 0 if (s)he is in the BSO track (BSO students do not have the option to
downgrade as already at the bottom of the track hierarchy). We cannot derive the likelihood
function on the basis of the density in Equation (4.4.2), because we do not observe vi. Instead,
we integrate vi out after assuming that it is orthogonal to zi.
Assumption 2 (Orthogonality):
vi ⊥ zi.
Under Assumption 2 on the orthogonality between the exogenous covariates and the unob-
servables we can integrate vi out once we specify its cumulative distribution function G(vi),
yielding the following marginal density:
f(ini, tri,Yi|zi) =
∫
R7
f(ini|zi,vi) · f(tri|zi,vi, ini)
·
T∏
t=1
[
f(evit|zi,vi,=it−1)1−gitf(diit|zi,vi,=it−1)git
· f(outit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit)sit
· f(reit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit = B)1−git
· f(dowit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit, reit)cit
]
dG(vi). (4.4.3)
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Providing an empirical specification to the each of the probability density functions in
Equation (4.4.3) leads to the sample log-likelihood function:
`(θ, δ) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[ ∫
R7
Li(θ, δ)
]
dG(vi; δ)
=
N∑
i=1
ln
{∫
R7
f(ini|zi,vi;θin) · f(tri|zi,vi, ini;θtr)
·
T∏
t=1
[
f(evit|zi,vi,=it−1;θev)1−gitf(diit|zi,vi,=it−1;θdi)git
· f(outit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit;θout)sit
· f(reit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit = B;θre)1−git
· f(dowit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit, reit;θdow)cit
]}
dG(vi; δ), (4.4.4)
where Li(θ, δ) is the individual contribution to the likelihood and θ and δ are parameters fully
characterising the probability density functions with respect to which the sample log-likelihood
will be maximised.
Assumption 3 (Logit and ordered logit probability density functions):
The probability density functions of both dichotomous and ordered response outcome variables
are assumed to have a logit form.
In Subsection 4.4.2, we clarify in more detail how the explanatory variables and past realisa-
tions enter the specification of the logit and ordered logit models of the probability density
functions in the log-likelihood function (4.4.4). We also explain how we deal with the unob-
served heterogeneity distribution and how we allow the unobserved determinants to interact
with retention episodes.
4.4.2 The Empirical Specification
4.4.2.1 The Initial Conditions
Students start secondary school at different ages, meaning that they have different numbers of
years of delay. This is due to a delayed beginning of primary school and/or retention in primary
school. In our econometric model, years of delay at the beginning of each secondary school
year can affect schooling choices and performances. This variable evolves over time according
to the realisation of episodes of retention, which is also one of the outcome variables. As such,
years of delay at the beginning of secondary school cannot be assumed to be a nonstochastic
starting position for each student. It is very likely to be endogenous since correlated to the
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unobserved determinants of schooling choices and performances. This results in an initial
conditions problem that we solve by specifying an ordered logit model for the years of delay,
where unobserved characteristics are allowed to be correlated to those determining future
outcomes and choices.
We specify the probability density function of the number of years of delay at the beginning
of secondary school as an ordered logit model. This outcome variable takes on the values −1,
0 and 1. We define as α1,in < α2,in the unknown cut points (threshold parameters) and as Λ
the logit function. The unobserved heterogeneity component vi,in enters the specification as
a shift in the threshold parameters. The probability density function of the initial conditions
is:
Pr(ini = −1|zi, vi,in) = Λ(α1,in + vi,in − z′iβin),
Pr(ini = 0|zi, vi,in) = Λ(α2,in + vi,in − z′iβin)− Λ(α1,in + vi,in − z′iβin),
Pr(ini = 1|zi, vi,in) = 1− Λ(α2,in + vi,in − z′iβin). (4.4.5)
Students with a higher level of vi,in are less likely to end up into the top category, that is to
start secondary school one year late.
4.4.2.2 The Track Choice at the Start of Secondary School
The track choice takes value on {BSO,TSO−, TSO+,ASO−,ASO+}. The probability density
function of the choice of the hierarchically ordered tracks is:
Pr(tri=BSO|xi, ini, vi,tr) = Λ(α1,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=TSO−|xi, ini, vi,tr) = Λ(α2,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α1,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=TSO+|xi, ini, vi,tr) = Λ(α3,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α2,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=ASO−|xi, ini, vi,tr) = Λ(α4,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α3,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=ASO+|xi, ini, vi,tr) = 1−Λ(α4,tr+vi,tr−x′iβtr−iniγtr), (4.4.6)
where xi ⊂ zi due to an exclusion restriction.
As exclusion restriction, we use the years of delay at the beginning of primary school. We
assume therefore that, at the beginning of secondary school, choices and performances are
not affected by the years of delay at the beginning of primary school but just by the years
of delay at the start of secondary school, conditional on the other covariates and unobserved
heterogeneity.
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4.4.2.3 The Evaluation
At the end of each academic year, pupils receive an evaluation: A, B, or C. As mentioned
before, an A allows students to move to the next grade. Students getting a C must resit the
grade. Students with a B can decide to downgrade the track if they wish to avoid resitting
the grade. The probability density function of the evaluation variable is specified as follows:
Pr(evit=C|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, vi,ev)=Λ
[
α1,ev+vi,ev−x′iβev−φev(ini, tri,=it−1)
]
,
Pr(evit=B|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, vi,ev)=Λ
[
α2,ev+vi,ev−x′iβev−φev(ini, tri,=it−1)
]
−Λ[α1,ev+vi,ev−x′iβev−φev(ini, tri,=it−1)],
Pr(evit=A|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, vi,ev)=1−Λ
[
α2,ev+vi,ev−x′iβev−φev(ini, tri,=it−1)
]
,(4.4.7)
where φev(ini, tri,=it−1) is the impact of past outcome variables on future evaluations. We
impose some parametric restrictions on the way in which the past is allowed to affect the
future. We keep in mind that, from the policy perspective, it is of interest to understand
whether and how students’ performance is affected by past retention episodes and by past
track downgrades. The impact of past outcome variables on future evaluations is modelled as
follows:
φev(ini, tri,=it−1) = ηevtrit + pievdowit−1
+ κevreit−1 + τevreit−1 · evit−1 + ψevtreit−1, (4.4.8)
where trit is the track at the beginning of the t-th academic year, reit−1 is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the individual was retained at the end of the previous year (resitting therefore in
the current year) and treit−1 = ini +
∑t−1
s=1 reis is the total years of delay at the beginning of
the t-th academic year. The coefficients κev and τev capture the transitory effect of retention
on the subsequent academic performance, while and ψev is the permanent effect. ηev captures
track heterogeneity in the ability of the students to get good evaluations. Finally, piev is the
effect of downgrading at the end of the last year on the current schooling achievement.
4.4.2.4 The School Drop-Out
In Belgium, compulsory education ends on 30 June of the year in which the youth reach the
age of 18. From that date onwards, the student is at risk of school drop-out without diploma.
Ignoring school drop-out might lead to sample selection attrition as it is not likely to be a
random process. We model therefore also the probability of exiting school without the diploma
at the end of each year, where the unobserved components determining the school drop-out are
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allowed to be correlated to the unobserved determinants of the other endogenous processes.
In the sequentiality of the events, school drop-out takes place at the end of the academic year,
after receiving the evaluation.9 The school drop-out variable is binary and equal to 1 in case
of drop-out. The logit model for pupils at risk of exit is:
Pr(outit=1|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, vi,out) = Λ
[
αout + vi,out + x
′
iβout
+ φout(ini, tri,=it−1, evit)
]
, (4.4.9)
Similar to Equation (4.4.8), the impact of past outcomes on the drop-out probability is:
φout(ini, tri,=it−1, evit) = ηouttrit + pioutdowit−1 + ωoutevit
+ κoutreit−1 + τoutreit−1 · evit−1 + ψouttreit−1. (4.4.10)
Compared to Equation (4.4.8), φout has the extra argument, evit, the evaluation of the just
ended academic year. Under the sequentiality assumption (Assumption 1), evit is predeter-
mined with respect to the realisation of the drop-out variable. Thereby, it acts as a valid
exclusion restriction in the drop-out equation.
4.4.2.5 The Resitting Choice for B Students
Students getting a B can choose either to resit or to downgrade the track. The choice is binary
and, conditional on getting a B, the probability of resitting the grade is specified as a logit
model:
Pr(reit=1|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, evit=B, vi,re)=Λ
[
αre+vi,re+x
′
iβre+φre(ini, tri,=it−1)
]
.(4.4.11)
The function φre(ini, tri,=it−1) is parametrised as Equation (4.4.8):
φre(ini, tri,=it−1) = ηretrit + piredowit−1
+ κrereit−1 + τrereit−1 · evit−1 + ψretreit−1. (4.4.12)
4.4.2.6 The Track Downgrade
In Belgium, at the beginning of secondary school, students can choose among different tracks
characterised by different curricula. This tracking system is aimed at grouping students with
9Very few students (71, 1.7% of the sample) drop out of school before the end of the academic year. In
order to simplify the model and the timing of events, in these cases we advance the drop-out date at the end
of the previous academic year, disregarding information on retention and track downgrade of the uncompleted
academic year.
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similar abilities and preferences. Choosing the right track is important as it will determine
future work and education opportunities. However, the initial track choice is not always
binding. Students are indeed allowed to switch track at the beginning of a new academic year,
although under a set of constraints. The tracks are hierarchically ordered and students can
only move from the more general (and more prestigious) tracks to the more specialised and
vocationally oriented (and less prestigious) ones. The Belgian system of tracking is therefore
often referred to as a ‘cascade’ system.
We model track transitions by defining a categorical ordered dependent variable for track
downgrade. The ordered categories are no downgrade, one-step downgrade and two-step
downgrade. They are coded as 0, 1 and 2, respectively.10 Students in the BSO track are
already at the bottom of the cascade and cannot downgrade further. Hence, we model track
downgrade only for ASO/TSO students. For BSO students, track downgrade will not give any
contribution to the likelihood function. The probability density function of track downgrade
for ASO/TSO students is:
Pr(dowit = 0|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, vi,dow) =
Λ
[
α1,dow + vi,dow − x′iβdow − φdow(ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)
]
,
Pr(dowit = 1|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, vi,dow) =
Λ
[
α2,dow + vi,dow − x′iβdow − φdow(ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)
]
− Λ[α1,dow + vi,dow − x′iβdow − φdow(ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)],
Pr(dowit = 2|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, vi,dow) =
1− Λ[α2,dow + vi,dow − x′iβdow − φdow(ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)]. (4.4.13)
The function φdow(ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit) is linearly specified as follows:
φdow(ini, tri,=it−1) = ηdowtrit + pidowdowit−1 + ωdowevit + ξdow(1− reit)
+ κdowreit−1 + τdowreit−1 · evit−1 + ψdowtreit−1, (4.4.14)
where ξdow is the effect of not being retained at the end of the academic year on the probability
of downgrading the track.
10In our dataset, we observe only 48 track transitions of three or more steps. Hence, given the knowledge
of a starting point, information on track changes compressed in no downgrade, 1-step downgrade and 2-step
downgrade is able to describe almost all the possible track transitions.
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4.4.2.7 The Diploma Equation
In the last grade of the track (6th grade for ASO/TSO and 7th grade for BSO), students do
not receive an evaluation with marks A, B, or C. If they succeed, they simply get the diploma.
If they fail, they have to resit the last grade.11 The performance variable of the last grade
of secondary school is therefore binary. We specify the probability of success, which implies
getting the secondary school diploma, as a logit model:
Pr(diit = 1|xi, ini, tri,=it−1, vi,di) = Λ
[
αdi + vi,di + x
′
iβdi + φdi(ini, tri,=it−1)
]
. (4.4.15)
The function φdi(ini, tri,=it−1) has a linear form as in Equation (4.4.8):
φdi(ini, tri,=it−1) = ηditrit + pididowit−1
+ κdireit−1 + τdireit−1 · evit−1 + ψditreit−1. (4.4.16)
4.4.2.8 The Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution
In order to maximise the log-likelihood function in (4.4.4), we need to assign some parametric
form to the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component vi ≡ (vi,in, vi,tr,
vi,ev, vi,out, vi,re, vi,dow, vi,di). In order to avoid too strict parametric assumptions, we follow
Heckman and Singer (1984) and assume that G(vi) is discrete with a finite and, a priori, un-
known numberM points of support. However, estimating our model with a seven-dimensional
discrete distribution would be computational demanding. Our outcome variables belong to
three types: i) the initial conditions; ii) schooling achievements (evaluation and diploma ac-
quisition) and iii) educational choices (track choice, downgrade choice, resitting decision in
case of B and drop-out decision). In order to reduce the estimation complexity of the model,
we reduce the dimension of vi to three by one-factor loading specifications: vi,di = δdi · vi,ev,
vi,tr = δtr · vi,dow, vi,out = δout · vi,dow and vi,re = δre · vi,dow.
On the basis of Monte Carlo simulations for treatment effects in duration models, Gaure
et al. (2007) find that the number of the points of support is best chosen by minimising
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We follow this recommendation. The probabilities
associated to the points of support sum to one and are, ∀ m = 1, . . . ,M , denoted by
pm = Pr(vi,in=v
m
i,in, vi,ev=v
m
i,ev, vi,dow=v
m
i,dow) ≡ Pr(vi = vmi ) (4.4.17)
11Students failing the last grade of ASO/TSO can also choose to switch to grade 6 of the BSO track, which
is taken into account in the model.
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and specified as logistic transforms:
pm =
exp (λm)∑M
g=1 exp (λ
g)
with m = 1, . . . ,M and λM = 0. (4.4.18)
The sample log-likelihood function in Equation (4.4.4) can be rewritten as
`(θ, δ) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[ M∑
m=1
pmLim(θ, δ)
]
, (4.4.19)
where Lim(θ, δ) is the individual contribution to the likelihood function if the individual is of
type m.
During the empirical analysis, we also use an alternative specification of the unobserved
heterogeneity support points. In this alternative specification, we allow the points of support of
vmev and vmdow to interact with lagged retention and cumulated retention for eachm = 1, · · · ,M :
vmit,ev = v
m
i,ev(1 + ψevreit−1 + ζevtreit−1) (4.4.20)
vmit,dow = v
m
i,dow(1 + ψdowreit−1 + ζdowtreit−1). (4.4.21)
By doing so, we allow the transitory and permanent effect of grade retention to be heteroge-
neous across unobserved determinants of preferences and choices. In other words, the points
of support become time-varying, depending on the retention realisation. These time-varying
components have to be plugged into models (4.4.7), (4.4.9), (4.4.11), (4.4.13) and (4.4.15).
4.4.3 Identification
The identification of the interrelated dynamics between grade retention, track mobility and
schooling attainment is obtained by addressing some key challenges. In this subsection we
summarise the aforementioned characteristics of our model that induce this identification.
First, educational achievements and choices are likely to be determined by a set of un-
observed determinants, for instance behavioural and cognitive skills, with an unknown cor-
relation structure. In order to disentangle the pure effects of past educational outcomes on
future ones from the spurious effects determined by unobserved abilities, we take into account
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity by semi-parametric maximum likelihood techniques
(Heckman and Singer, 1984; Mroz, 1999). The identification of the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution is based on multiple observations per student of the same processes.
Second, the imposed sequencing of schooling achievements and choices makes some of the
outcome variables determinants of later outcomes within each academic year. This generates
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predetermined exclusion restrictions which are used to identify the interrelated dynamics of
schooling achievements and choices.
Third, at the start of secondary school pupils have already different years of delay due
to retention episodes either in kindergarten or in primary school. If we assume that grade
retention affects future outcome variables, we have an initial conditions problem. We solve for
initial conditions by adding an equation for the years of delay at the beginning of secondary
school, which depends on unobserved heterogeneity and an exclusion restriction (Heckman,
1981a). As exclusion restriction, we use the number of years of delay at the start of primary
school. We assume therefore that once we control for the years of delay at the start of
secondary school, the years of delay at the start of primary school do not affect secondary
school performances and choices.
Fourth, as pointed out by Fruehwirth et al. (2011), the effect of grade retention might be
heterogeneous and vary by students’ unobserved abilities. We allow therefore the effect of past
retention episodes to vary across different levels of the unobserved determinants by imposing
a specific functional forms on the interaction effect.
Finally, there might be sample selection attrition induced by students dropping out of
secondary school. We model therefore also the probability of exiting school without the
diploma at the end of each year, where the unobserved components determining the school
drop-out are allowed to be correlated to the unobserved determinants of the other endogenous
processes. The loading factor structure of the unobserved heterogeneity component and the
fact that some students are at risk of drop-out for more than one year are of help in identifying
the attrition equation.
4.4.4 Partial Observability of Tracks at the Start of Secondary School
As mentioned in Section 4.3, at the beginning of secondary school, we have only partial infor-
mation about the school track choice. We only know whether students are in the vocational
track (BSO) or not (ASO/TSO). Only starting from grade 2 we have detailed information on
courses of study and we can group students into the five tracks. However, the cascade system
of the institutional set-up jointly with the track position and track mobility of each student in
subsequent grades convey some information about the possible starting track. For example,
students who are in ASO+ in grade 2, surely were also in ASO+ in grade 1, as track upgrading
is not allowed. For the same reason, students in ASO− in grade 2 were not in TSO and BSO
tracks in grade 1.
We modify the likelihood function to take into account the partial observability of the track
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at the beginning of secondary school: we integrate over the possible tracks in grade 1, given
future information about tracks and mobility. This is similar to the strategy used by Mroz
and Picone (2011) to solve the partial observability of the time in which persons with diabetes
progress to the next disease stage.
To show in what direction we modify the likelihood function and keep the notation simple,
we rewrite the density in Equation (4.4.1) by ignoring the conditioning on the observed and
unobserved covariates and the individual subscript i, yielding
f(in, tr,Y) = f(in)f(tr|in)f(Y|tr, in). (4.4.22)
We assume that the probability of being in each track at the beginning of secondary school
is related to the information we have in the future about tracks, mobility choices and per-
formances. Denote by f(tr|in,Y) this probability density function. If we integrate Equation
(4.4.22) over the possible tracks, we get
f(in,Y) = f(in)
∫
f(tr|in)f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in,Y)dtr. (4.4.23)
Once we parametrise f(tr|in) and f(Y|tr, in), like we did in Subsection 4.4.2, we imply a
particular parametrisation of f(tr|in,Y):
f(tr|in,Y) = f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)
f(Y|in)
=
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)∫
f(Y, tr|in)dtr
=
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)∫
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)dtr . (4.4.24)
Both the numerator and the denominator of Equation (4.4.24) depend indeed on the proba-
bility density functions that we have already parametrised in Subsection 4.4.2. Substituting
Equation (4.4.24) into Equation (4.4.23) yields
f(in,Y) = f(in)
∫
f(tr|in)2f(Y|tr, in)2∫
f(Y|s, in)f(s|in)dsdtr. (4.4.25)
Since tracks take value on five categories, the integrals in Equation (4.4.25) are just sums
over the five possible realisations. The individual contribution to the likelihood function in
Equation (4.4.3) and the sample log-likelihood function in Equation (4.4.4) are modified along
the lines dictated by Equation (4.4.25).
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Table 4.3: Estimated Probability Masses of the Discrete Unobserved Heterogeneity Distri-
bution and Other Statistics
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Unobserved heterogeneity probability masses (λ6 is normalised to 0)
λ1 −1.595∗∗∗ (0.458) −1.545∗∗∗ (0.467)
λ2 −2.929∗∗∗ (0.338) −2.583∗∗∗ (0.279)
λ3 −1.171∗∗∗ (0.304) −1.161∗∗∗ (0.253)
λ4 0.256 (0.267) 0.290 (0.281)
λ5 0.099 (0.262) 0.163 (0.261)
Resulting probability masses
p1 0.051 0.052
p2 0.013 0.018
p3 0.078 0.076
p4 0.326 0.325
p5 0.279 0.286
p6 0.252 0.243
Log-likelihood -22,380.5 -22,222.2 -22,194.2
AIC/N 10.679 10.615 10.604
Number of parameters 120 144 148
Number of pupils (N) 4,214 4,214 4,214
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
4.5 Estimation Results
The econometric model is made up of seven equations. The estimation results of the coef-
ficients of each equation are reported and commented in the next subsections. We display
estimation results of three different model specifications: without unobserved heterogeneity,
with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and with time-invariant unobserved heteroge-
neity interacted with lagged retention and the cumulated years of delay.
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results of the probability masses of the discrete unobserved
heterogeneity distribution. The number of points of support are chosen by minimising the AIC.
For both specifications controlling for unobserved heterogeneity the resulting number is 6. The
preferred model according to the AIC is the one that encompasses the interactions between
the unobserved heterogeneity and lagged retention and cumulated retention.
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results of the Initial Conditions Equation: Years of Delay at the
Beginning of Secondary School
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Years delay start primary school 5.317∗∗∗ (0.253) 10.275∗∗∗ (0.593) 10.505∗∗∗ (0.621)
Female −0.137 (0.164) −0.221 (0.224) −0.225 (0.224)
Cohort 1980 −0.217 (0.171) −0.215 (0.228) −0.198 (0.228)
Calendar day of birth/100 1.549∗∗∗ (0.141) 1.960∗∗∗ (0.242) 1.965∗∗∗ (0.243)
Father’s education/10 −0.634∗∗ (0.302) −0.774∗ (0.421) −0.751∗ (0.422)
Mother’s education/10 −1.484∗∗∗ (0.312) −1.636∗∗∗ (0.465) −1.696∗∗∗ (0.460)
Number of siblings – Reference: No siblings
1 sibling 0.232 (0.254) 0.340 (0.344) 0.356 (0.342)
2 siblings 0.072 (0.277) 0.177 (0.374) 0.204 (0.375)
3 or more 0.744∗∗∗ (0.285) 1.029∗∗ (0.401) 1.046∗∗∗ (0.400)
Unobserved heterogeneity support points
v2 −0.871 (8.336) −1.587 (7.551)
v3 −10.582∗∗∗ (1.875) −11.184∗∗∗ (1.732)
v4 −1.313 (1.530) −1.371 (1.442)
v5 −10.419∗∗∗ (1.952) −10.981∗∗∗ (1.772)
v6 −1.997 (2.362) −2.753 (2.103)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
4.5.1 Initial Conditions: Years of Delay at the Start of Secondary School
Table 4.4 reports the estimation results of the ordered logit model for the years of delay at the
beginning of secondary school. The estimation results of the initial conditions equation are
very stable across the three model specifications. We find that the years of delay at the start
of primary school, the exclusion restriction, strongly and positively affects the probability
of starting secondary school with delay. The relative age determined by birth date has a
significantly negative effect on the years of delay at the beginning of secondary school: the
later in the year the kid was born, the higher the probability that (s)he will cumulate years
of delay. This evidence is consistent with those in Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Fredriksson
and Öckert (2006), Hámori (2007), McEwan and Shapiro (2008), Strøm (2004) and Altwicker-
Hámori and Köllő (2012), who find that school starting age has a positive effect on several
measures of academic performance.
Parents’ education has a significant impact on years of delay at the start of secondary
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school, especially mother’s education: the higher the education of the mother of the student,
the lower the probability that the pupil begins secondary education with delay. The number
of siblings is also a significant determinant of the years of delay: in line with the effect on
test scores in Hámori (2007), we find that pupils with more than two siblings have a higher
probability of starting secondary school with delay. This effect might be explained by the fact
that in larger families parents have less time to dedicate to each child. It might also be that
the number of siblings capture particular social and cultural family background.
4.5.2 Track Choice at the Beginning of Secondary School
Table 4.5 displays the estimation results of the equation for the track choice at the beginning
of secondary school. The tracks are hierarchically ordered from the bottom (BSO) to the
top (ASO+). The years of delay at the beginning of secondary school significantly reduce
the probability of choosing the ASO+ track and increase the probability of preferring the
vocational track. When we control for unobserved heterogeneity the impact of past schooling
performances captured by the years of delay at the start of secondary school gets smaller in
absolute value. This means that part of the effect is spurious: unobserved characteristics,
like ability and intelligence, jointly determine the probability of starting late secondary school
and the track choice. Once we net out the spurious negative correlation between unobserved
ability and the probability of starting late secondary school, the coefficient of the impact is
reduced in size.
All the other regressors are highly significant in explaining the school track choice. Girls
and pupils from highly educated parents are less likely to choose the vocational track and more
likely to get into ASO+. The gender effect might be induced by gender heterogeneous prefe-
rences for vocational/technical tracks but also influenced by the socio-cultural environment,
the performance expectations and their interaction.12
Both mother’s and father’s education strongly push up the probability of choosing the
highest track (ASO+) and discourage the vocational track (BSO), meaning that parents take
influence on the education of their children. This is a quite common association found in the
educational research literature. See Haveman and Wolfe (1995) for a review of the literature on
intergenerational mobility with respect to education and, among others, Bratti et al. (2012),
Dustmann (2004) and Falter et al. (2011) for more recent findings on the effect of parental
background on pupils’ track choices. Also the family structure has an impact on track choice:
the larger the number of siblings the higher the probability of choosing the vocational track
(BSO). Finally, the younger the pupil, the higher the probability of choosing a lower track.
12Guiso et al. (2008) show that the more the culture is gender-equal, the better the girls score in math.
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results of the Track Choice Equation
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female 0.318∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.448∗∗∗ (0.077) 0.428∗∗∗ (0.076)
Cohort 1980 −0.150∗∗∗ (0.058) −0.238∗∗∗ (0.076) −0.250∗∗∗ (0.075)
Calendar day of birth/100 −0.166∗∗∗ (0.029) −0.273∗∗∗ (0.040) −0.275∗∗∗ (0.039)
Father’s education/10 1.651∗∗∗ (0.109) 2.262∗∗∗ (0.155) 2.233∗∗∗ (0.154)
Mother’s education/10 1.741∗∗∗ (0.118) 2.310∗∗∗ (0.166) 2.283∗∗∗ (0.165)
Number of siblings – Reference: No siblings
1 sibling −0.111 (0.090) −0.174 (0.118) −0.178 (0.117)
2 siblings −0.243∗∗ (0.099) −0.351∗∗∗ (0.130) −0.354∗∗∗ (0.128)
3 or more −0.425∗∗∗ (0.110) −0.584∗∗∗ (0.142) −0.585∗∗∗ (0.140)
Endogenous variables
Years delay start secondary school −1.277∗∗∗ (0.136) −0.804∗∗∗ (0.174) −0.785∗∗∗ (0.176)
Unobserved heterogeneity loading factor
Loading factor −6.347∗∗∗ (2.063) −6.403∗∗∗ (2.144)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
4.5.3 Evaluation at the End of the Academic Year
There are several studies in the educational research literature aimed at understanding whether
grade retention has a positive or a negative impact on subsequent academic performances. See
for instance the literature review in Xia and Kirby (2009) and the meta-analysis in Jimerson
(2001). The conclusions are not uncontroversial. Most of the studies find a negative relation-
ship between retention and subsequent academic achievement. However, if the analyst cannot
control for all the determinants of grade retention and subsequent performances the estimate
will be biased due to a selection bias. Innate ability, intelligence, cognitive skills and commit-
ment to work are determinants of both grade retention and future educational achievements.
If they are not properly taken into account, the impact of grade retention will be spurious and
biased downwards.
In existing studies, the identification of the causal effect of grade retention mostly relies on
controlling for confounding factors or on matching students on the basis of a set of observable
characteristics. A few studies address the selection bias by instrumental variables (IV) relying
on shifts and discontinuities determined by retention policies (Fruehwirth et al., 2011; Eide
and Showalter, 2001; Greene and Winters, 2007; Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, 2009; Manacorda,
2012) or on the independence between the instrument and the selection variable, conditional
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on the outcome (D’Haultfœuille, 2010). For the French speaking region of Belgium, Belot and
Vandenberghe (2013) exploit a reform which reintroduced the possibility of retention in the
first grade of secondary education, finding no impact on academic performance.
In this study, we do not need to assume that we are controlling for all factors determining
both the treatments (retention and track mobility) and the outcomes (some measures of sub-
sequent performance), like in the matching literature. Moreover, we do not need a valid IV
or an exclusion restriction. We rather exploit the longitudinal dimension of the dataset and
the availability of multiple observations per student of the achievement and choice variables.
This rich information allows us to flexibly identify the unobserved heterogeneity distribution
and the correlation between the unobserved determinants of the performance outcomes (for
instance evaluation), of the choices (for instance retention and track downgrade) and of the
initial conditions (the years of delay at the beginning of secondary school).
The estimation results of the evaluation ordered logit equation are displayed in Table
4.6. In all three specifications, the transitory impact of retention (the coefficient of lagged
retention) has a positive impact on the next evaluation. Hence, ceteris paribus, pupils who
are resitting the grade are less likely to get a C and thereby to be retained again, than
students who are not resitting. In contrast, based on model (2) controlling for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, for the permanent effect (the coefficient of total years of delay) we
get a negative effect. In model (3), which allows the retention effects to be heterogeneous
across different levels of the unobserved component vev, however, also the permanent effect
is positive. This means that an episode of grade retention will also have a positive effect on
the evaluation of all the next academic years. The evidence of a positive impact of grade
retention on future schooling achievements contrasts with prior research. Two exceptions are
D’Haultfœuille (2010) and Jacob and Lefgren (2004), who found that in the US and France,
respectively, grade retention has a positive short-term effect on schooling performance. The
former research based identification on a new method for models with endogenous selection
and exploited the independence between an instrument and the selection variable, conditional
on the outcome. The latter exploited a discontinuity generated by a school reform.
Two points are worthy of mention about the estimation results when moving to model (3).
First, the permanent effect of grade retention (the coefficient of total years of delay) switches
sign, from negative to positive. Hence, when we do not take into account that pupils might
react differently to retention by abilities, like cognitive skills, intelligence and commitment,
the permanent effect of retention is underestimated. Second, the interaction between the
unobserved heterogeneity component and total years of delay is significantly negative: if the
unobserved component is small enough (vev << 0), for instance if the student is very smart,
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Table 4.6: Estimation Results of the Evaluation Equation
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female 0.423∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.504∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.467∗∗∗ (0.054)
Cohort 1980 −0.055 (0.045) −0.083 (0.053) −0.103∗∗ (0.052)
Calendar day of birth/100 0.026 (0.022) −0.013 (0.026) −0.012 (0.026)
Father’s education/10 0.215∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.473∗∗∗ (0.103) 0.432∗∗∗ (0.102)
Mother’s education/10 0.200∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.481∗∗∗ (0.110) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.108)
Number of siblings – Reference: No siblings
1 sibling −0.015 (0.069) −0.036 (0.081) −0.035 (0.081)
2 siblings −0.143∗ (0.074) −0.212∗∗ (0.088) −0.208∗∗ (0.089)
3 or more −0.161∗ (0.085) −0.233∗∗ (0.102) −0.231∗∗ (0.101)
Grade – Reference: Grade 1
Grade 2 −1.747∗∗∗ (0.127) −1.532∗∗∗ (0.138) −1.529∗∗∗ (0.137)
Grade 3 −1.597∗∗∗ (0.135) −1.414∗∗∗ (0.144) −1.413∗∗∗ (0.144)
Grade 4 −1.654∗∗∗ (0.129) −1.537∗∗∗ (0.137) −1.523∗∗∗ (0.138)
Grade 5 −1.494∗∗∗ (0.134) −1.438∗∗∗ (0.144) −1.414∗∗∗ (0.144)
Grade 6 −1.225∗∗∗ (0.222) −1.255∗∗∗ (0.240) −1.186∗∗∗ (0.238)
Endogenous variables
Track – Reference: BSO
ASO+ 0.964∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.167 (0.186) 0.298 (0.187)
ASO− −0.541∗∗∗ (0.080) −1.150∗∗∗ (0.126) −1.058∗∗∗ (0.122)
TSO+ −0.681∗∗∗ (0.093) −1.063∗∗∗ (0.122) −1.028∗∗∗ (0.120)
TSO− −0.907∗∗∗ (0.078) −1.187∗∗∗ (0.101) −1.174∗∗∗ (0.100)
Total years of delay −0.522∗∗∗ (0.055) −0.476∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.370∗∗ (0.146)
Lagged retention 1.369∗∗∗ (0.138) 1.419∗∗∗ (0.155) 1.033∗∗∗ (0.367)
Lag B if retained last year 0.866∗∗∗ (0.303) 0.782∗∗ (0.311) 0.767∗∗ (0.330)
Lag A if not retained last year 0.958∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.675∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.662∗∗∗ (0.106)
Downgrade at the end of previous year – Reference: No downgrade
1-step downgrade 0.597∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.443∗∗∗ (0.106) 0.474∗∗∗ (0.106)
2-step downgrade 0.916∗∗∗ (0.170) 0.648∗∗∗ (0.179) 0.713∗∗∗ (0.182)
Unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity support points (v1 is normalised to 0)
v2 1.876∗∗∗ (0.273) 1.632∗∗∗ (0.221)
v3 0.401∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.245∗ (0.140)
v4 −0.111 (0.105) −0.088 (0.070)
v5 −0.876∗∗∗ (0.192) −1.113∗∗∗ (0.211)
v6 −1.330∗∗∗ (0.239) −1.295∗∗∗ (0.249)
Interactions of unobserved heterogeneity support points with retention variables
Interaction with total years of delay −0.279∗∗∗ (0.040)
Interaction with lagged retention 0.114 (0.114)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
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grade retention generates a net negative permanent effect. Less able pupils (vev > 0) will
instead be permanently, as well as momentarily, favoured by grade retention. The fact that
more able students might be permanently penalised by an episode of grade retention suggests
that psychological costs dominate possible benefits. For less able pupils the psychological costs
might instead be dominated by the benefit of having more time to develop the knowledge and
emotional maturity required at each educational grade. Also Fruehwirth et al. (2011) find
that the retention effect varies by the abilities of pupils retained in kindergarten in the US.
However, in contrast to our results, they find that lower able pupils are more negatively affected
by grade retention. We conclude that when assessing the effectiveness of grade retention, one
should carefully consider the heterogeneity in responses to grade retention by unobservable
behavioural and cognitive abilities.
In the top track (ASO+) and in the vocational track (BSO), it is easier to get top evalua-
tions. Pupils downgrading track are more likely to get good evaluations in the next academic
year. Although there might be negative effects induced by changing peers and sometimes
school, students who come from a higher track are likely to have an excess of knowledge
relatively to the new track-level requirements, so they succeed more easily.
About the impact of exogenous regressors, the results are as expected. Girls perform
better than boys, as it is generally found in the educational literature.13 Parents’ education
is positively associated to the probability of getting an A. Pupils in larger families are more
likely to perform worse.
4.5.4 Resitting Decision for B Students
Students getting a B can choose either to resit or to downgrade the track. The estimation
results of the resitting equation for B students are reported in Table 4.7. Few regressors are
significant. The higher the education of the father, the higher the probability that the pupil
will prefer to resit instead of downgrading the track. The social status of the father of the
pupil is therefore not only a determinant of schooling success, but also of resitting/downgrading
choices. The lagged retention indicator has a significantly negative impact on the probability
of choosing retention. This means that retained students who get a B are more likely to
downgrade than to resit again compared to non-retained students. The cost of losing an
academic year seems therefore to be increasing with the number of times students resit the
same grade.
13See for instance the results in Van Houtte (2004) for Flanders.
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results of the Resitting Decision for B Students
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female −0.135 (0.164) −0.147 (0.168) −0.143 (0.167)
Cohort 1980 0.024 (0.167) 0.030 (0.169) 0.028 (0.169)
Calendar day of birth/100 0.123 (0.077) 0.128 (0.080) 0.127 (0.080)
Father’s education/10 0.716∗∗ (0.298) 0.701∗∗ (0.321) 0.707∗∗ (0.322)
Mother’s education/10 0.160 (0.319) 0.145 (0.331) 0.153 (0.332)
1 or more siblings 0.055 (0.259) 0.053 (0.260) 0.054 (0.262)
Grade – Reference: Grade 2
Grade 3 0.573∗∗ (0.227) 0.544∗∗ (0.229) 0.542∗∗ (0.232)
Grade 4 0.722∗∗∗ (0.196) 0.712∗∗∗ (0.208) 0.712∗∗∗ (0.210)
Grade 5 0.969 (1.016) 0.776 (1.030) 0.775 (1.077)
Endogenous variables
Track – Reference: BSO
ASO+ −0.556 (0.514) −0.628 (0.649) −0.656 (0.656)
ASO− 0.432 (0.322) 0.269 (0.359) 0.269 (0.359)
TSO+ 0.992∗∗∗ (0.356) 0.805∗∗ (0.368) 0.810∗∗ (0.369)
TSO− 1.144∗∗∗ (0.326) 0.955∗∗∗ (0.336) 0.963∗∗∗ (0.336)
Total years of delay −0.384 (0.270) −0.409 (0.281) −0.278 (0.322)
Lagged retention −0.957 (0.668) −0.984 (0.687) −1.638∗∗ (0.753)
Downgrade in the previous year 0.076 (0.323) 0.080 (0.327) 0.070 (0.332)
Unobserved heterogeneity loading factor
Loading factor 0.281 (0.761) −0.193 (0.806)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Due to the small number of students getting a B, there is not enough variation to be finer in
distinguishing between number of siblings and the number of downgrade steps at the end of the previous academic year. For the same
reason, we could not identify the effect of the interactions between lagged retention and lagged evaluation. Nobody resits grade 1 and
therefore the reference category is grade 2.
4.5. Estimation Results 91
4.5.5 Track Downgrade
The estimation results of the ordered logit model for track downgrade are reported in Table
4.8. A positive coefficient means that the corresponding regressor has a positive impact on
the probability of making a two-step downgrade and a negative impact on the probability of
remaining in the same track.
Parents’ education has a negative effect on track downgrade. This evidence, jointly with
the finding that the higher the education of the father the higher the probability that students
getting a B will prefer to resit instead of downgrading, are in line with the predictions of
sociological theories claiming that educational choices are influenced by social status main-
tenance and structural risk aversion. In a society where education is an investment good
for social status upgrade, more advantaged families (higher educated parents) might have a
greater incentive to invest in their children’s education in order to preserve their advantage
(Thurow, 1972). Moreover, higher education might become a social norm which children are
persuaded to follow under the pressure of their family and peers (Boudon, 1974). Although
also families in less advantaged class positions might invest in their children’s education to give
them a chance to raise their social and economic position, the failure of getting an education
degree for a student from a lower educated family is likely to have more serious consequences
than those for a student from families with larger resources (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997;
Goldthorpe, 1996). Since easier and/or shorter educational tracks minimise the risk of failing
and entering the labour market without any (vocational) degree (Hartlaub and Schneider,
2012), it is not surprising to find students with lower educated parents to be more likely to
choose the vocational track and to prefer downgrading to resitting.
The likelihood of downgrading is the highest in ASO+ and the lowest in TSO−. Further-
more, the evaluation obtained at the end of the current academic year is a strong determinant
of downgrading. As expected, students getting an A are less likely to downgrade than students
getting a B and, above all, a C. Students who have experienced a track change are less likely
to downgrade in the following year, meaning that downgrading stabilises the track pathways
of students. Finally, the total years of delay and ending the year without the need to resit the
next one positively affect the probability of track downgrade.
4.5.6 School Drop-Out Without Diploma
Table 4.9 reports the estimation results of the drop-out equation. First, girls and younger
students are less likely to drop out of secondary school without a diploma.14 Second, the
14Eide and Showalter (2001) find the same gender difference in drop-out rates in the US.
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results of the Track Downgrade for ASO/TSO Students
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female 0.035 (0.056) −0.004 (0.058) 0.002 (0.058)
Cohort 1980 −0.041 (0.056) −0.026 (0.056) −0.024 (0.056)
Calendar day of birth/100 −0.003 (0.027) 0.019 (0.028) 0.019 (0.027)
Father’s education/10 −0.600∗∗∗ (0.105) −0.757∗∗∗ (0.116) −0.748∗∗∗ (0.116)
Mother’s education/10 −0.416∗∗∗ (0.114) −0.578∗∗∗ (0.125) −0.568∗∗∗ (0.124)
Number of siblings – Reference: No siblings
1 sibling −0.099 (0.082) −0.091 (0.084) −0.090 (0.083)
2 siblings −0.161∗ (0.091) −0.141 (0.092) −0.140 (0.092)
3 or more −0.09 (0.106) −0.063 (0.109) −0.066 (0.109)
Grade – Reference: Grade 1
Grade 2 2.544∗∗∗ (0.131) 2.454∗∗∗ (0.133) 2.464∗∗∗ (0.133)
Grade 3 1.318∗∗∗ (0.136) 1.237∗∗∗ (0.137) 1.243∗∗∗ (0.138)
Grade 4 1.851∗∗∗ (0.131) 1.814∗∗∗ (0.132) 1.818∗∗∗ (0.133)
Endogenous variables
Track – Reference: TSO−
ASO+ 1.193∗∗∗ (0.104) 1.747∗∗∗ (0.176) 1.712∗∗∗ (0.175)
ASO− 0.369∗∗∗ (0.093) 0.641∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.608∗∗∗ (0.107)
TSO+ 0.674∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.799∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.778∗∗∗ (0.109)
Current evaluation – Reference: C
A −4.297∗∗∗ (0.197) −4.292∗∗∗ (0.200) −4.299∗∗∗ (0.201)
B −0.721∗∗∗ (0.183) −0.727∗∗∗ (0.187) −0.732∗∗∗ (0.187)
Total years of delay 0.233∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.209∗∗ (0.092) 0.310∗∗ (0.158)
Lagged retention 0.414∗∗ (0.198) 0.445∗∗ (0.203) −0.121 (0.346)
No current retention 2.216∗∗∗ (0.182) 2.232∗∗∗ (0.186) 2.232∗∗∗ (0.186)
Lag B if retained last year −0.541∗ (0.295) −0.545∗ (0.299) −0.534∗ (0.304)
Lag A if not retained last year 0.105 (0.125) 0.119 (0.127) 0.127 (0.127)
Downgrade at the end of previous year – Reference: No downgrade
1-step downgrade −0.428∗∗ (0.167) −0.290∗ (0.170) −0.292∗ (0.171)
2-step downgrade −1.117∗∗∗ (0.367) −0.940∗∗ (0.385) −0.950∗∗ (0.388)
Unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity support points (v1 is normalised to 0)
v2 −1.146∗∗∗ (0.381) −1.073∗∗∗ (0.368)
v3 −1.019∗∗∗ (0.343) −0.990∗∗∗ (0.344)
v4 −0.917∗∗∗ (0.314) −0.889∗∗∗ (0.316)
v5 −0.894∗∗∗ (0.308) −0.880∗∗∗ (0.313)
v6 −0.478∗∗∗ (0.207) −0.464∗∗ (0.210)
Interactions of unobserved heterogeneity support points with retention variables
Interaction with total years of delay 0.041 (0.049)
Interaction with lagged retention −0.237∗∗ (0.102)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.9: Estimation Results of the Drop-Out Equation
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female −0.183 (0.144) −0.489∗∗ (0.200) −0.366∗∗ (0.183)
Cohort 1980 0.088 (0.138) 0.103 (0.178) 0.156 (0.169)
Calendar day of birth/100 −0.218∗∗∗ (0.067) −0.237∗∗∗ (0.085) −0.218∗∗∗ (0.082)
Father’s education/10 −0.454∗ (0.270) −1.008∗∗∗ (0.365) −0.917∗∗∗ (0.348)
Mother’s education/10 −0.158 (0.281) −0.830∗∗ (0.375) −0.725∗∗ (0.348)
1 or more siblings 0.000 (0.194) 0.075 (0.260) 0.010 (0.241)
Final grade −3.267∗∗∗ (0.288) −2.353∗∗∗ (0.343) −2.748∗∗∗ (0.353)
Endogenous variables
BSO 2.138∗∗∗ (0.248) 2.100∗∗∗ (0.349) 1.992∗∗∗ (0.300)
Current evaluation – Reference: C
A −1.450∗∗∗ (0.228) −0.738∗∗ (0.300) −1.079∗∗∗ (0.281)
B 0.215 (0.543) 0.575 (0.637) 0.284 (0.645)
Total years of delay −0.036 (0.106) −0.214 (0.140) −0.211 (0.137)
Lagged retention 0.231 (0.236) −0.123 (0.283) −0.000 (0.280)
Downgrade in the previous year −0.560∗ (0.320) −0.555 (0.407) −0.541 (0.394)
Unobserved heterogeneity loading factor
Loading factor −18.430∗∗ (7.604) −16.696∗∗ (6.931)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. As students can drop-out of school without the diploma only when they turn 18 years old, the sample
at risk of exit is small and there is not enough variation to distinguish between different tracks, grades and the number of downgrade
steps at the end of the previous academic year. For the same reason, we could not identify the effect of the interactions between lagged
retention and lagged evaluation.
higher parents’ education, the lower the propensity to drop-out. Third, students reaching the
final grade, therefore closer to the target, or getting an A are less likely to drop out without
the diploma. Last, BSO students have a significantly higher probability of not completing
secondary school. This finding might be explained by the fact that BSO students’ opportunity
cost of not getting the diploma might be lower than the one of ASO/TSO students for at least
two reasons. First, students in vocational tracks might access the labour market without the
diploma in specialised/blue collar jobs more easily than similar ASO/TSO students because
of the specific human capital they acquired in the BSO track. Second, BSO students might
be less interested in enrolling in tertiary education.
4.5.7 Secondary School Graduation
Table 4.10 reports the estimation results of the diploma equation, i.e. the impact of covariates
on the probability of getting the diploma once students make it to the last grade of their
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Table 4.10: Estimation Results of the Diploma Equation
Without Time-invariant Time-variant
unobserved unobserved unobserved
heterogeneity heterogeneity heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Exogenous variables
Female 0.724∗∗∗ (0.182) 2.023∗∗∗ (0.642) 2.794∗∗∗ (0.858)
Cohort 1980 0.034 (0.173) 0.027 (0.345) −0.652 (0.456)
Calendar day of birth/100 0.166∗∗ (0.084) 0.115 (0.169) 0.018 (0.210)
Father’s education/10 0.079 (0.340) 1.087 (0.764) 1.528 (0.996)
Mother’s education/10 −0.144 (0.353) 1.134∗ (0.684) 2.007∗∗ (0.943)
Number of siblings – Reference: No siblings
1 sibling 0.162 (0.253) −0.140 (0.590) −0.639 (0.810)
2 siblings −0.003 (0.284) −0.723 (0.659) −1.509 (0.978)
3 or more −0.263 (0.311) −1.323∗ (0.737) −2.348∗∗ (1.159)
Endogenous variables
Track – Reference: BSO
ASO+ 1.420∗∗∗ (0.385) 0.787 (0.818) −0.171 (1.301)
ASO− 0.873∗∗∗ (0.283) 0.334 (0.659) −0.151 (1.126)
TSO+ −0.139 (0.313) 0.712 (0.649) −2.285∗ (1.318)
TSO− 0.231 (0.279) 0.611 (0.687) −0.433 (1.076)
Total years of delay −0.441∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.150 (0.314) 0.647 (0.542)
Lagged retention 0.042 (0.431) 3.241∗∗∗ (1.103) 7.170 (6.588)
Unobserved heterogeneity loading factor
Loading factor −9.422∗∗ (3.999) −23.152∗ 14.000
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. As students are not allowed to change track at the beginning of the last grade, there is no control
for lagged downgrade decision in the diploma equation.
track.15 Once again we find that girls and pupils in smaller families perform better and
that they are significantly more likely to get the diploma. Parents’s education is positively
correlated to the probability of getting the diploma, although only the impact of mother’s
education is significantly different from zero. Finally, once students are in the last grade, the
transitory and the permanent retention effects are positive but not significantly different from
zero.
15As mentioned before, the last grade of ASO/TSO tracks is the 6th grade, while the last grade of the BSO
track is the 7th grade.
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4.6 Conclusions
We empirically analysed the short-term and permanent effect of grade retention on later
success rates in school. We exploited econometric modelling tools and identification analysis
to examine the interrelated dynamics of secondary school grade retention, school track choices
and achievements of a sample of Belgian pupils. We also shed light on the role played by
family background and unobserved abilities, especially looking at how unobserved abilities
interact with retention episodes in determining schooling pathways.
The empirical analysis was based on the rich schooling information contained in the SONAR
dataset, a retrospective survey conducted in Flanders on the 1976, 1978 and 1980 cohorts. Our
sample was made up of 4,214 students belonging to the 1978 and 1980 cohorts. We exploited
the ample information on secondary school performances and choices to estimate dynamic
qualitative choice models.
In contrast to most of the previous findings, we found that grade retention has a positive
impact on the next evaluation and can permanently affect subsequent performances. The
direction of the permanent effect depends on unobserved heterogeneity. While more able stu-
dents are permanently penalised by retention, less able students benefit from it. The fact that
more able students might be permanently penalised by an episode of grade retention suggests
that psychological costs dominate possible benefits. For less able pupils the psychological costs
might instead be dominated by the benefit of having more time to develop the knowledge and
emotional maturity required at each educational grade. We conclude that when assessing the
effectiveness of grade retention, one should carefully consider the heterogeneity in responses
to grade retention by unobservable behavioural and cognitive abilities.

5
Overeducation at the Start of the Career:
Stepping Stone or Trap?
This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Bart Cockx (Ghent University, Université catholique
de Louvain, CESifo and IZA) and Prof. Dr. Dieter Verhaest (HUBrussel and Ghent Univer-
sity).
5.1 Introduction
Numerous studies have shown that many young workers are overeducated at the start of their
career (see, e.g., Battu et al., 1999; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). A worker is considered to
be overeducated if her/his education level is higher than the level that is typically required
to perform adequately (McGuinness, 2006). This phenomenon suggests a less-than-optimal
allocation of graduates over jobs and is potentially costly for society (Groot and Maassen
van den Brink, 2000; McGuinness, 2006). For overeducated workers, this translates in lower
earnings (Hartog, 2012; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009) and lower job satisfaction (Tsang, 1987; Allen
and van der Velden, 2001). Therefore, one might wonder why young job seekers actually accept
jobs with requirements below their educational attainment. One potential answer is that by
accepting such positions these job seekers avoid scarring effects of staying unemployed (see,
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e.g., Arulampalam, 2001). Another (additional) explanation is that this might be the shortest
pathway to a job that matches the attained educational level. This stepping stone hypothesis
has been formulated most clearly by Sicherman and Galor (1990). According to their career
mobility theory, overeducation is an investment in work experience which enhances promotion
opportunities to higher level positions inside or outside the firm.1 However, overeducation
might just as well retard the transition to an adequate job. Job search intensity on-the-job
may decrease (Holzer, 1987) and job specific human capital investments may lock workers into
bad positions (Pissarides, 1994). Further, the sources underlying unemployment scarring may
equally apply to overeducation. According to McCormick (1990), overeducation even acts as
a stronger negative signal to employers than unemployment and de Grip et al. (2008) show
that overeducation also results in cognitive decline.
Several empirical studies have already provided interesting insights into this debate by in-
vestigating the mobility behaviour of overeducated workers. Sicherman (1991), Robst (1995)
and Rubb (2006), for instance, find for the US that overeducated workers are more likely
to move to occupations with higher human capital requirements than adequately educated
workers with similar educational backgrounds. This is consistent with the career mobility
thesis. In addition, Rubb (2003) reports a yearly transition rate from overeducation to ade-
quate employment of about 20%, suggesting that overeducation is a temporary problem for
most US workers. Finally, relying on data for a large Dutch firm, Groeneveld and Hartog
(2004) find some evidence that overeducated workers experience more internal promotions,2
suggesting that overeducation may foster career mobility. However, a number of studies for
other countries challenge this conclusion. Battu et al. (1999) find that the match between
the educational degree and the job requirements remains fairly stable around 60% 1, 6 and
11 years after graduation for two cohorts who graduated from higher education in the UK.
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) arrive at similar conclusions. Bauer (2002) finds, using the Ger-
man GSOEP data from 1984 to 1998, that relatively few employees change their mismatch
status. This is confirmed by Büchel and Mertens (2004) who report that overeducation re-
sults in less upward occupational mobility and less wage growth in the German labour market.
This is especially the case for young workers with low-quality education (Pollmann-Schult and
Büchel, 2004). More recently, Verhaest and van der Velden (2013) studied the persistence of
overeducation in 14 countries. They find substantial heterogeneity in this persistence both
1Within such a context, the term of overeducation may sound confusing as there is no overinvestment
in education if the whole career is taken into account. However, we follow the literature and conceptualise
overeducation rather as a situation of underutilisation of education given one’s job at a particular point in
time (see McGuinness (2006), and the aforementioned definition).
2This evidence was found for the internally oriented work units of the firm, but not for the more externally
oriented ones.
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across countries and within countries according to the quality and orientation of their human
capital. Finally, Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012) estimate a dynamic random effects pro-
bit model allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity on Australian data. They find
substantial state dependence in overskilling3 for workers with a high educational degree, but
none for workers with vocational education. Based on a similar model and consistent with the
aforementioned findings, Mavromaras et al. (2013) report that neither overeducation nor over-
skilling has any significant effect on job mobility of female university graduates in Australia.
By contrast, overeducation, especially in combination with overskilling, positively affects (vol-
untary) quits, but not (involuntary) layoffs of male graduates. Whether this leads to more
upward occupational mobility remains an open question, however.
From this overview of the literature we conclude that evidence for the career mobility
theory is mixed. Moreover, most researchers just study the persistence of overeducation.
However, even if overeducation is persistent, this does not necessarily mean that one slows
down the transition to an adequate job. This transition may still be accelerated. After all, an
individual who does not accept a job for which he is overeducated may remain unemployed and
therefore without adequate job even longer than when he accepts such a job. In other words,
overeducation is not necessarily a “trap”. It may still be a “stepping stone” to an adequate
job. This chapter studies the stepping stone hypothesis.
An answer to this research question is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective,
but also from a policy point of view. By analysing the stepping stone hypothesis for un-
employed youth, this paper provides more insight in the strategy that policy makers should
follow in fighting youth unemployment, currently one of main priorities of the European Union
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012). For, if
overeducation is a stepping stone for young unemployed graduates, then the policy maker has
an interest to encourage or enforce acceptance of job offers to this group as early as possible,
irrespectively of whether the educational attainment required in the job matches or is below
that of the job candidate. By contrast, if overeducation is a trap, then the policy maker faces
a trade-off. In that case the benefits of the shorter unemployment spell induced by accepting
a job for which one is overeducated, should be weighed against the losses of the delayed entry
in an adequate job.
Our analysis also innovates in the overeducation literature from a methodological point
of view. As pointed out by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), many studies on overeducation
and its consequences fail to account for possible non-random selection into overeducation.4
3Overskilling is a situation whereby an individual has more skills and knowledge than those utilised in the
job (see, e.g., Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007)
4The aforementioned articles of Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012) and Mavromaras et al. (2013) are
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For instance, overeducated workers may be less able than adequately educated workers. If
so, the comparison of the outcomes between adequately qualified and overeducated workers
may partly reflect this ability difference and is therefore not causal. To solve this selection
problem, we apply the Timing of Events approach as developed by Abbring and van den
Berg (2003). To identify the selection from the treatment effect, this method exploits that
unobserved time-constant individual determinants of the transition to an adequate job affect
this transition throughout the period that one is searching for an adequate job whereas the
treatment (transition into overeducation) may only influence this transition as from the mo-
ment at which the treatment occurs. The selection effect can therefore be identified from
the pre-treatment data if the treatment is not anticipated and the timing of the treatment is
random, even without any exclusion restrictions.
A second methodological critique on the overeducation literature by Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2011) concerns the error in the measurement of overeducation. Even if we do not directly
address this critique, we indirectly deal with it by assessing the sensitivity of our results to
two alternative measures of overeducation. One is based on a job analysis approach and
another on a modified self-assessment method. Moreover, we argue in the text that the latter
measure is close to a measure of “genuine” overeducation, as defined by Chevalier (2003). This
is important, since Chevalier argues that genuinely overeducated workers are more likely to
move to a higher level job than those who are apparently overeducated. Since our findings are
not sensitive to the choice of these measures, we are quite confident that they are not driven
by incorrect measurement of the overeducation.
The analysis is based on a retrospective survey of a representative sample of two birth
cohorts, born in 1978 and 1980 and living in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking region in the
North of Belgium. From this sample we retain male unemployed youth who started searching
for a job after graduating from formal education. An advantage of analysing data right after
graduation is that there is a closer connection between the concept of overeducation and
overskilling, since individuals have not yet acquired any skills through experience on-the-job.
Moreover, the unusual richness of the database sustains the credibility of our findings. On the
one hand, it contains detailed information on the timing of labour market transitions: starting
dates of job search, transitions from unemployment to employment and even job-to-job and
position changes within a same firm. This is crucial for the application of the Timing of Events
method and also to capture career mobility even if it occurs within the firm (Groeneveld and
Hartog, 2004), ensuring that our study cannot be criticised on the grounds of underestimating
career mobility.
rare exceptions with respect to the literature on the job mobility of overeducated workers.
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The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we summarise the institutional
setting: the educational system and the youth labor market in Flanders. Section 5.3 describes
the dataset in further detail and provides some selected descriptive statistics. Section 5.4
discusses the econometric framework. Section 5.5 contains and discusses the estimation results.
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The Transition from Education to Work in Flanders: Insti-
tutional Context
As many other countries, Belgium has experienced substantial youth labour market problems
since the nineties (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000). In 2005, for instance, youth unemploy-
ment rate was three times that of adults, compared to an OECD average ratio of 2.3 (OECD,
2007).5 This high unemployment is particularly observed among new labour market entrants
(Gangl, 2003) while relatively few youngsters experience repeated unemployment spells once
they have found a job (Couppié and Mansuy, 2003). This poor performance at labour market
entry is partly related to the strict employment protection legislation (EPL) especially for
experienced white collar workers (OECD, 2007). Moreover, different from other countries,
school graduates in Belgium can claim unemployment benefits (UB) after a so-called “waiting
period” of nine months even if they did not acquire any work experience, and during the first
six months they may refuse job offers that do not match their acquired skills in school with-
out losing their entitlement to UB. However, in 2012 (beyond the observation period of the
empirical analysis), the Belgian government has tightened UB eligibility requirements. The
aforementioned waiting period has been prolonged to twelve months and the period during
which inadequate job offers could be refused has been shortened to three months. This pro-
vides incentives to search more intensively for jobs and to be less selective in job acceptance
behaviour, so to accept lower paid jobs and jobs for which one is overeducated. This may
therefore deteriorate the quality of the job match in the short run, but also in the long run if
these jobs are no stepping stone to adequate jobs, but a trap, a point that will be clarified in
our empirical analysis.
Apart from labour market regulations, also educational institutions matter for the transi-
tion from education to work. As most other regions and countries, Flanders has experienced a
substantial increase in the average level of education of the population over the past decades.6
5While there are substantial regional disparities in youth unemployment rates, with Flanders approaching
the OECD average, all regions face a similarly high youth versus adult unemployment ratio.
6In Belgium, educational policy is a regional competence. The Flemish educational landscape is described
in Chapter 4 of this thesis and in De Ro (2008).
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This is at least partly attributed to the increase in the age of compulsory education age to
18 years since the beginning of the eighties. At that age, full-time students without grade
retention have completed their higher secondary education (ISCED7 3 or 4). In Flanders,
full-time secondary education is organised along four tracks (general, technical, arts and vo-
cational) and lasts six years. Along with full-time education, also an apprenticeship track can
be followed from the age of 15 onwards. Those with a full-time higher secondary education
degree can afterwards choose to start a seventh specialisation grade or to enrol immediately,
without any entry exam, into higher education.8 Our data concern education registrations
prior to adoption of the Bologna process. Three kinds of higher degrees could be obtained:
(i) non-university of the “short type” (lasting 3 years), (ii) non-university of the “long type”
and (iii) university education of the “long type” (4 years or more). Since the Bologna reform,
programs of type (i) deliver Bachelor degrees (“Lower tertiary education”), while programs of
type (ii) and (iii) deliver Master degrees (“Higher tertiary education”).
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 The Sample of Analysis
Our analysis is based on data from a representative sample of two cohorts (birth years 1978 and
1980) of the SONAR survey conducted when respondents were 23 years old. These data are
supplemented with data from two follow-up surveys, completed at age 26 for the 1978 cohort
(response rate of 69%) and at age 29 for the 1980 cohort (response rate of 64%). Detailed
information regarding the sampling procedures and general summary statistics can be found
in SONAR (2000a) and SONAR (2005).
The SONAR data contain detailed information regarding school and labour market careers,
which makes them very suitable for our analysis. The level of acquired educational attainment
is measured at the moment that the youngster reports to have left formal education for the
first time. The labour market history is registered on a monthly basis. Each month is assigned
either to a working or to a non-working status,9 depending on the status in which one spends
most of the time. Further, if employed, both job-to-job transitions and position changes within
a job are recorded. Part-time jobs held during vocational education, student and vacation jobs
are defined to be part of the educational career.
The analysis targets workers who are unemployed right after graduation. We therefore
7ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education.
8Students from the vocational track are obliged to follow the seventh specialisation year to start tertiary
education. Candidates for studying medicine must first pass an entry exam.
9Not working is simply defined as a residual category, meaning neither in work nor in education.
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select individuals from the first moment they report to have started searching for a job since
graduation.10 Furthermore, in the benchmark model we only consider men, since career mo-
bility of women could be influenced by fertility and by their traditionally higher responsibility
in household activities, including child rearing. However, in a sensitivity analysis, we include
women in the analysis and conclude that our findings are actually hardly affected. Finally, we
exclude individuals who did not attain a degree of lower secondary education, because below
this level of education no one is overeducated by definition. After eliminating 114 observations
for which explanatory variables are missing, the final dataset contains 1,434 individuals. In
the sensitivity analysis that includes women the sample size increases to 2,956.
5.3.2 Measures of Overeducation
In the main analysis we define overeducation according to a job analysis approach. Each
position in the SONAR data has been coded following the Standard Occupation Classification
of Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2001). This classification groups jobs according to a set of
tasks to be executed and assigns to each occupation the educational level that is the most
appropriate. The following five functional levels are considered: less than lower secondary
(ISCED 0 or 1), lower secondary (ISCED 2), higher secondary (ISCED 3 or 4), lower tertiary
(ISCED 5–Bachelor) and higher tertiary (ISCED 5–Master) education. Hence, an individual is
considered to be overeducated if the functional level of his job exceeds his attained educational
level. Those with a functional level above their educational level, the so-called undereducated,
are considered to be adequately educated in this study. Considering this –small –group as a
separate category would further complicate the analysis. Moreover, undereducated individuals
generally earn at least as much and are at least as satisfied with their jobs as adequately
educated workers (Hartog, 2012; Verhaest and Omey, 2009). Hence, this justifies pooling
them with the adequately educated.
Apart from job analysis, several other measurement approaches, for instance based on
self-assessments, have been applied in the literature (see Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011, for
an overview). As any method, job analysis has some disadvantages. One often formulated
criticism is that, within a particular occupation, there may be substantial heterogeneity in
the tasks to be executed. However, since the SBC-classification is rather built upon tasks to
be executed than on occupational titles, this problem should be less severe for our measure.
Another criticism is that occupational or task classifications may be relatively inflexible to
upgrades in educational requirements. Subjective measures or, better, measures of “genuine”
10We do not retain individuals who started searching for jobs during their studies, since for these indivi-
duals we cannot identify the moment at which they found a job (if this occurs before graduation). Without
information on this moment the Timing of Events approach cannot be implemented.
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overeducation à la Chevalier (2003) may perform better in this respect in that they discard
“apparent” overeducation induced thereby in the job analysis methodology. On the other hand,
Hartog (2012) argues that, as a consequence of a social desirability bias, job requirements may
be overestimated in a self-assessment approach and the measure of overeducation therefore
biased downwards. From this discussion follows that there is no agreement among researchers
which measure of overeducation should be used. This justifies a sensitivity analysis.
Ideally, we would like to build a measure of “genuine” overeducation à la Chevalier (2003).
However, this is not possible, since this requires a response on a question that gauges the extent
to which the employee is utilising his skills and knowledge (Green and Zhu, 2010). The survey
does contain a statement11 to which the respondent should formulate the extent of agreement
that could be used as a proxy for this question. However, this statement was only asked with
respect to the first job occupied after graduation. To study the stepping stone hypothesis
we also need this information for all occupied jobs until the first that is adequate. As a
way out, we develop a “modified self-assessment method”, the method of which is explained
below, that is highly associated with the aforementioned measure of genuine overeducation.
According to the modified self-assessment measure 34% of the individuals in our sample are
overeducated in their first job after graduation compared to 33% according to the measure of
genuine overeducation. The measures classify 75% of the jobs in the same way.
The modified self-assessment is defined in the following way. The SONAR survey included
the following survey question regarding the first job: “What is (was), according to your own
opinion, the most appropriate educational level to execute your job?” As this question was
not included for subsequent jobs, we adopted the following construction procedure for our
alternative measure. First, relying on this information on first jobs, we computed the median
subjectively assessed required level within each occupation.12 Second, we assessed both for
the first job and for later jobs whether someone was overeducated or not by comparing his
educational level with this computed median of the subjectively required level.
According to the job analysis method within the retained sample 59% of the first jobs
were filled by overeducated workers. This is a substantial fraction. The fact that we choose
to focus on a more disadvantaged group of unemployed graduates, as to address our policy
question regarding youth unemployment, explains only part of this high fraction. The fraction
of overeducated workers drops to 49% if we retain only graduates who directly transit from
school to work. The high fraction seems therefore more related to the fact that we focus
11“I can show in my job what I am capable of doing”.
12For this derivation, we rely on the full SONAR dataset. Nevertheless, the number of self-assessments is
relatively low for some occupations at more detailed levels. Therefore, we base the computation on the most
detailed occupational level for which we have at least 20 observations available in our data. For a similar
procedure and discussion in the case of realised matches measures, see Verhaest and Omey (2010).
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on young graduates. van Smoorenburg and van der Velden (2000) and Giret and Hatot
(2001) report on the basis of job analysis approaches that 65% and 57% of the first jobs after
graduation were filled by overeducated workers, respectively in the Netherlands and France.
The degree of overeducation according to the modified self-assessment method is 34% and
is therefore much lower than according to the job analysis approach. This is again consistent
with the literature, in particular if we focus on the degree of overeducation in the first job
after graduation. Subjective measures of overeducation range for this group between 23% in
the Netherlands (van Smoorenburg and van der Velden, 2000), 40% in the UK (Dolton and
Vignoles, 2000) and 48% in France (Giret and Hatot, 2001). In a study analysing 14 countries,
Verhaest and van der Velden (2013) find that the median incidence of self-assessed overed-
ucation is 24% in the job that is occupied six months after graduating from university. For
Flanders, the region that we study here, 27% of these university graduates were overeducated
according to this method.
5.3.3 Descriptive Analysis
Based on the aforementioned information, we determine for each sampled individual the timing
at which he entered an adequate job or a job for which he was overeducated since he started
searching for a job. 788 young men (55% of the sample) find an adequate job (as measured
by job analysis) before the end of the observation period. 546 (38%) of these men directly
enter an adequate job (subsample ‘E’), while 242 (17%) are temporarily overeducated before
entering the adequate job (subsample ‘OE’). 549 young men (38%) enter a job for which
they are overeducated and do not subsequently transit to an adequate job before they are
right censored (subsample ‘OC’). 97 (7%) individuals are right censored before making any
transition (subsample ‘C’). The treatment group consists of those individuals who enter a job
for which they are overeducated; subsamples ‘OE’ and ‘OC’. The control group consists of the
same individuals until the moment they enter overeducation, plus those individuals who are
never overeducated; subsample ‘E’ (until entry in an adequate job) and ‘C’.
The right-censoring for 646 (= 549 + 97) of the observations occurs for one of the following
reasons: (i) end of the observation period and sample attrition (69% of the 646 right censored
observations); (ii) transition to a job for which the functional level is not registered (15%); (iii)
return to full time education (7%); (iv) transition to self-employment (7%) and (v) transition
to disability (2%).
Figure 5.1 reports non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the monthly transition into a
first job (irrespectively of whether one is overeducated for it or not) and into a first adequate
job (directly or indirectly, so after a temporary spell of overeducation). Overeducation is
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Figure 5.1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates: Duration Between Start Job Search and Entry in the
First (Adequate) Job (Job Analysis Method)
measured according to the job analysis method.
The corresponding figure if overeducation is measured by the self-assessment method is
reported in the Appendix of this chapter. The median duration until the transition to a first
job is 1 month and 29 months until a first transition to an adequate job. This illustrates
clearly that most young graduates very rapidly find a job at the start of their career, but also
that these graduates are overeducated for most of these jobs, since they enter an adequate job
at a much slower rate.
Figure 5.2 reports the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the number of months
that elapse after accepting a job for which one is overeducated until entry in an adequate
job. The median duration is as high as 110 months. As the median duration since the start
of job search until (direct or indirect) entry into an adequate job is only 29 months, this
means that most direct transitions into an adequate job occur much more rapidly than the
indirect transitions. However, since this comparison does not take selection on (un)observable
characteristics into account, we cannot conclude from this descriptive evidence, that accepting
a job for which one is overeducated is a trap rather than a stepping stone to an adequate job.
Overeducated individuals might have very low chances to enter adequate jobs anyway, so
that for these individuals it might have taken even longer before they would have found an
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Figure 5.2: Kaplan-Meier Estimates: Duration Between Start Overeducated Employment
and Entry in the First Adequate Job (Job Analysis Method)
adequate job if they would have rejected all jobs for which they were overeducated. The
Timing of Events method that we apply in this research takes the selection on (un)observable
characteristics into account and leads therefore to a better founded answer to our research
question.
Our analysis controls for a rich set of observed characteristics. A vector of time-constant
variables measured before the start of the job search spell captures the respondents’ (i) level
of educational attainment (highest attained level of education, number of uncertified years of
schooling beyond the highest level and an indicator of whether one obtained an additional
degree at the same level of education), (ii) school achievement (years of schooling delay at the
age of 16 and the grade obtained in tertiary education),13 (iii) school orientation in secondary
school (general, technical, vocational or arts), (iv) social background (mother’s and father’s
level of education and migrant status as captured by the nationality of the grandmother at
mother’s side), (v) birth cohort (1978 or 1980), (vi) work experience during school (internship
or student job) and (vii) timing of the start of job search (quarter in the year and number
of months since leaving school). In addition, the monthly Belgian youth unemployment rate
(ILO definition) is included as a time varying variable as to capture seasonal and business
13This information is not available at the level of secondary education.
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cycle variation. Details concerning some of these variables are outlined in the notes of Table
5.1.
In Table 5.1 we report descriptive statistics for these explanatory variables used in the
econometric analysis below. We separately report statistics on the four subsamples identified
in the beginning of this subsection: ‘E’, ‘OE’, ‘OC’ and ‘C’. Subsample C is relatively small
and contains the most educated graduates, since, as this group studies longer, the observation
period is systematically shorter for this group. On the other hand, it comprises more foreign
youth, which squares with the well documented negative correlation between foreign ethnicity
and labour market success. There are also fewer individuals in this subsample with any
internship or student work experience during their educational careers.
There is no clear pattern in the differences observed between the other three subsamples
except that in subsample E, which is restricted to youth with a direct transition to adequate
employment, the parent’s level of education and the number of years of schooling delay at
the age of 16 are on average higher and the youth unemployment rate is lower than in the
two other subsamples, containing youth who are (first) overeducated. It is a priori unclear in
which direction this could have biased the aforementioned descriptive evidence on our research
question.
5.4 Econometric Model
5.4.1 The Selection Problem
We aim at identifying whether an unemployed graduate can accelerate the transition to an ade-
quate job by temporarily accepting a job for which he is overeducated (“the treatment”) rather
than only accepting adequate jobs, or whether instead he might get trapped in overeducation
by following such a strategy. To answer this question, we face a double selection problem.
First, young men who are more likely to accept a job for which they are overeducated may
have a systematically lower (or higher) likelihood of finding an adequate job than those who
are less likely to be overeducated. If we ignore this ‘classic selection problem’, then a simple
comparison of the speed of transition to an adequate job between those who directly enter an
adequate and those who do so only after an intermediate period of employment as overedu-
cated worker, will underestimate (overestimate) the treatment effect on this speed. Second,
even if there is no systematic relationship between the unobserved determinants of treatment
and entry in an adequate job, then we are still confronted with a “dynamic selection problem”.
Since the treatment does not occur at the start of the unemployment spell, treatment can only
occur for youth who did not find an adequate job beforehand. Consequently, the treatment
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effect is measured for a population that has less chances of finding an adequate job than if
it was measured at the start of the unemployment spell. This biases the treatment effect
towards zero because the treatment effect is confounded with the unobserved lower chances
of finding adequate employment in this population (Lancaster, 1990). The Timing of Events
method proposed by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) takes this double selection problem
into account and identifies therefore the true causal impact of a transition to overeducation
on the speed of transition to an adequate job. We first write down the econometric model and
then discuss why we believe that the main identifying assumptions of the Timing of Events
method are satisfied.
5.4.2 The Econometric Model
In the following, the index o indicates overeducation and the index e refers to adequate employ-
ment. The transitions of interest into overeducation and adequate employment are represented
by two random latent durations: To and Te, with to and te denoting their realisations. We
assume that all individual differences in the joint distribution of both durations can be char-
acterised by explanatory variables X and V . X denotes the observed variables as described
in Section 5.3.3 with realisation x.14 V , on the other hand, is unobservable to the researcher
and transition-specific. More concretely, V is a vector (Ve, Vo) with realisation (ve, vo). X and
V are assumed to be independently distributed (see Section 5.4.3 for further discussion).
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) assume that Te and To are independent conditionally on
X and V , so that the joint distribution of (To, Te)|(X,V ) can be written as the product of the
distributions of Te|(X,Ve) and To|(X,Vo) which are in turn completely determined by their
hazard rates θe(t|to, x, Vo) and θo(t|x, Vo), where t is the elapsed job search duration. These
hazard rates are then specified according to the following Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH)
form: ln θo(t|x, Vo) = lnλo(t) + x′βo + Vo,ln θe(t|to, x, Ve) = lnλe(t) + x′βe + δ(t|to, x)I(t > to) + Ve, (5.4.1)
where I(.) is an indicator function, which is 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise, and
δ(t|to, x) is the treatment effect of overeducation on the speed of transition to an adequate
job.15 Observe that it can be any function of t, to and x, but cannot depend on any unobserved
factor.
In the benchmark model we allow the treatment effect to depend on both the duration
14To avoid cumbersome notation, we ignore that youth unemployment rate is a time-varying covariate.
15Note that in this specification we do not model transitions from a job for which one is overeducated back
to unemployment. If this happens, they remain at risk for a transition to adequate employment as members
of the “treated” group.
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since entry in overeducation (t− to) and on the elapsed unemployment duration until entry in
overeducated employment to. The first factor (t− to) aims at capturing a gradually decreasing
locking-in effect and/or steadily growing investment effect. Locking-in may reflect investment
in specific human capital (Pissarides, 1994), cognitive decline (de Grip et al., 2008), habitua-
tion (Verhaest and Omey, 2009) or reduced job-search effort on-the-job (Holzer, 1987). The
investment effect reflects the gradually increasing promotion opportunities with work experi-
ence, as described in the career mobility theory (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). The dependence
on the elapsed unemployment duration, on the other hand, aims at testing whether long-term
unemployed benefit more from a stepping stone effect (if any) than short-term unemployed,
since accepting any job might reduce the scarring effects of long-term unemployment. We
include quadratic terms to allow for nonlinearity of these effects over time.
δ(t|to) = δ0 + δ1(t− to) + δ2(t− to)2 + δ3to + δ4(to)2. (5.4.2)
In Section 5.5.2, in which we report a number of sensitivity analyses, we discuss some
extensions in which the treatment effect depends on some other explanatory variables.
λo(t) and λe(t) represent the baseline hazard functions for transitions into overeducation
and adequate employment. The hazard rate is said to be duration dependent if these functions
are time-variant. Positive (negative) duration dependence in the transition into overeduca-
tion, respectively adequate employment, means that λo(t), respectively λe(t), are increasing
(decreasing) in t. We follow the literature by specifying these baseline hazards as piecewise
constant: lnλo(t) = αom,lnλe(t) = αem, for t ∈ [tm−1, tm), (5.4.3)
where m is an indicator of the time interval and where in the application m ≤ 8 and t0 = 0,
t1 = 1, t2 = 2, t3 = 3, t4 = 4, t5 = 6, t6 = 9, t7 = 18 and t8 = +∞.
We estimate the benchmark model by Maximum Likelihood. We distinguish between four
types of likelihood contributions, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution,
depending on the labour market history of the youth described in Section 5.3.3; lc(V ), le(V ),
loc(V ) and loe(V ). We refer to the working paper version of this chapter for the derivation
of these conditional contributions taking the time-grouped nature of the data into account
(Baert et al., 2012).
To obtain the unconditional likelihood contributions, we integrate the four conditional
contributions over the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We follow Heckman and Singer
(1984) and assume that (ve, vo) is randomly drawn from a discrete distribution with a finite
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and a priori unknown number K of points of support. Since we include a constant term in X,
ve1 and vo1 are normalised to 0. The probabilities associated to these points of support are
specified as logistic transforms:
pk =
exp(γk)∑K
j=1 exp(γj)
, with k = 1, 2, . . . ,K; γ1 = 0. (5.4.4)
Hence, the likelihood contribution for individual i in subsample n ∈ {c, e, oc, oe} uncondi-
tional on unobserved heterogeneity is:
lni =
K∑
k=1
pk · ln(vek, vok), with n ∈ {c, e, oc, oe}. (5.4.5)
We can then write the unconditional log-likelihood as the sum of the unconditional indivi-
dual log-likelihood contributions:
L =
N∑
i=1
[Jci ln(lci) + Jei ln(lei) + Joci ln(loci) + Joei ln(loei)], (5.4.6)
where Jni equals 1 if lni is the contribution of individual i to the likelihood and Jni equals
0 otherwise. We maximise this log-likelihood according to the procedure described in Gaure
et al. (2007). In particular, we increase the number of points of support until the likelihood
function does not show any improvement and subsequently select the model that minimises the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to reduce the risk of bias induced by an over-parameterised
model.
5.4.3 Identification
Unlike some other methods that aim at resolving the selection problem, the Timing of Events
method does not require any exclusion restrictions. All observed determinants may affect both
the transition to overeducation (the treatment) and the transition to an adequate job (the
outcome of interest). However, the method requires another set of identifying assumptions
(Abbring and van den Berg, 2003) of which we discuss the credibility of the four most important
ones.
Firstly, it is essential that the moment at which employment is entered may not be antici-
pated. Since the timing of job offers cannot be anticipated and neither the employer nor the
job searcher has in general an interest to postpone hiring once the hiring decision is taken,
we believe that the time lag between the moment at which the job was offered and the mo-
ment at which the job is entered, is relatively short, so that the no-anticipation assumption
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is approximately satisfied. The fact that we observe many transitions to a job in the first few
months since individuals started job search (see Figure 5.1) demonstrates that in many cases
individuals enter employment shortly after they have been offered a job, suggesting that bias
induced by anticipation is not so important. Note that by ignoring anticipation we tend to
overestimate the treatment effect, or stated otherwise in case of a negative treatment effect:
the entrapment in overeducation might be even larger than what our estimates suggest. This
occurs because those who anticipate job entry have during this period a lower propensity of
entering a job and have incorrectly been assigned to the control group, so those who are still
searching for a job. Assigning these individuals during that period to the treatment group
will therefore decrease the transition rate to an adequate job of the treated and increase the
transition rate of the control group. However, we cannot correct for this bias, since we do not
observe the timing of job offers.
Secondly, observed and unobserved determinants affect the transition rates to overeduca-
tion and adequate employment of the untreated individuals proportionally. This is the so
called Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) assumption. The Monte Carlo analysis of Gaure
et al. (2007), specially designed to evaluate the reliability of the Timing of Events Method
of Abbring and van den Berg (2003), has shown that this assumption is crucial, at least if
only time constant explanatory variables are available.16 We are concerned that the MPH as-
sumption may not be satisfied across levels of educational attainment and that this therefore
may be a source of bias. On the one hand, one may argue that the highest educated indi-
viduals have more opportunities to be overeducated, simply because accepting any job with
requirements below the highest level of educational attainment leads to overeducation. By
contrast, individuals with a lower secondary degree are only overeducated if they accept a job
that does not require any educational attainment. On the other hand, there is the evidence on
job polarisation indicating that technological change has resulted in a substantial drop in the
number of medium-skilled jobs over the past decades (Goos et al., 2009). Consequently, the
medium educated individuals are more likely overeducated than the lower or higher educated.
We therefore perform a sensitivity analysis in which we estimate our model separately for
each level of educational attainment, relaxing thereby the proportionality assumption in this
dimension. Since our findings are robust to this sensitivity analysis, we are convinced that
the MPH assumption is reasonable in this application.
Thirdly, X and V should be independently distributed. This is a strong assumption, but
it can be relaxed if one is willing to assume that the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on
x can be written as vk exp(xµk) (for k = e, o), where Vk is then independently distributed
16Note that despite the youth unemployment rate is a time-varying explanatory variable, it is of no use for
identification, since its variation is the same across all observations in the sample.
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from X and where µk is some unknown parameter vector. In this case it is not difficult to see
that the treatment effect is still consistently estimated, but that the parameters associated
to the covariates of x can no longer be given a structural interpretation. This is very similar
to widely used extension of the random effect probit model as established by Chamberlain
(1980). See Cockx et al. (2013) for further discussion.
Finally, based on Monte Carlo analysis Baker and Melino (2000) have shown that Maximum
Likelihood estimates of a flexible specification of both the baseline hazard and the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution in single spell duration models tend to be biased towards finding
an excessively dispersed distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, especially if the sample size
is small, as it is in our case. However, these researchers show that these biases can essentially
be eliminated by selecting the model on the basis of a criterion that penalises the model with
too many points of support. Gaure et al. (2007) arrive at very similar conclusions and propose
to use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to select the appropriate model. We therefore
follow the latter procedure to select the appropriate model. Moreover, to ascertain that the
small sample size does not bias our findings, we show that our findings are robust to sensitivity
analyses in which we (i) increase the sample size (by integrating women in the analysis); (ii)
restrict the specification of the baseline hazard, since this is shown to reduce the bias (Baker
and Melino, 2000); and (iii) reduce the number of explanatory variables.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main Results
In this subsection we first discuss the main results. In a subsequent subsection we report
a number of sensitivity analyses. In the main text we focus on the treatment effects. The
complete estimation results, including those that do not correct for selection on unobservables,
can be found in the working paper version of this chapter (Baert et al., 2012).
On the basis of the AIC we retain for the benchmark specification of the treatment effect
the model with three heterogeneity types. However, the probability assigned to one of the
points of support is small (4%), so that the estimates are not very different from a model with
two points of support.
The main estimation results of the benchmark model are summarised in Table 5.2. First,
the point estimate for δ0, indicating the treatment effect in the first month of overeducation,
is very negative and highly statistically significant. In the full sample the monthly transition
rate into adequate employment drops by about 98%17 for this month. Second, the point
170.98 = 1− exp(−4.080).
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Table 5.2: Results of the Benchmark Model
Treatment effect
Constant: δ0 −4.080∗∗∗ (0.354)
Interaction with (t− to): δ1 −0.014 (0.012)
Interaction with (t− to)2: δ2 × 100 0.011 (0.011)
Interaction with to: δ3 0.232∗∗∗ (0.088)
Interaction with (to)2: δ4 −0.004 (0.004)
Log-likelihood -4594.661
AIC 9331.321
Parameters 71
Observations 1434
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. Standard errors in parentheses.
estimates for δ1 and δ2, capturing the effect heterogeneity in the elapsed duration since inflow
into a job for which one is overeducated, are not statistically significant. Third, by contrast,
δ3 is highly significant. This means that young men delay the transition to an adequate job
by accepting jobs for which they are overeducated more in case they do this at the start of
the unemployment spell rather than later on. The magnitude of this adverse effect declines
with unemployment duration and, if we ignore the insignificant second order term (δ4), it
becomes even positive beyond an unemployment duration of 17.6 months.18 This would be an
important finding, since it would mean that only short-term unemployed graduates get trapped
in overeducation. Long-term unemployed would accelerate the transition to an adequate job
by temporarily accepting a job for which they are overeducated. However, this conclusion
crucially hinges on ignoring the insignificant second order term δ4. If we take it into account,
the treatment effect attains a maximum at 29 months19 and decreases again thereafter. At
this maximum the transition rate to an adequate job after entry in overeducation is still
51%20 below what it would have been if one would have only accepted adequate jobs. In the
sensitivity analysis below, we will argue that this is the correct interpretation of our findings.
The transition to overeducation is thus never a stepping stone, but always a trap.
In order to get some sense of the meaning of the size of the treatment effect, we calculate
for the treated group, so for all men who are overeducated in the first job that they enter,
the first quartile and median duration until transition in an adequate job, both in the case
of treatment and in the counterfactual of no treatment. In this counterfactual we impose
that these individuals do not enter any job for which they are overeducated (we set the
1817.6 = 4.08/0.232.
1929 = 0.232/(2 · 0.004).
20−4.08 + 0.232 · 29− 0.004 · 292 = −0.716 and 1− exp(−0.716) = 0.51.
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transition rate to zero, so θo(t|x, Vo) = 0, but instead only transit directly to adequate jobs
at the estimated transition intensity (without treatment, so δ(t|to, x) = 0). The median (first
quartile) duration until a transition in an adequate job in case of treatment is 115.8 (39.4)
months compared to 3.0 (1.1) months in the counterfactual. These figures reconfirm that
if unemployed graduates aim at entering a job for which they have the appropriate level of
education, they should not accept a job for which they are overeducated.
We briefly discuss some secondary results. Recall, however, that a structural interpretation
of the coefficients for the observed covariates is hazardous given the potential dependence
between X and V .21 We find that the employment gap between foreign and native youth
is significantly larger for the transition into jobs for which one is overeducated than for the
transition into adequate jobs. In addition we get a stable positive effect of an honours degree
in tertiary education on the transition to adequate employment. Conducting any student
work during education affects the transition to overeducation and adequate employment with
a similar magnitude.
The fact that the high educated ceteris paribus less rapidly find a job than the lower edu-
cated is most likely a consequence of only retaining in the sample young men who started
job search after leaving education: this group is a negatively selected subsample of the higher
educated. One might argue that this might cause non-proportionality of the unobserved deter-
minants of the transitions from unemployment, since for lower levels of education this negative
selection is less an issue because they are less likely to find a job immediately after leaving
education. Conditional on the level of educational attainment, one might therefore expect
higher V ’s for the lower educated than for the higher educated. However, we will investigate
this point in the sensitivity analysis reported in the next subsection and demonstrate that this
concern is not an issue for our data.
5.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In Table 5.3 we report some robustness checks of our main result that young men get trapped
in jobs for which they are overeducated. First, we test the robustness of our results to the
alternative measure of overeducation as defined in Section 5.3.2. This alternative measure
results in a rearrangement of the sample of graduates over the four subsamples: subsamples
‘C’, ‘E’, ‘OC’ and ‘OE’ comprise 97, 886, 267 and 184 individuals respectively. As explained in
Section 5.3.2, this alternative measure is closely related to a measure of genuine overeducation.
If so, Chevalier (2003) argues that the likelihood of promotion should increase. The estimated
negative treatment effects are indeed somewhat less important. However, they do not reverse
21See the discussion of the identifying assumptions in Section 5.4.3.
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the main conclusions of the benchmark model. For the treated group median (first quartile)
duration until a transition in an adequate job in case of treatment is 85.7 (17.3) months
compared to 1.4 (1.0) months in the counterfactual of no treatment. For the benchmark model
these numbers were 115.8 (39.4) months if treated and 3.0 (1.1) months in the counterfactual.
The alternative measure leads to two main differences compared to the benchmark model.
A first one is that the quadratic interaction term with unemployment duration (δ4) is now
very significantly different from zero. This provides a first confirmation that we should take
this interaction term into account when interpreting the results. A second main difference is
the significance of δ1 and δ2, the interactions with the time since entry in a job for which one
is overeducated (t − to): the entrapment effect is (slightly) more pronounced during the first
70 months.
In a second sensitivity analysis we re-estimate our model separately on the four subsamples
defined according to their highest attained level of education.22 We do so because we are
concerned that the MPH assumption might fail across levels of educational attainment (see
our discussion of identifying assumption 2 in Section 5.4.3 as well as our discussion at the end
of the previous subsection). However, panels B1 until B4 indicate that the estimates of the
treatment effects are not different across these subgroups. For all educational levels, accepting
a job for which one is overeducated prolongs the transition to an adequate job. Moreover, δ1
and δ2 are insignificant for all subsamples. As in the pooled analysis, δ3 is large and positive,
but only significantly for the two lowest levels of education. Finally, δ4 is systematically
negative and even significantly (at the 10% level) for graduates with a secondary education.
If this quadratic term is taken into account, the treatment effect remains negative for all
possible unemployment durations. These findings are therefore reassuring and consistent with
the main findings reported in Section 5.5.1.
In a third sensitivity test we introduce more heterogeneity in the treatment effect. On
the one hand it could be argued that in a booming economy it would be easier to promote
from overeducation to an adequate job. On the other hand we want to capture the difference
in treatment effects according to differences in skills, since one may argue that, within each
educational level, the higher skilled transit faster to an adequate job. This would be evidence
of promotion induced by genuine overeducation, since the more skilled are more likely to be
22For the models reported in panels B1 and B3 the lowest AIC was obtained with two points of support,
while for the model reported in panel B2 three points of support were required. For the model reported in
panel B4 one point of support was optimal. This is probably due to the relatively small number of observations
in this sample. Since the findings of this model are quite different from the models accounting for heterogeneity
and since among the models that account for heterogeneity the one with 3 points of support yields the lowest
AIC, we choose to report the parameter estimates of the latter model rather than those of the model that
disregards unobserved heterogeneity.
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genuinely overeducated and the latter are more likely to promote (see the discussion in Section
5.1). To this end, we further include interactions with the unemployment rate and the years
of schooling delay at the age of 16. Panel C indicates that neither of the two additional
interaction effects is statistically significant.
In a fourth set of sensitivity analyses, we aim at addressing the critique that we might fail
to identify the selection on unobservables as a consequence of a too small sample size and the
relatively large number of estimated parameters. First, we enlarge our sample by including
women. Recall that we did not include women in the benchmark analysis, since we were
concerned that, as a consequence of fertility considerations and for their traditionally higher
responsibility in household activities, including child rearing, women would more likely get
trapped in jobs for which they are overeducated. This sensitivity analysis reveals, however,
that this concern was void. The findings of this analysis are reported in Panel D of Table 5.3.
The interaction of the treatment effect with female gender is very small (-0.027) and insignif-
icantly different from zero. The constant term is slightly lower, implying that by accepting
a job for which one is overeducated in the first month of unemployment, the transition rate
decreases by 97%23 instead of by 98% in the benchmark model. Different from the benchmark
model, the quadratic term of the interaction effect of the treatment with the unemployment
duration at the start of the spell of overeducation (t2o) is now significantly negative. This is
a further confirmation that in the benchmark model the coefficient of this quadratic term is
insignificant as a consequence of lack of precision and not because it is truly zero.
We further investigate the claim that selection on unobservables might not be well identi-
fied as a consequence of overfitting, by (i) reducing in the benchmark model the number of
explanatory variables24 and by (ii) reducing the number of duration intervals in the baseline
hazard.25 However, this influences the findings only negligibly.26
5.5.3 Discussion
The finding that overeducation strongly retards the transition to adequate employment clearly
challenges Sicherman and Galors’ (1990) career mobility thesis. This adds to the more indirect
evidence provided by other researchers who studied upward mobility of overeducated indivi-
duals, and who concluded that many individuals remain overeducated for very long periods
230.97 = 1− exp(−3.445).
24We exclude the following variables: “additional successful years at school after highest attained level of
education”, “additional degree at highest attained level of education”, “tertiary education: grade”, “years of
schooling delay (at age of 16)”, “year of birth”, “any internship during education” and “months between leaving
school and starting job search”.
25We reduce the number of duration intervals from eight to four: t0 = 0, t1 = 6, t2 = 18 and t3 = +∞.
26These results are not reported, but are available upon request.
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(see Section 5.1). It also confirms the conclusions of studies that test this theory in an indirect
way by investigating the relationship between overeducation and training participation or skill
acquisition. These studies in general find that overeducated workers participate less often in
training and acquire less additional skills than adequately educated workers with a similar
educational background (Robst, 1995; van Smoorenburg and van der Velden, 2000; Verhaest
and Omey, 2013). Finally, it is also consistent with the finding that overeducated workers ex-
perience no more wage growth than adequately educated workers (Büchel and Mertens, 2004;
Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009).
An often-formulated criticism on the literature of overeducation is that many workers are
only “apparently overeducated” (Chevalier, 2003; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Green and Zhu,
2010), that is because of occupational upgrading and/or lower quality of human capital, they
are formally overeducated but not overskilled. Hence, for these individuals, making a transi-
tion to a job for which they are formally adequately educated may simply be not an option.
While this might be true for some of the individuals, we have no indications that this drives
our results. Firstly, our results were largely similar if based on an adapted subjective overed-
ucation measure which, as argued in Section 5.3.2, is a good proxy of genuine overeducation.
Secondly, by focusing our analysis on young graduates we do not face the problem that work
experience confounds the measure of overeducation. This reduces the likelihood of mismea-
suring overeducation. Thirdly, we accounted for selection on unobservables, implying that
our basic estimates are likely reflecting the true causal effect of overeducation and not just
unobserved ability (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). Fourthly, additional estimates did not
deliver indications of heterogeneous effects depending on skill level as measured by the years
of schooling delay. Finally, since a job change in our data is defined to be a change either
in employer or in the tasks to be executed with the same employer, we account for possible
changes in skill requirements due to task upgrading and internal promotions.
Accounting for selection on unobservables in the analysis of the mobility behaviour of
overeducated workers is an important contribution of this study. Remarkably, we found that
the entrapment effect is underestimated if such selection is assumed to be absent. Those with
favourable unobserved characteristics for a transition to an adequate job are thus also more
likely to make the transition to a job for which they are overeducated. This suggests that
selection on unobservables is mainly driven by other factors than differences in unobserved
ability. A reasonable explanation is that highly motivated job seekers have a higher search
intensity, resulting in higher transition rates for both types of jobs, and that more able youth is
not more selective than less able youth in their job search and acceptance behaviour. Motivated
youth seems to be willing to accept any job, which according to our findings may have a long-
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lasting negative impact on the quality of the job match. We return to this point at the end
of this section where we discuss policy implications.
If overeducation is not a stepping stone to an adequate job, one may wonder why. What
explains the strong entrapment effect immediately after entry into overeducation? And why
does this entrapment effect not decrease with job tenure? An explanation for the strong initial
entrapment effect may be that, by accepting a position that does not match with one’s level of
educational attainment, the worker may transmit a negative signal to prospective employers
(McCormick, 1990). Furthermore, it may be difficult to maintain the same job search intensity
on-the-job than when one is unemployed (Holzer, 1987). If so, this may also reduce the
incentive for employers to create vacancies for adequately matched jobs and thereby reinforce
the low transition rate to an adequate job (Dolado et al., 2009).27 Furthermore, the entrapment
effect might not decrease with job tenure as a consequence of investments in specific human
capital (Pissarides, 1994), cognitive decline (de Grip et al., 2008), or habituation (Verhaest
and Omey, 2009).
Another interpretation of the strong entrapment effect may be that it reflects that vacancies
for adequate positions are cyclically or structurally lacking. However, we have no indications
that this is the dominant explanation. First, in our sample entry in the labour market is
spread out over a relatively long period (from 1996 to 2006) covering both years of economic
upturn and downturn. Second, the median search duration until an adequate job, under the
counterfactual that no one enters overeducation, is simulated to be only three months on
the basis of our benchmark model (see Section 5.5.1). This does not fit with a structural
mismatch between the qualifications of the graduates and those needed by the labour market.
Third, we found that the entrapment effect is not significantly related to the unemployment
rate. Neither did we find that the entrapment effect is significantly higher for the medium
educated, who may be affected by job polarisation.
These findings may follow from the fact that the relationship between labour demand and
the entrapment effect is theoretically less clear than it may seem. While a lack of vacant
adequate positions is likely to result in longer spells of overeducation, it will also decrease the
likelihood of finding an adequate position for the unemployed. Of course, it is possible that
some of the previously mentioned mechanisms underlying the entrapment effect (such as via
job search intensity or signalling) depend on the availability of jobs, but it is a priori unclear
in which direction this will affect the entrapment effect. For instance, the average quality of
overeducated workers will be higher in a slack labour market so that negative signalling effects
27The low likelihood of finding an adequate position may also be explained by an efficiency wage type of
argument (Skott, 2006).
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resulting from overeducation may then be lower.
Given the strong entrapment effect of overeducation, we need to understand why individuals
are prepared to accept such jobs. One reason can be that the financial and psychological
costs of overeducation are, although significant, still relatively modest in comparison to those
of being unemployed (Verhaest and Omey, 2009). Albrecht and Vroman (2002) developed
a matching model in which they show that it may be optimal for skilled workers to accept
unskilled jobs as long as the productivity differences between skilled and unskilled jobs are not
too large. In that case, the expected earning gains resulting from future adequate employment
no longer outweighs the income loss resulting from unemployment. This argument applies
especially for individuals who are already long-term unemployed, since, if these individuals
reject job offers for which they are overeducated, they risk remaining unemployed even longer
as a consequence of the negative duration dependence in the exit rate from unemployment.
For instance, based on the benchmark model reported in Table 5.2, we predict that the median
remaining unemployment duration of a young graduate who is already one year unemployed
and who does not accept jobs for which he is overeducated is 11.9 months. Moreover, this cost
in terms of expected remaining unemployment duration continues to increase with elapsed
unemployment duration.
The preceding argument does not hold, however, for short-term unemployed graduates.
For instance, for a young graduate who is just one month unemployed and who follows the
aforementioned job search strategy the median remaining unemployment duration is only 1.8
months. So, in this case there should be another explanation why young graduates accept jobs
for which they are overeducated. One explanation is that individuals are credit constrained.
Since school-leavers are only entitled to unemployment benefits after nine months of regis-
tered unemployment, this is a natural explanation, especially if they are no longer financially
dependent on their parents’ income. 15% of the individuals in the sample retained for the
analysis left the parental home at the moment at which they started job search. Furthermore,
after expiration of this waiting period, the benefit level is low. For singles and cohabiting
individuals it is not very different from the means-tested social assistance benefit level.28
Further reasons why short-or long-term unemployed graduates may accept jobs for which
they are overeducated are that (i) they may be insufficiently informed about the long-term cost
of doing so or (ii) that they are too impatient, that is they display “hyperbolic” time preferences
(see, e.g., Frederick et al., 2002; DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005; Fang and Silverman, 2009).
28Depending on factors such as cohabitation status and number of children, the unemployment benefit is
only 4 –24% higher than the social assistance benefit level (source: National Employment Office and Federal
Public Service for Social Integration of the Belgian government). In addition, in contrast to beneficiaries of
social assistance, the unemployed are usually not entitled to reduced rates of telecommunication, electricity,
heating and public transport.
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Impatient individuals with so called hyperbolic preferences tend to choose activities with
immediate rewards and delayed costs (accepting a job for which one is overeducated) to those
with immediate costs and delayed rewards (continuing search for an adequate job). Which of
all these explanations apply, is matter for future research.
These findings have policy implications. Since overeducation is not a stepping stone to
an adequate job, it may pay for young graduates to search for jobs selectively and therefore
reject jobs for which they are overeducated.29 This suggests that policy makers should take
care in not providing incentives to young unemployed graduates to accept any job too early
in the unemployment spell, since this may induce persistent mismatch between the indivi-
duals’ qualifications and those required on the job. This is not only costly for the individual
concerned, but also for society as a whole. Consequently, the short-term benefits in terms of
job transitions that can be induced by a tightening of entitlement conditions to UB, such as
the Belgian government implemented in 2012 (see Section 5.2), must be carefully traded-off
against the long-term costs in terms of qualification mismatch in the job, especially if this
tightening targets the short-term unemployed for whom the costs of waiting for an adequate
job are not yet counterbalanced by the costs of the risk of not finding any job at all. Besides,
the form of the policy intervention that aims at preventing that unemployed graduates accept
to early jobs for which they are overeducated depends on the reason for which they accept
these jobs. If the reason is related to a credit constraint, then the policy should be aimed at
lifting this constraint. By contrast, if it is lack of information or impatience that is the main
explanation, guidance in the job acceptance behaviour may be more appropriate.
5.6 Conclusions
In this research project we investigated whether overeducation at the start of the career speeds
up the transition to adequate employment. Contrary to many other contributions in this re-
search area, we handled selection on both observables and unobservables. For this, we applied
the Timing of Events approach. Our findings indicate that, even for long-term unemployed
young people, accepting a job for which one is overeducated substantially retards the transi-
tion to an adequate job. By accepting a job for which one is overeducated rather than only
accepting adequate job matches, monthly transition rates into adequate employment fall by
51–98%, depending on the elapsed unemployment duration. This result was found to be robust
29We implicitly assume that workers earn more in adequate jobs than in jobs for which they are overeducated.
Although Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) challenge this, since many studies giving evidence for lower wages for
the overeducated do not properly account for selection bias and measurement error issues, there are a couple
of more recent studies that attempt to address this criticism and still arrive at the same conclusion (see, e.g.,
Dolton and Silles, 2008; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009; Verhaest and Omey, 2012).
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against various sensitivity checks including the comparison of our results with respect to two
measures of overeducation. We argued that this entrapment effect is likely to be explained by
a combination of factors, such as a negative signal of overeducation, reduced job search inten-
sity, job-specific human capital investments, cognitive decline and habituation. Furthermore,
for long-term unemployed graduates the substantial costs entailed by the expected duration
of the remaining unemployment spell and for short-term unemployed credit constraints, lack
of information or impatience may explain why graduates nevertheless choose for such jobs.
From a policy point of view, these results imply that policy makers should, especially early
in the unemployment spell, carefully trade-off the benefits and costs of forcing young graduates
to accept any job, so ignoring whether the educational requirement of this job matches the
qualifications of these graduates, since this may lead to a persistent qualification mismatch in
the job. This is not only costly for the individual concerned, but also for society as a whole.
5.7 Appendix: Additional Figures
Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier Estimates: Duration Between Start Job Search and Entry in the
First (Adequate) job (Modified Self-Assessment Method)
6
General Conclusions
At the end of this PhD thesis we wrap up with three key results and their policy implications
(“to take away for policy makers”) and three key directions for future research (“to take away
for researchers”). A first key result of this thesis is that ethnicity, even after controlling for
socio-economic background characteristics, affects success in school and first labour market
transitions in Flanders. Chapter 2 showed that a small pure ethnic gap exists in educatio-
nal attainment if school delays are neglected. This pure ethnic gap becomes substantial if
grade retention is taken into account. This is an important finding, since it means that eth-
nic schooling gaps, in particular gaps in schooling delay, cannot be eliminated by focussing
policy to disadvantaged groups irrespectively of their ethnic background. Moreover, Chapter
2 revealed that the pure ethnic gap in the school-to-work transition is very important. In
addition, in Chapter 3 it was shown that this pure ethnic gap in the labour market is to
a large extent induced by ethnic discrimination in the Flemish youth labour market. This
discrimination is not only unacceptable from an ethical perspective, but has also important
economic consequences. Given the significant challenges due to an ageing population that
face the Belgian labour market, it is important to call on all groups of the population so that
there is no room for the (partial) exclusion of minority groups. The legal framework to punish
discrimination is available in Belgium, so that the main benefit seems to lie in a more vigorous
detection of discrimination. One could investigate whether this could not happen based on a
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systematic application of the experimental method we have reported in Chapter 3. On the
other hand, the latter chapter indicates that employers discriminate less if they have to at-
tract workers for occupations for which labour market tightness is high. Our results therefore
suggest advising minorities to apply for jobs that are difficult to fill. However, such a policy
advice may only work to the extent the competencies of minorities match the requirements for
these jobs and that the tightness in the labour market is partly a consequence of minorities not
being informed about the occupations for which employers have difficulties in filling vacancies.
Moreover, the benefit of applying for bottleneck professions in terms of hiring chances should
be weighed against the potential losses induced by the particular working conditions in these
occupations.1
A second key result is that grade retention in school has important short- and long-term
consequences. In contrast to most of the previous empirical contributions, we find that grade
retention has a positive impact on the next evaluation and can permanently affect subsequent
educational achievements. The direction of the permanent effect is “essentially” heterogeneous:
while from a long-term perspective more able students are penalised by retention, less able
students permanently benefit from it in terms of later success rates. Given these consequences
of grade retention and given the aforementioned pure ethnic gaps in grade retention, we
believe that decision makers in school should use this instrument with care. Furthermore, we
conclude that in the design of the optimal retention policy, the interaction between retention
and students’ abilities should be taken into account.
A third key result is that, for unemployed school-leavers, accepting a job for which one is
overeducated substantially delays the transition to a first adequate job. Since overeducation
is not a stepping stone to an adequate job, it may pay for young graduates to search for
jobs selectively and therefore reject jobs for which they are overeducated. In Chapter 5 we
therefore argued that policy makers should take care in not providing incentives to young
unemployed graduates to accept any job too early in the unemployment spell, since this
may induce persistent mismatch between the acquired qualifications and those required in
the job. This is not only costly for the young graduates, but also for society as a whole.
Consequently, the short-term benefits in terms of job transitions that can be induced by a
tightening of entitlement conditions to unemployment benefits, such as the Belgian government
implemented in 2012, must be carefully traded-off against the long-term costs in terms of
qualification mismatch in the job. This is especially the case if this tightening targets the short-
term unemployed for whom the costs of waiting for an adequate job are not yet counterbalanced
by the costs of the risk of not finding any job at all.
1According to VDAB (2009b), besides the relatively size of the pool of adequately skilled workers and the
wage level, the bottleneck status of an occupation is driven by its working conditions.
127
We now briefly review some directions for future research. First, in order to develop
adequate policy action to tackle pure ethnic gaps in educational attainment one should identify
the exact mechanisms behind these gaps. In Chapter 2 we discussed the most important
candidates in this respect among which discrimination, ethnic differences in preferences and
expectations and class and school segregation of migrants. However, our model is not capable
to identify their relative importance. Therefore, more research is needed, potentially in other
fields, to uncover the relative importance of these mechanisms in explaining ethnic gaps in
educational attainment in Flanders and abroad. We hope that our proposed methodology, by
which we can identify the instants at which these gaps emerge, can be a useful tool to target
this research on the key schooling years. Second, Chapter 2 innovated by explaining observed
ethnic gaps not only in educational attainment but also in the time it takes to realise this
attainment. As mentioned before, by doing this it is found that important pure ethnic gaps
exist in grade retention. We suggest that similar pure ethnic gaps might arise with respect to
other measures of educational achievement within a particular level of educational attainment,
such as scores on standardised tests of achievement. Identifying these gaps would be of great
relevance in view of policy action aimed at realising equal opportunities in education. Third,
we believe the important empirical evidence for a negative relationship between labour market
discrimination and labour market tightness in Flanders we presented in Chapter 3 should be
complemented with evidence from other countries. To this end, one could re-inspect the data
gathered in similar large scale field experiments on ethnic discrimination with respect to this
relationship.
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